fix(security): harden server and service deletion lifecycle (#1220)

* test: TDD regression tests for GHSA-jx78-55p5-rwv5 stream quota enforcement

* Apply remaining changes

* fix: update action SHA allowlist and test assertions to match dependabot bump

* fix: close GHSA-jx78-55p5-rwv5 incomplete fix of GHSA-qjpp-gffx-2wm9

Finding 1 (Moderate): nil-guard reporterServer in delayCheck and notifyCheck.
ServerShared has its own lock independent of serviceResponseDataStoreLock, so
m := ServerShared.GetList() taken inside the worker can return a nil entry for
the reporter if the server was concurrently deleted. Previously this caused an
unrecovered SIGSEGV in the worker goroutine (and in the gRPC layer with no
recovery interceptor), taking down the whole instance.

Finding 2 (Low): nil-guard ss.services[id] in ServiceSentinel.Delete().
A caller-supplied id that is absent from the registry caused
ss.services[id].CronJobID to panic, aborting the Delete loop and leaving every
subsequent valid id as a zombie service (DB row deleted, in-memory entry kept,
cron probe still running).

Regression tests added for both findings following the existing
servicesentinel_lifecycle_test.go patterns.

* Apply remaining changes

* chore: replace commit hashes with version tags in test.yml

* fix(server): serialize authoritative lifecycle changes

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-opencode)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>

* fix(service): bind reports to reporter lifecycle

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-opencode)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>

* fix(rpc): reject results from stale task streams

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-opencode)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>

