fix(rpc): bind io_stream sessions to creator to prevent terminal/fm hijack

createTerminal and createFM correctly check server ownership before
issuing a stream UUID, but terminalStream and fmStream only verified
that the UUID existed. Any authenticated user holding a valid stream
UUID could attach to it, gaining the original creator's live shell or
file-manager session — and the UUID is exposed via URL path (referer
leaks, access logs, browser history, frontend error reporters).

Bind the creator user ID into ioStreamContext at CreateStream time,
expose StreamOwnership and IsStreamAuthorizedForUser, and check
ownership in terminalStream/fmStream before the WebSocket upgrade so a
rejected attempt does not tear down the legitimate stream via defer.

NAT streams are also routed through CreateStream(_, 0); they are not
reachable from /ws/terminal or /ws/file so a sentinel user ID is fine.

Co-authored-by: naiba/CloudCode <hi+cloudcode@nai.ba>
This commit is contained in:
naiba
2026-05-18 15:16:40 +00:00
co-authored by naiba/CloudCode
parent ea7ad67f03
commit 36297699f5
6 changed files with 238 additions and 5 deletions
+4 -1
View File
@@ -138,7 +138,10 @@ func ServeNAT(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, natConfig *model.NAT) {
return
}
rpcService.NezhaHandlerSingleton.CreateStream(streamId)
// NAT streams are anonymous HTTP-facing tunnels; they are NOT reachable
// via /ws/terminal or /ws/file (which check stream ownership), so the
// creator user ID does not need to identify a real user.
rpcService.NezhaHandlerSingleton.CreateStream(streamId, 0)
defer rpcService.NezhaHandlerSingleton.CloseStream(streamId)
taskData, err := json.Marshal(model.TaskNAT{