mirror of
https://github.com/Buriburizaem0n/nezha_domains.git
synced 2026-11-04 08:40:20 +00:00
fix(nat): scrub dashboard-issued credentials from all accepted token channels
The initial selective strip covered only the Authorization header, but the dashboard also accepts its JWT via the ?token= query parameter and the nz-jwt cookie (jwt.go TokenLookup channels). A dashboard credential arriving through those channels would still reach a NAT backend. Apply the same classify-then-strip rule to all three channels at NAT ingress: values verified as dashboard-issued are removed, foreign values are preserved byte-for-byte. Adds a ServeNAT flow test exercising the live classifier and a wiring test pinning the gate injection in main().
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
40240ed02b
commit
3ad985f36e
12 files changed
+806
-82
No files matched your search
@@ -43,19 +43,33 @@ func newDashboardCredentialJWTParser(authMiddleware *ginjwt.GinJWTMiddleware) *g
|
||||
// NAT backend may authenticate with credentials of its own.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Decision policy mirrors the dashboard's own auth middlewares: only the
|
||||
// case-sensitive "Bearer " scheme is considered; PAT-shaped values are
|
||||
// resolved against the api_tokens table; everything else is treated as a JWT.
|
||||
// Whenever the classification cannot be completed (parser or config not ready,
|
||||
// database failure) the value is conservatively reported as a dashboard
|
||||
// credential so the caller strips it; only a deterministic proof that the
|
||||
// value was not issued by this dashboard (scheme mismatch, unknown PAT hash,
|
||||
// failed signature verification) returns false.
|
||||
// case-sensitive "Bearer " scheme is considered; the value after the scheme is
|
||||
// classified by IsDashboardCredentialValue, which is also the entry point for
|
||||
// the panel's scheme-less TokenLookup channels. Only a deterministic proof
|
||||
// that the value was not issued by this dashboard (scheme mismatch, unknown
|
||||
// PAT hash, failed signature verification) returns false.
|
||||
func IsDashboardCredential(authz string) bool {
|
||||
raw := strings.TrimSpace(authz)
|
||||
if !strings.HasPrefix(raw, "Bearer ") {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
plaintext := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(raw, "Bearer "))
|
||||
return IsDashboardCredentialValue(strings.TrimPrefix(raw, "Bearer "))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// IsDashboardCredentialValue reports whether a raw credential value — the part
|
||||
// after the "Bearer " scheme, exactly as the panel's other TokenLookup
|
||||
// channels carry it (the ?token= query parameter and the nz-jwt cookie, see
|
||||
// initParams) — was issued by this dashboard: a panel-signed JWT or a panel
|
||||
// API token (PAT).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Failure policy is identical to IsDashboardCredential: whenever the
|
||||
// classification cannot be completed (parser or config not ready, database
|
||||
// failure) the value is conservatively reported as a dashboard credential so
|
||||
// the caller strips it; only a deterministic proof that the value was not
|
||||
// issued by this dashboard (unknown PAT hash, failed signature verification)
|
||||
// returns false.
|
||||
func IsDashboardCredentialValue(value string) bool {
|
||||
plaintext := strings.TrimSpace(value)
|
||||
if strings.HasPrefix(plaintext, model.APITokenPrefix) {
|
||||
return isDashboardAPIToken(plaintext)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user