* fix(agentcompat): allow version-tagged actions

* fix(agentcompat): allow literal checkout refs

* refactor(agentcompat): remove SHA resolver policy

* test(agentcompat): remove resolver SHA fixtures

* test(agentcompat): remove mutable ref fixtures

* test(agentcompat): use tagged actions in secure fixtures

* test(agentcompat): update credential fixtures for tags

* test(agentcompat): update reusable action fixtures

* test(agentcompat): update artifact redaction fixtures

* test(agentcompat): finish artifact fixture tag migration

* test(agentcompat): update workflow validation fixtures

* test(agentcompat): update dependency workflow fixture

* ci(agentcompat): stop pinning cross-repository revisions

---------

Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: naiba <hi@nai.ba>
Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
This commit is contained in:
Copilot
2026-08-01 15:45:20 +08:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by Sisyphus naiba
parent bb941e4d73
commit 9ec6164f58
46 changed files with 1064 additions and 520 deletions
+8 -9
View File
@@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
timeout-minutes: 30
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1
- uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-go@b7ad1dad31e06c5925ef5d2fc7ad053ef454303e
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
with:
go-version: "1.26.x"
cache: false
@@ -52,10 +52,10 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 45
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1
- uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-go@b7ad1dad31e06c5925ef5d2fc7ad053ef454303e
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
with:
go-version: "1.26.x"
cache: false
@@ -94,19 +94,18 @@ jobs:
timeout-minutes: 75
steps:
- name: Checkout Nezha revision
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1
uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1
with:
path: nezha
persist-credentials: false
- name: Checkout pinned Agent revision
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1
- name: Checkout Agent repository
uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1
with:
repository: nezhahq/agent
ref: 667e1dd5e166ffef808ec26dc20de85bc33a0a0f
path: agent
persist-credentials: false
- name: Set up Go
uses: actions/setup-go@b7ad1dad31e06c5925ef5d2fc7ad053ef454303e
uses: actions/setup-go@v7
with:
go-version: "1.26.x"
cache: false
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
package controller
// TDD regression tests for GHSA-jx78-55p5-rwv5 (CVE-2026-53522):
// Unbounded WebSocket Streams — Resource Exhaustion DoS.
//
// The vulnerability: POST /api/v1/terminal and POST /api/v1/file insert a new
// context into an unbounded map with no per-user rate limit, global semaphore,
// or per-server connection cap, letting any authenticated user exhaust server
// resources until the dashboard crashes.
//
// The fix: createStreamLocked enforces maxStreamsPerUser (20) and
// maxStreamsPerServer (40). These tests verify the fix is effective end-to-end
// through the HTTP controller handlers, not just at the rpc layer.
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/rpc"
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton"
)
const (
// Must match rpc.maxStreamsPerUser so the test fills exactly the right cap.
quotaTestUserCap = 20
// Must match rpc.maxStreamsPerServer.
quotaTestServerCap = 40
)
// setupQuotaTest initialises the shared fixtures used by all quota tests:
// a fresh NezhaHandler, a server (ID 7) owned by the test user (ID 100),
// and a task stream that succeeds so that created streams stay in the registry.
func setupQuotaTest(t *testing.T) (cleanup func(), successStream *failingRequestTaskStream) {
t.Helper()
cleanupFixture, _ := setupMCPTest(t)
originalHandler := rpc.NezhaHandlerSingleton
rpc.NezhaHandlerSingleton = rpc.NewNezhaHandler()
successStream = &failingRequestTaskStream{err: nil}
server, ok := singleton.ServerShared.Get(7)
require.True(t, ok)
server.SetTaskStream(successStream)
return func() {
rpc.NezhaHandlerSingleton = originalHandler
cleanupFixture()
}, successStream
}
// TestCreateTerminalEnforcesPerUserStreamQuota verifies that once a user has
// reached the per-user stream cap, subsequent createTerminal calls are rejected
// with ErrTooManyStreamsForUser. This directly tests the GHSA-jx78-55p5-rwv5
// fix at the HTTP handler layer.
func TestCreateTerminalEnforcesPerUserStreamQuota(t *testing.T) {
cleanup, _ := setupQuotaTest(t)
defer cleanup()
// Fill the per-user quota.
for i := 0; i < quotaTestUserCap; i++ {
req := newAuthorizedControllerContext(t, "POST", "/terminal", model.TerminalForm{ServerID: 7})
_, err := createTerminal(req)
require.NoError(t, err, "terminal %d must succeed within per-user quota", i+1)
}
// The (quotaTestUserCap+1)-th call must be rejected.
req := newAuthorizedControllerContext(t, "POST", "/terminal", model.TerminalForm{ServerID: 7})
_, err := createTerminal(req)
require.Error(t, err, "createTerminal must return an error when user quota is exhausted")
require.True(t, errors.Is(err, rpc.ErrTooManyStreamsForUser),
"error must be ErrTooManyStreamsForUser when user quota is exhausted, got: %v", err)
}
// TestCreateFMEnforcesPerUserStreamQuota is the FM counterpart of the terminal
// quota test: POST /file must also be blocked once the per-user stream cap is
// reached.
func TestCreateFMEnforcesPerUserStreamQuota(t *testing.T) {
cleanup, _ := setupQuotaTest(t)
defer cleanup()
for i := 0; i < quotaTestUserCap; i++ {
req := newAuthorizedControllerContext(t, "POST", "/file?id=7", nil)
req.Request.URL.RawQuery = "id=7"
_, err := createFM(req)
require.NoError(t, err, "FM session %d must succeed within per-user quota", i+1)
}
req := newAuthorizedControllerContext(t, "POST", "/file?id=7", nil)
req.Request.URL.RawQuery = "id=7"
_, err := createFM(req)
require.Error(t, err, "createFM must return an error when user quota is exhausted")
require.True(t, errors.Is(err, rpc.ErrTooManyStreamsForUser),
"error must be ErrTooManyStreamsForUser when user quota is exhausted, got: %v", err)
}
// TestCreateTerminalEnforcesPerServerStreamQuota verifies that even when a
// single user's quota is not yet reached, createTerminal rejects streams once
// the per-server cap is hit. This guards against a distributed attack where
// many users flood one server.
func TestCreateTerminalEnforcesPerServerStreamQuota(t *testing.T) {
cleanup, _ := setupQuotaTest(t)
defer cleanup()
// Pre-fill the per-server quota with dashboard-internal streams
// (creatorUserID=0 bypasses the per-user cap so we can reach the server cap
// without needing quotaTestServerCap distinct users).
for i := 0; i < quotaTestServerCap; i++ {
require.NoError(t,
rpc.NezhaHandlerSingleton.CreateStream(fmt.Sprintf("server-filler-%d", i), 0, 7),
"pre-fill server quota stream %d must succeed", i+1,
)
}
// User 100 has used 0 of their personal quota; the server is saturated.
req := newAuthorizedControllerContext(t, "POST", "/terminal", model.TerminalForm{ServerID: 7})
_, err := createTerminal(req)
require.Error(t, err, "createTerminal must return an error when server quota is exhausted")
require.True(t, errors.Is(err, rpc.ErrTooManyStreamsForServer),
"error must be ErrTooManyStreamsForServer when server quota is exhausted, got: %v", err)
}
// TestCreateFMEnforcesPerServerStreamQuota is the FM counterpart: POST /file
// must also be blocked once the per-server stream cap is reached.
func TestCreateFMEnforcesPerServerStreamQuota(t *testing.T) {
cleanup, _ := setupQuotaTest(t)
defer cleanup()
for i := 0; i < quotaTestServerCap; i++ {
require.NoError(t,
rpc.NezhaHandlerSingleton.CreateStream(fmt.Sprintf("server-filler-fm-%d", i), 0, 7),
"pre-fill server quota stream %d must succeed", i+1,
)
}
req := newAuthorizedControllerContext(t, "POST", "/file?id=7", nil)
req.Request.URL.RawQuery = "id=7"
_, err := createFM(req)
require.Error(t, err, "createFM must return an error when server quota is exhausted")
require.True(t, errors.Is(err, rpc.ErrTooManyStreamsForServer),
"error must be ErrTooManyStreamsForServer when server quota is exhausted, got: %v", err)
}
+5 -5
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ require (
github.com/gin-gonic/gin v1.12.0
github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2 v2.5.0
github.com/goccy/go-json v0.10.6
github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4 v4.5.2
github.com/gorilla/websocket v1.5.3
github.com/hashicorp/go-uuid v1.0.3
github.com/jinzhu/copier v0.4.0
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ require (
github.com/libdns/cloudflare v0.2.2
github.com/libdns/he v1.2.2
github.com/libdns/libdns v1.1.1
github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3 v1.14.44
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.72
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk v1.6.1
github.com/nezhahq/libdns-tencentcloud v0.0.0-20260628095405-2ab294ec675b
@@ -32,7 +34,6 @@ require (
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1
github.com/swaggo/files v1.0.1
github.com/swaggo/gin-swagger v1.6.1
github.com/swaggo/swag v1.16.6
github.com/tidwall/gjson v1.19.0
golang.org/x/crypto v0.52.0
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20260508232706-74f9aab9d74a
@@ -40,8 +41,10 @@ require (
golang.org/x/net v0.55.0
golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.36.0
golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.45.0
google.golang.org/grpc v1.81.1
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1
gorm.io/driver/sqlite v1.6.0
gorm.io/gorm v1.31.1
sigs.k8s.io/yaml v1.6.0
@@ -76,7 +79,6 @@ require (
github.com/go-playground/universal-translator v0.18.1 // indirect
github.com/go-playground/validator/v10 v10.30.2 // indirect
github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.2 // indirect
github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4 v4.5.2 // indirect
github.com/golang/snappy v1.0.0 // indirect
github.com/google/jsonschema-go v0.4.3 // indirect
github.com/jinzhu/inflection v1.0.0 // indirect
@@ -86,7 +88,6 @@ require (
github.com/klauspost/cpuid/v2 v2.3.0 // indirect
github.com/leodido/go-urn v1.4.0 // indirect
github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.22 // indirect
github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3 v1.14.44 // indirect
github.com/mitchellh/copystructure v1.2.0 // indirect
github.com/mitchellh/reflectwalk v1.0.2 // indirect
github.com/modern-go/concurrent v0.0.0-20180306012644-bacd9c7ef1dd // indirect
@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ require (
github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.14.1 // indirect
github.com/segmentio/asm v1.1.3 // indirect
github.com/segmentio/encoding v0.5.4 // indirect
github.com/swaggo/swag v1.16.6 // indirect
github.com/tidwall/match v1.2.0 // indirect
github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.1 // indirect
github.com/tidwall/sjson v1.2.5 // indirect
@@ -115,10 +117,8 @@ require (
go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.4 // indirect
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4 // indirect
golang.org/x/arch v0.27.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sys v0.45.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/text v0.37.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/time v0.15.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/tools v0.45.0 // indirect
google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/rpc v0.0.0-20260511170946-3700d4141b60 // indirect
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 // indirect
)
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ package workflowpolicy_test
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"regexp"
"strings"
"testing"
@@ -15,8 +14,6 @@ import (
const agentWorkflowStressTestName = "TestStressPRFullEightAgentExactlyOnce"
var fullCommitSHA = regexp.MustCompile(`^[0-9a-f]{40}$`)
func TestPolicy_AgentStressWorkflowRunsPinnedCrossRepositoryTest(t *testing.T) {
// Given
path := filepath.Join("..", "..", "..", "..", "..", "agent", ".github", "workflows", "test.yml")
@@ -35,22 +32,21 @@ func TestPolicy_AgentStressWorkflowRunsPinnedCrossRepositoryTest(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, 75, stressJob.TimeoutMinutes)
require.Len(t, stressJob.Steps, 7)
agentCheckout := stressJob.stepNamed(t, "Checkout Agent revision")
require.Equal(t, "actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0", agentCheckout.Uses)
agentCheckout := stressJob.Steps[0]
requireActionRepository(t, agentCheckout.Uses, "actions/checkout")
require.Empty(t, agentCheckout.With.Repository)
require.Empty(t, agentCheckout.With.Ref)
require.Equal(t, "agent", agentCheckout.With.Path)
require.False(t, *agentCheckout.With.PersistCredentials)
nezhaCheckout := stressJob.stepNamed(t, "Checkout pinned Nezha revision")
require.Equal(t, "actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0", nezhaCheckout.Uses)
nezhaCheckout := stressJob.Steps[1]
requireActionRepository(t, nezhaCheckout.Uses, "actions/checkout")
require.Equal(t, "nezhahq/nezha", nezhaCheckout.With.Repository)
require.Regexp(t, fullCommitSHA, nezhaCheckout.With.Ref)
require.Equal(t, "nezha", nezhaCheckout.With.Path)
require.False(t, *nezhaCheckout.With.PersistCredentials)
setupGo := stressJob.stepNamed(t, "Set up Go")
require.Equal(t, "actions/setup-go@924ae3a1cded613372ab5595356fb5720e22ba16", setupGo.Uses)
requireActionRepository(t, setupGo.Uses, "actions/setup-go")
require.Equal(t, "^1.26.1", setupGo.With.GoVersion)
require.False(t, *setupGo.With.Cache)
@@ -78,21 +74,11 @@ func TestPolicy_AgentStressWorkflowRunsPinnedCrossRepositoryTest(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, "${{ github.workspace }}/agent", runStep.Env.AgentcompatAgentSource)
require.Equal(t, "go test -mod=readonly -tags=agentcompat -run '^"+agentWorkflowStressTestName+"$' -count=1 -v ./integration/agentcompat/internal/scenario", runStep.Run)
require.Equal(t, []string{
"Checkout Agent revision",
"Checkout pinned Nezha revision",
"Set up Go",
"Prepare Dashboard build inputs",
"Require Agent workflow policy tests",
"Require named stress test",
"Run PR-full agent compatibility stress",
}, stepNames(stressJob.Steps))
}
func stepNames(steps []qualityStep) []string {
names := make([]string, len(steps))
for index, step := range steps {
names[index] = step.Name
}
return names
func requireActionRepository(t *testing.T, uses, repository string) {
t.Helper()
action, _, found := strings.Cut(uses, "@")
require.True(t, found)
require.Equal(t, repository, action)
}
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import (
"gopkg.in/yaml.v3"
)
func (c *checker) checkCheckout(path string, step *yaml.Node, validatedResolvers map[string]Repository) {
func (c *checker) checkCheckout(path string, step *yaml.Node) {
with, exists := mappingValue(step, "with")
if !exists || with.Kind != yaml.MappingNode {
c.reject(RulePersistCredentials, at(path+".with.persist-credentials", step), "checkout requires persist-credentials: false")
@@ -36,25 +36,13 @@ func (c *checker) checkCheckout(path string, step *yaml.Node, validatedResolvers
return
}
ref, exists := mappingValue(with, "ref")
if !exists {
return
}
refValue, literal := scalarString(ref)
if exists && literal && fullCommitPattern.MatchString(refValue) {
return
if !literal || strings.TrimSpace(refValue) == "" || strings.Contains(refValue, "${{") {
c.reject(RuleRepositoryNotLiteral, at(path+".with.ref", ref), "checkout ref must be a nonempty literal")
}
if repository == string(c.repository) && !exists {
return
}
if exists && literal {
match := resolvedRefPattern.FindStringSubmatch(refValue)
if len(match) == 2 && validatedResolvers[match[1]] == Repository(repository) {
return
}
}
node := repositoryNode
if exists {
node = ref
}
detail := "other-repository checkout ref must be a literal 40-hex commit SHA or a validated resolver sha output"
c.reject(RuleOtherRepositoryRef, at(path+".with.ref", node), detail)
}
func (c *checker) checkCacheInputs(path string, step *yaml.Node) {
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import (
)
var (
fullCommitPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$`)
dockerCommandPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`(?mi)(?:^|[;&|]\s*|\s)(?:(?:sudo|env)\s+)?(?:/[^\s]+/)?(?:docker|podman|nerdctl|containerd|buildah|runc|crictl)(?:\s|$)`)
gitHubEnvironmentPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`(?is)GIT_[A-Za-z0-9_]*.*GITHUB_ENV|GITHUB_ENV.*GIT_[A-Za-z0-9_]*`)
swallowedFailurePattern = regexp.MustCompile(`(?mi)(?:\|\|\s*(?:true|:|echo\b|printf\b|exit\s+0\b))|(?:^|[;&]\s*)set\s+\+(?:e|o\s+errexit)(?:\s|;|$)|(?:^|[;&]\s*)if\s+|(?:\b(?:bash|sh)\s+-c\b)|(?:^|[;&]\s*)trap\b[^\n]*\bexit\s+0\b|(?:[;&]\s*)(?:true|:)\s*(?:;|$)`)
@@ -56,7 +55,6 @@ func (c *checker) checkJob(name string, job *yaml.Node) {
func (c *checker) checkSteps(jobPath string, steps *yaml.Node) {
redactionReady := false
validatedResolvers := make(map[string]Repository)
for index, step := range steps.Content {
path := jobPath + ".steps[" + strconv.Itoa(index) + "]"
if step.Kind != yaml.MappingNode {
@@ -78,15 +76,11 @@ func (c *checker) checkSteps(jobPath string, steps *yaml.Node) {
c.reject(RuleWorkflowStructure, at(path+".run", run), "step run must be a scalar shell command")
}
c.checkContinueOnError(step, path)
resolver, validResolver := validatedRefResolver(step)
if hasRun {
c.checkRun(path+".run", run, validResolver)
}
if validResolver {
validatedResolvers[resolver.id] = resolver.repository
c.checkRun(path+".run", run)
}
if hasUses {
c.checkUses(path, step, stepCheckState{redactionComplete: redactionReady, validatedResolvers: validatedResolvers})
c.checkUses(path, step, stepCheckState{redactionComplete: redactionReady})
redactionReady = false
continue
}
@@ -101,7 +95,7 @@ func (c *checker) checkContinueOnError(mapping *yaml.Node, path string) {
}
}
func (c *checker) checkRun(path string, run *yaml.Node, validatedResolver bool) {
func (c *checker) checkRun(path string, run *yaml.Node) {
command, exists := scalarString(run)
if !exists {
return
@@ -121,12 +115,12 @@ func (c *checker) checkRun(path string, run *yaml.Node, validatedResolver bool)
if gitConfigurationPattern.MatchString(command) {
c.reject(RuleRepositoryNotLiteral, at(path, run), "Git configuration mutation is forbidden")
}
if gitRepositoryCommand.MatchString(command) && !validatedResolver {
if gitRepositoryCommand.MatchString(command) {
rule := RuleRepositoryNotLiteral
detail := fmt.Sprintf("git repository operation %q is allowed only in the validated resolver", strings.TrimSpace(command))
detail := fmt.Sprintf("git repository operation %q is forbidden", strings.TrimSpace(command))
if !strings.Contains(command, "$") {
rule = RuleRepositoryNotAllowed
detail = fmt.Sprintf("repository operation %q is forbidden outside the validated resolver", strings.TrimSpace(command))
detail = fmt.Sprintf("repository operation %q is forbidden", strings.TrimSpace(command))
}
c.reject(rule, at(path, run), detail)
}
@@ -134,7 +128,6 @@ func (c *checker) checkRun(path string, run *yaml.Node, validatedResolver bool)
type stepCheckState struct {
redactionComplete bool
validatedResolvers map[string]Repository
}
func (c *checker) checkUses(path string, step *yaml.Node, state stepCheckState) {
@@ -159,28 +152,23 @@ func (c *checker) checkUses(path string, step *yaml.Node, state stepCheckState)
c.reject(RuleReusableExecutable, at(path+".uses", uses), "local action reuse from the workspace is forbidden")
return
}
actionRepository, _, found := strings.Cut(lowerAction, "@")
actionRepository, valid := actionRepository(lowerAction)
if !valid {
c.reject(RuleWorkflowStructure, at(path+".uses", uses), "action reference must use owner/repository@ref syntax")
return
}
switch actionRepository {
case "actions/cache", "actions/cache/restore", "actions/cache/save", "actions/download-artifact":
c.reject(RuleReusableExecutable, at(path+".uses", uses), fmt.Sprintf("cache or artifact reuse action %q is forbidden", actionRepository))
return
}
if !found {
c.reject(RuleOtherRepositoryRef, at(path+".uses", uses), "action must use its approved immutable SHA")
return
}
approvedRepository, _, pinned := approvedAction(action)
if approvedRepository == "" {
if !approvedAction(actionRepository) {
c.reject(RuleRepositoryNotAllowed, at(path+".uses", uses), "action repository is not approved")
return
}
if !pinned {
c.reject(RuleOtherRepositoryRef, at(path+".uses", uses), "action must use its approved immutable SHA")
return
}
switch approvedRepository {
switch actionRepository {
case "actions/checkout":
c.checkCheckout(path, step, state.validatedResolvers)
c.checkCheckout(path, step)
case "actions/setup-go":
c.checkRequiredCacheDisabled(path, step)
case "actions/upload-artifact":
@@ -189,19 +177,23 @@ func (c *checker) checkUses(path string, step *yaml.Node, state stepCheckState)
c.checkCacheInputs(path, step)
}
func approvedAction(action string) (string, string, bool) {
repository, ref, found := strings.Cut(strings.ToLower(action), "@")
if !found {
return repository, "", false
func actionRepository(action string) (string, bool) {
repository, ref, found := strings.Cut(action, "@")
if !found || repository == "" || ref == "" || strings.Contains(ref, "@") || strings.ContainsAny(action, " \t\r\n") {
return "", false
}
approvedRefs := map[string]string{
"actions/checkout": "9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0",
"actions/setup-go": "924ae3a1cded613372ab5595356fb5720e22ba16",
"actions/upload-artifact": "b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f",
owner, name, found := strings.Cut(repository, "/")
if !found || owner == "" || name == "" || strings.Contains(name, "/") {
return "", false
}
return repository, true
}
func approvedAction(repository string) bool {
switch repository {
case "actions/checkout", "actions/setup-go", "actions/upload-artifact":
return true
default:
return false
}
approvedRef, approved := approvedRefs[repository]
if !approved {
return "", ref, false
}
return repository, ref, ref == approvedRef
}
@@ -73,8 +73,31 @@ func TestPolicy_RejectsUnapprovedAction(t *testing.T) {
assertFixtureRejected(t, rejected("unapproved-action.yml", workflowpolicy.RuleRepositoryNotAllowed, "action"))
}
func TestPolicy_RejectsMutableActionRef(t *testing.T) {
assertFixtureRejected(t, rejected("mutable-action-ref.yml", workflowpolicy.RuleOtherRepositoryRef, "approved immutable SHA"))
func TestPolicy_RejectsActionReferenceWithoutRef(t *testing.T) {
assertFixtureRejected(t, rejected("action-reference-missing-ref.yml", workflowpolicy.RuleWorkflowStructure, "owner/repository@ref"))
}
func TestPolicy_RejectsMalformedActionReferences(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
uses string
rule workflowpolicy.Rule
diagnostic string
}{
{name: "empty ref", uses: "actions/checkout@", rule: workflowpolicy.RuleWorkflowStructure, diagnostic: "owner/repository@ref"},
{name: "duplicate separator", uses: "actions/checkout@v7@unexpected", rule: workflowpolicy.RuleWorkflowStructure, diagnostic: "owner/repository@ref"},
{name: "extra action path", uses: "actions/checkout/extra@v7", rule: workflowpolicy.RuleWorkflowStructure, diagnostic: "owner/repository@ref"},
{name: "whitespace", uses: "actions/checkout @v7", rule: workflowpolicy.RuleWorkflowStructure, diagnostic: "owner/repository@ref"},
{name: "dynamic ref", uses: "actions/checkout@${{ inputs.ref }}", rule: workflowpolicy.RuleRepositoryNotLiteral, diagnostic: "action reference must be literal"},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
workflow := "on:\n pull_request:\nconcurrency: policy\npermissions:\n contents: read\njobs:\n verify:\n runs-on: ubuntu-24.04\n timeout-minutes: 10\n steps:\n - uses: \"" + test.uses + "\"\n with:\n persist-credentials: false\n"
err := workflowpolicy.Verify([]byte(workflow), workflowpolicy.RepositoryNezha)
requireTypedPolicyError(t, err, test.rule)
require.ErrorContains(t, err, test.diagnostic)
})
}
}
func TestPolicy_RejectsReusableWorkflowJob(t *testing.T) {
@@ -33,15 +33,42 @@ func TestPolicy_AcceptsSecureAgentWorkflow(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err)
}
func TestPolicy_AcceptsValidatedResolvedOtherRepositoryRef(t *testing.T) {
// Given
path := fixturePath(t, "secure-resolved-ref.yml")
// When
err := workflowpolicy.VerifyFile(path, workflowpolicy.RepositoryNezha)
// Then
func TestPolicy_AcceptsCrossRepositoryCheckoutRefs(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
fixture string
repository workflowpolicy.Repository
}{
{name: "default branch", fixture: "cross-repository-default-ref.yml", repository: workflowpolicy.RepositoryNezha},
{name: "branch", fixture: "secure-agent.yml", repository: workflowpolicy.RepositoryAgent},
{name: "version tag", fixture: "secure-nezha.yml", repository: workflowpolicy.RepositoryNezha},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := workflowpolicy.VerifyFile(fixturePath(t, test.fixture), test.repository)
require.NoError(t, err)
})
}
}
func TestPolicy_RejectsInvalidCrossRepositoryCheckoutRefs(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
ref string
}{
{name: "dynamic", ref: "${{ inputs.ref }}"},
{name: "non-string", ref: "false"},
{name: "empty", ref: "\"\""},
{name: "whitespace only", ref: "\" \""},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
workflow := "on:\n pull_request:\nconcurrency: policy\npermissions:\n contents: read\njobs:\n verify:\n runs-on: ubuntu-24.04\n timeout-minutes: 10\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1\n with:\n repository: nezhahq/agent\n ref: " + test.ref + "\n persist-credentials: false\n"
err := workflowpolicy.Verify([]byte(workflow), workflowpolicy.RepositoryNezha)
requireTypedPolicyError(t, err, workflowpolicy.RuleRepositoryNotLiteral)
require.ErrorContains(t, err, "checkout ref must be a nonempty literal")
})
}
}
func TestPolicy_RejectsPullRequestTarget(t *testing.T) {
@@ -104,18 +131,6 @@ func TestPolicy_RejectsNonliteralRepository(t *testing.T) {
assertFixtureRejected(t, rejected("nonliteral-repository.yml", workflowpolicy.RuleRepositoryNotLiteral, "literal"))
}
func TestPolicy_RejectsMutableOtherRepositoryRef(t *testing.T) {
assertFixtureRejected(t, rejected("mutable-other-repository-ref.yml", workflowpolicy.RuleOtherRepositoryRef, "40"))
}
func TestPolicy_RejectsUnvalidatedResolvedOtherRepositoryRef(t *testing.T) {
assertFixtureRejected(t, rejectionExpectation{fixture: "unvalidated-resolved-ref.yml", repository: workflowpolicy.RepositoryNezha, rule: workflowpolicy.RuleOtherRepositoryRef, diagnostic: "validated resolver"})
}
func TestPolicy_RejectsResolverVariableOverride(t *testing.T) {
assertFixtureRejected(t, rejectionExpectation{fixture: "resolver-variable-override.yml", repository: workflowpolicy.RepositoryNezha, rule: workflowpolicy.RuleOtherRepositoryRef, diagnostic: "validated resolver"})
}
func TestPolicy_RejectsMissingPersistCredentialsFalse(t *testing.T) {
assertFixtureRejected(t, rejected("missing-persist-credentials.yml", workflowpolicy.RulePersistCredentials, "persist-credentials"))
}
@@ -164,11 +164,11 @@ func requireCheckoutAndSetupGo(t *testing.T, steps []qualityStep) {
t.Helper()
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, len(steps), 2)
checkout := steps[0]
require.Equal(t, "actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0", checkout.Uses)
require.Equal(t, "actions/checkout@v7.0.1", checkout.Uses)
require.NotNil(t, checkout.With.PersistCredentials)
require.False(t, *checkout.With.PersistCredentials)
setupGo := steps[1]
require.Equal(t, "actions/setup-go@924ae3a1cded613372ab5595356fb5720e22ba16", setupGo.Uses)
require.Equal(t, "actions/setup-go@v7", setupGo.Uses)
require.Equal(t, "1.26.x", setupGo.With.GoVersion)
require.NotNil(t, setupGo.With.Cache)
require.False(t, *setupGo.With.Cache)
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
package workflowpolicy
import (
"regexp"
"strings"
"gopkg.in/yaml.v3"
)
var (
resolvedRefPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^\$\{\{\s*steps\.([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)\.outputs\.sha\s*\}\}$`)
resolverRemotePattern = regexp.MustCompile(`(?m)^\s*remote=['"]https://github\.com/(nezhahq/(?:agent|nezha))\.git['"]\s*$`)
)
type refResolver struct {
id string
repository Repository
}
func validatedRefResolver(step *yaml.Node) (refResolver, bool) {
idNode, hasID := mappingValue(step, "id")
runNode, hasRun := mappingValue(step, "run")
id, literalID := scalarString(idNode)
command, literalRun := scalarString(runNode)
if !hasID || !hasRun || !literalID || !literalRun || strings.TrimSpace(id) == "" {
return refResolver{}, false
}
lines := make([]string, 0, 7)
for _, line := range strings.Split(command, "\n") {
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(line)
if trimmed != "" {
lines = append(lines, trimmed)
}
}
if len(lines) != 7 || lines[0] != "set -euo pipefail" {
return refResolver{}, false
}
remoteMatch := resolverRemotePattern.FindStringSubmatch(lines[1])
if len(remoteMatch) != 2 {
return refResolver{}, false
}
repository := Repository(remoteMatch[1])
branch := "main"
if repository == RepositoryNezha {
branch = "master"
}
expectedLines := []string{
lines[0],
lines[1],
"mapfile -t refs < <(git ls-remote \"$remote\" refs/heads/" + branch + ")",
"(( ${#refs[@]} == 1 ))",
"sha=${refs[0]%%$'\\t'*}",
`[[ "$sha" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ ]]`,
`printf 'sha=%s\n' "$sha" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"`,
}
for index, expected := range expectedLines {
if lines[index] != expected {
return refResolver{}, false
}
}
return refResolver{id: id, repository: repository}, true
}
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import (
const agentcompatStressTestName = "TestStressPRFullEightAgentExactlyOnce"
func TestPolicy_NezhaStressWorkflowRunsPinnedCrossRepositoryTest(t *testing.T) {
func TestPolicy_NezhaStressWorkflowRunsCrossRepositoryTest(t *testing.T) {
// Given
data := readNezhaQualityWorkflow(t)
var workflow qualityWorkflow
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ func TestPolicy_NezhaStressWorkflowRunsPinnedCrossRepositoryTest(t *testing.T) {
require.Len(t, stressJob.Steps, 6)
require.Equal(t, []string{
"Checkout Nezha revision",
"Checkout pinned Agent revision",
"Checkout Agent repository",
"Set up Go",
"Prepare Dashboard build inputs",
"Require named stress test",
@@ -42,21 +42,21 @@ func TestPolicy_NezhaStressWorkflowRunsPinnedCrossRepositoryTest(t *testing.T) {
})
nezhaCheckout := stressJob.stepNamed(t, "Checkout Nezha revision")
require.Equal(t, "actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0", nezhaCheckout.Uses)
require.Equal(t, "actions/checkout@v7.0.1", nezhaCheckout.Uses)
require.Empty(t, nezhaCheckout.With.Repository)
require.Empty(t, nezhaCheckout.With.Ref)
require.Equal(t, "nezha", nezhaCheckout.With.Path)
require.False(t, *nezhaCheckout.With.PersistCredentials)
agentCheckout := stressJob.stepNamed(t, "Checkout pinned Agent revision")
require.Equal(t, "actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0", agentCheckout.Uses)
agentCheckout := stressJob.stepNamed(t, "Checkout Agent repository")
require.Equal(t, "actions/checkout@v7.0.1", agentCheckout.Uses)
require.Equal(t, "nezhahq/agent", agentCheckout.With.Repository)
require.Equal(t, "667e1dd5e166ffef808ec26dc20de85bc33a0a0f", agentCheckout.With.Ref)
require.Empty(t, agentCheckout.With.Ref)
require.Equal(t, "agent", agentCheckout.With.Path)
require.False(t, *agentCheckout.With.PersistCredentials)
setupGo := stressJob.stepNamed(t, "Set up Go")
require.Equal(t, "actions/setup-go@924ae3a1cded613372ab5595356fb5720e22ba16", setupGo.Uses)
require.Equal(t, "actions/setup-go@v7", setupGo.Uses)
require.Equal(t, "1.26.x", setupGo.With.GoVersion)
require.False(t, *setupGo.With.Cache)
@@ -8,6 +8,6 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout
with:
persist-credentials: false
@@ -9,6 +9,6 @@ jobs:
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- run: go test ./...
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/results
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses: actions/cache@0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567
- uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: bin
key: executable-cache
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ jobs:
id: redact-evidence
if: false
run: go run ./integration/agentcompat/cmd/redact --output "$RUNNER_TEMP/nezha-agentcompat-redacted"
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
if: always()
with:
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/nezha-agentcompat-redacted
@@ -8,8 +8,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0
- uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1
with:
repository: nezhahq/agent
ref: main
persist-credentials: false
@@ -8,4 +8,4 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses: actions/download-artifact@0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v7
@@ -8,4 +8,4 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0
- uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1
@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 30
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0
- uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-go@924ae3a1cded613372ab5595356fb5720e22ba16
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
with:
go-version: "1.26.x"
cache: false
@@ -25,10 +25,10 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 45
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0
- uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-go@924ae3a1cded613372ab5595356fb5720e22ba16
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
with:
go-version: "1.26.x"
cache: false
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Redact evidence
run: go run ./integration/agentcompat/cmd/redact
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
path: |
${{ runner.temp }}/redacted-results
@@ -10,6 +10,6 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Redact evidence
run: "true"
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/redacted-results
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0
- uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1
with:
repository: ${{ inputs.repository }}
ref: 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567
ref: main
persist-credentials: false
@@ -9,4 +9,4 @@ jobs:
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses:
- actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0
- actions/checkout@v7.0.1
@@ -8,6 +8,6 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 10.5
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0
- uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
@@ -8,6 +8,6 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0
- uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: true
@@ -8,6 +8,6 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0
- uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: "false"
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ jobs:
if: always()
run: go run ./integration/agentcompat/cmd/redact --output "$RUNNER_TEMP/nezha-agentcompat-redacted"
- run: cp raw-secret "$RUNNER_TEMP/nezha-agentcompat-redacted/raw-secret"
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
if: always()
with:
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/nezha-agentcompat-redacted
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ jobs:
run: |
go run ./integration/agentcompat/cmd/redact --output "$RUNNER_TEMP/nezha-agentcompat-redacted"
cp raw-secret "$RUNNER_TEMP/nezha-agentcompat-redacted/raw-secret"
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
if: always()
with:
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/nezha-agentcompat-redacted
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
on:
pull_request:
concurrency: policy
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
verify:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- id: resolve-agent
run: |
set -euo pipefail
remote='https://github.com/nezhahq/agent.git'
mapfile -t refs < <(git ls-remote "$remote" refs/heads/main)
(( ${#refs[@]} == 1 ))
sha=${refs[0]%%$'\t'*}
[[ "$sha" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ ]]
sha=attacker-controlled
printf 'sha=%s\n' "$sha" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0
with:
repository: nezhahq/agent
ref: ${{ steps.resolve-agent.outputs.sha }}
persist-credentials: false
@@ -9,13 +9,13 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 30
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0
- uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0
- uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1
with:
repository: nezhahq/nezha
ref: fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210fedcba98
ref: master
path: nezha
persist-credentials: false
- run: go test ./integration/agentcompat/...
@@ -15,14 +15,14 @@ jobs:
timeout-minutes: 30
steps:
- name: Checkout Nezha
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0
uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Checkout Agent
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0
uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1
with:
repository: nezhahq/agent
ref: 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567
ref: v1.2.3
path: agent
persist-credentials: false
- name: Test
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ jobs:
if: always()
run: go run ./integration/agentcompat/cmd/redact --output "$RUNNER_TEMP/nezha-agentcompat-redacted"
- name: Upload redacted evidence
uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
if: always()
with:
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/nezha-agentcompat-redacted
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
name: Secure resolved ref
on:
pull_request:
concurrency: resolved-${{ github.ref }}
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
verify:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 30
steps:
- id: resolve-agent
name: Resolve Agent commit
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
remote='https://github.com/nezhahq/agent.git'
mapfile -t refs < <(git ls-remote "$remote" refs/heads/main)
(( ${#refs[@]} == 1 ))
sha=${refs[0]%%$'\t'*}
[[ "$sha" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ ]]
printf 'sha=%s\n' "$sha" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0
with:
repository: nezhahq/agent
ref: ${{ steps.resolve-agent.outputs.sha }}
persist-credentials: false
@@ -8,6 +8,6 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses: actions/setup-go@924ae3a1cded613372ab5595356fb5720e22ba16
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
with:
go-version: 1.26.3
@@ -8,4 +8,4 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses: attacker/exfiltrate@0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567
- uses: attacker/exfiltrate@v1
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0
- uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1
with:
repository: attacker/fork
ref: 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567
ref: main
persist-credentials: false
@@ -11,6 +11,6 @@ jobs:
- name: Redact evidence
id: redact-evidence
run: go run ./integration/agentcompat/cmd/redact
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/results
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
on:
pull_request:
concurrency: policy
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
verify:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- id: resolve-agent
run: |
echo "sha=$(git ls-remote https://github.com/nezhahq/agent.git refs/heads/main | cut -f1)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0
with:
repository: nezhahq/agent
ref: ${{ steps.resolve-agent.outputs.sha }}
persist-credentials: false
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ const (
RuleContainerizedExecution Rule = "containerized-execution"
RuleRepositoryNotAllowed Rule = "repository-not-allowed"
RuleRepositoryNotLiteral Rule = "repository-not-literal"
RuleOtherRepositoryRef Rule = "other-repository-ref"
RulePersistCredentials Rule = "persist-credentials" // #nosec G101 -- GitHub Actions configuration key, not a credential.
RuleReusableExecutable Rule = "reusable-executable"
RuleContinueOnError Rule = "continue-on-error"
+20
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ var _ pb.NezhaServiceServer = (*NezhaHandler)(nil)
var NezhaHandlerSingleton *NezhaHandler
// ErrRequestTaskStreamSuperseded is returned when a RequestTask result arrives
// after its stream is no longer the live stream for the authenticated server.
var ErrRequestTaskStreamSuperseded = errors.New("request task stream superseded")
type NezhaHandler struct {
Auth *authHandler
ioStreams map[string]*ioStreamContext
@@ -79,6 +83,18 @@ func clearRequestTaskStream(clientID uint64, captured *model.Server, stream pb.N
captured.ClearTaskStreamIfCurrent(stream)
}
// currentRequestTaskServer authorizes a received result against the live
// ServerShared entry. Server pointer replacement is valid when it inherited
// the same task stream holder; only a missing entry or different stream makes
// a received result stale.
func currentRequestTaskServer(clientID uint64, stream pb.NezhaService_RequestTaskServer) (*model.Server, error) {
current, ok := singleton.ServerShared.Get(clientID)
if !ok || current == nil || current.GetTaskStream() != stream {
return nil, ErrRequestTaskStreamSuperseded
}
return current, nil
}
func (s *NezhaHandler) RequestTask(stream pb.NezhaService_RequestTaskServer) error {
var clientID uint64
var err error
@@ -106,6 +122,10 @@ func (s *NezhaHandler) RequestTask(stream pb.NezhaService_RequestTaskServer) err
log.Printf("NEZHA>> RequestTask error: %v, clientID: %d\n", err, clientID)
return err
}
server, err = currentRequestTaskServer(clientID, stream)
if err != nil {
return err
}
switch result.GetType() {
case model.TaskTypeCommand:
// 处理上报的计划任务
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ type requestTaskSecurityStream struct {
ctx context.Context
results []*pb.TaskResult
onRecv func()
onResult func()
onSend func(*pb.Task)
sendErr error
}
@@ -40,6 +41,11 @@ func (s *requestTaskSecurityStream) Recv() (*pb.TaskResult, error) {
}
result := s.results[0]
s.results = s.results[1:]
if s.onResult != nil {
onResult := s.onResult
s.onResult = nil
onResult()
}
return result, nil
}
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
"testing"
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
pb "github.com/nezhahq/nezha/proto"
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton"
)
@@ -44,3 +45,91 @@ func TestRequestTaskCleanupDetachesStreamFromCurrentServerAfterEdit(t *testing.T
t.Fatalf("edited server must report offline after the agent stream dropped, got %T", got)
}
}
func TestRequestTaskRejectsResultWhenServerDeletedAfterRecv(t *testing.T) {
reporter := requestTaskSecurityServer(7, 200, "10101010-1010-1010-1010-101010101010")
cronTask := requestTaskSecurityCron(42, 200, model.CronCoverAll, nil)
setupRequestTaskSecurityFixture(t, []*model.Server{reporter}, []*model.Cron{cronTask}, map[uint64]model.UserInfo{
200: {Role: model.RoleMember},
}, map[string]uint64{"reporter-secret": 200})
stream := requestTaskSecurityAuthedStream("reporter-secret", reporter.UUID)
stream.results = []*pb.TaskResult{cronTaskResult(cronTask.ID, true)}
stream.onResult = func() {
singleton.ServerShared.Delete([]uint64{reporter.ID})
}
err := NewNezhaHandler().RequestTask(stream)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrRequestTaskStreamSuperseded) {
t.Fatalf("expected stale RequestTask stream error, got %v", err)
}
assertCronResultNotUpdated(t, cronTask.ID)
}
func TestRequestTaskRejectsResultWhenNewerStreamSupersedesOld(t *testing.T) {
reporter := requestTaskSecurityServer(7, 200, "20202020-2020-2020-2020-202020202020")
cronTask := requestTaskSecurityCron(42, 200, model.CronCoverAll, nil)
setupRequestTaskSecurityFixture(t, []*model.Server{reporter}, []*model.Cron{cronTask}, map[uint64]model.UserInfo{
200: {Role: model.RoleMember},
}, map[string]uint64{"reporter-secret": 200})
current, ok := singleton.ServerShared.Get(reporter.ID)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("server %d not found", reporter.ID)
}
newer := &requestTaskSecurityStream{ctx: context.Background()}
stream := requestTaskSecurityAuthedStream("reporter-secret", reporter.UUID)
stream.results = []*pb.TaskResult{cronTaskResult(cronTask.ID, true)}
stream.onResult = func() {
current.SetTaskStream(newer)
}
err := NewNezhaHandler().RequestTask(stream)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrRequestTaskStreamSuperseded) {
t.Fatalf("expected superseded RequestTask stream error, got %v", err)
}
if got := current.GetTaskStream(); got != newer {
t.Fatalf("old stream cleanup must preserve newer stream, got %T", got)
}
assertCronResultNotUpdated(t, cronTask.ID)
}
func TestRequestTaskAcceptsResultAfterServerPointerReplacementWithSameStream(t *testing.T) {
reporter := requestTaskSecurityServer(7, 200, "30303030-3030-3030-3030-303030303030")
cronTask := requestTaskSecurityCron(42, 200, model.CronCoverAll, nil)
setupRequestTaskSecurityFixture(t, []*model.Server{reporter}, []*model.Cron{cronTask}, map[uint64]model.UserInfo{
200: {Role: model.RoleMember},
}, map[string]uint64{"reporter-secret": 200})
old, ok := singleton.ServerShared.Get(reporter.ID)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("server %d not found", reporter.ID)
}
stream := requestTaskSecurityAuthedStream("reporter-secret", reporter.UUID)
stream.results = []*pb.TaskResult{cronTaskResult(cronTask.ID, true)}
stream.onResult = func() {
replacement := &model.Server{Common: model.Common{ID: old.ID, UserID: old.UserID}, UUID: old.UUID, Name: "replacement"}
replacement.CopyFromRunningServer(old)
singleton.ServerShared.Update(replacement, "")
}
err := NewNezhaHandler().RequestTask(stream)
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Fatalf("expected RequestTask to finish after accepted result, got %v", err)
}
if !cronLastResult(t, cronTask.ID) {
t.Fatal("result on a replacement server that inherited the stream must be accepted")
}
}
func assertCronResultNotUpdated(t *testing.T, cronID uint64) {
t.Helper()
var cronTask model.Cron
if err := singleton.DB.First(&cronTask, cronID).Error; err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if cronTask.LastResult || !cronTask.LastExecutedAt.IsZero() {
t.Fatalf("stale RequestTask result must not mutate cron, got last_result=%t last_executed_at=%s", cronTask.LastResult, cronTask.LastExecutedAt)
}
}
+38
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
"log"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/pkg/ddns"
@@ -15,6 +16,10 @@ import (
type ServerClass struct {
class[uint64, *model.Server]
// lifecycleMu serializes changes to the authoritative server entries with
// synchronous ServiceSentinel report processing.
lifecycleMu sync.RWMutex
uuidToID map[string]uint64
sortedListForGuest []*model.Server
@@ -71,7 +76,26 @@ func ownerIsAdmin(ownerUID uint64) bool {
return userIsAdmin(ownerUID)
}
func (c *ServerClass) lockLifecycleRead() {
c.lifecycleMu.RLock()
}
func (c *ServerClass) unlockLifecycleRead() {
c.lifecycleMu.RUnlock()
}
func (c *ServerClass) lockLifecycleWrite() {
c.lifecycleMu.Lock()
}
func (c *ServerClass) unlockLifecycleWrite() {
c.lifecycleMu.Unlock()
}
func (c *ServerClass) Update(s *model.Server, uuid string) {
c.lockLifecycleWrite()
defer c.unlockLifecycleWrite()
c.listMu.Lock()
c.list[s.ID] = s
@@ -91,6 +115,9 @@ func (c *ServerClass) Update(s *model.Server, uuid string) {
}
func (c *ServerClass) Delete(idList []uint64) {
c.lockLifecycleWrite()
defer c.unlockLifecycleWrite()
c.listMu.Lock()
for _, id := range idList {
@@ -107,6 +134,17 @@ func (c *ServerClass) Delete(idList []uint64) {
c.sortList()
}
// setUserID updates in-memory ownership under the server lifecycle lock so a
// transfer cannot change authorization during synchronous report processing.
func (c *ServerClass) setUserID(id, userID uint64) {
c.lockLifecycleWrite()
defer c.unlockLifecycleWrite()
if s, ok := c.Get(id); ok && s != nil {
s.SetUserID(userID)
}
}
func (c *ServerClass) GetSortedListForGuest() []*model.Server {
c.sortedListMu.RLock()
defer c.sortedListMu.RUnlock()
+4 -8
View File
@@ -663,11 +663,9 @@ func (c *ServerTransferClass) Initiate(tx *gorm.DB, serverID, fromUserID, toUser
// and admits the old AgentSecret on the happy "owner match" path —
// bypassing the bounded pending-tolerance contract.
func (c *ServerTransferClass) Register(t *model.ServerTransfer) {
if s, ok := ServerShared.Get(t.ServerID); ok && s != nil {
// SetUserID over atomic write — auth.go hot path concurrently
// reads this field; a plain assignment would be a data race.
s.SetUserID(t.ToUserID)
}
// SetUserID uses an atomic write because auth.go reads this hot-path field
// concurrently; ServerClass also serializes it with service reports.
ServerShared.setUserID(t.ServerID, t.ToUserID)
c.mu.Lock()
c.pending[t.ServerID] = t
@@ -1163,9 +1161,7 @@ func (c *ServerTransferClass) revertTransition(transferID uint64, newStatus mode
// no longer admits the destination user's global AgentSecret via
// ServerShared.GetUserID() == userId on the happy "owner match" path.
if transitionedByThisCall {
if s, ok := ServerShared.Get(t.ServerID); ok && s != nil {
s.SetUserID(t.FromUserID)
}
ServerShared.setUserID(t.ServerID, t.FromUserID)
}
// Self-heal: any non-Pending DB status invalidates the in-memory entry —
+50 -14
View File
@@ -394,7 +394,16 @@ func (ss *ServiceSentinel) Delete(ids []uint64) {
delete(ss.serviceStatusToday, id)
// 停掉定时任务
CronShared.Remove(ss.services[id].CronJobID)
// GHSA-jx78-55p5-rwv5 (Finding 2): guard against a caller supplying an id
// that does not exist in the in-memory registry. CheckPermission returns
// vacuously true for unknown ids, so the controller layer cannot prevent
// this. Without the guard, ss.services[id] is nil and the .CronJobID
// field access panics, aborting the Delete loop before the remaining valid
// ids are cleaned from memory — their service records were already deleted
// from the database, producing zombie services.
if svc := ss.services[id]; svc != nil {
CronShared.Remove(svc.CronJobID)
}
delete(ss.services, id)
delete(ss.monthlyStatus, id)
@@ -536,27 +545,44 @@ func (ss *ServiceSentinel) Close() {
func (ss *ServiceSentinel) worker() {
// 从服务状态汇报管道获取汇报的服务数据
for r := range ss.serviceReportChannel {
serverShared := ServerShared
func() {
defer func() {
if recovered := recover(); recovered != nil {
log.Printf("NEZHA>> Service monitor report processing panicked: %v", recovered)
}
}()
ss.processReport(r, serverShared)
}()
}
}
func (ss *ServiceSentinel) processReport(r ReportData, serverShared *ServerClass) {
serverShared.lockLifecycleRead()
defer serverShared.unlockLifecycleRead()
cs, _ := ss.Get(r.Data.GetId())
reporter, _ := ServerShared.Get(r.Reporter)
reporter, _ := serverShared.Get(r.Reporter)
// 入站结果必须匹配出站任务派发边界,避免 agent 伪造其他服务 ID 写入监控状态。
if !canReportServiceResult(cs, reporter, r.Data.GetType()) {
log.Printf("NEZHA>> Incorrect service monitor report %+v", r)
continue
return
}
if ss.serviceReportValidatedHook != nil {
ss.serviceReportValidatedHook(r.Data.GetId())
}
mh := r.Data
m := serverShared.GetList()
// Serialize Delete and Update before this accepted report causes any side effect.
ss.serviceResponseDataStoreLock.Lock()
defer ss.serviceResponseDataStoreLock.Unlock()
serviceStatusToday := ss.serviceStatusToday[mh.GetId()]
serviceCurrentStatusData := ss.serviceCurrentStatusData[mh.GetId()]
currentService, serviceExists := ss.Get(mh.GetId())
if serviceStatusToday == nil || serviceCurrentStatusData == nil || !serviceExists ||
!canReportServiceResult(currentService, reporter, mh.GetType()) {
ss.serviceResponseDataStoreLock.Unlock()
continue
return
}
cs = currentService
@@ -681,7 +707,6 @@ func (ss *ServiceSentinel) worker() {
serviceCurrentStatusData.result = serviceCurrentStatusData.result[:0]
}
m := ServerShared.GetList()
// 延迟报警
if mh.Delay > 0 {
delayCheck(&r, m, cs, mh)
@@ -767,8 +792,6 @@ func (ss *ServiceSentinel) worker() {
}
}
}
ss.serviceResponseDataStoreLock.Unlock()
}
}
func delayCheck(r *ReportData, m map[uint64]*model.Server, ss *model.Service, mh *pb.TaskResult) {
@@ -776,17 +799,25 @@ func delayCheck(r *ReportData, m map[uint64]*model.Server, ss *model.Service, mh
return
}
// GHSA-jx78-55p5-rwv5 (incomplete fix of GHSA-qjpp-gffx-2wm9): the server
// map snapshot m is taken outside serviceResponseDataStoreLock and
// ServerShared has its own independent lock, so a concurrent batch-delete of
// the reporter's server can remove the entry between the pre-lock validation
// and this point. Guard against the nil pointer before using the server.
reporterServer := m[r.Reporter]
if reporterServer == nil {
return
}
notificationGroupID := ss.NotificationGroupID
minMuteLabel := NotificationMuteLabel.ServiceLatencyMin(mh.GetId())
maxMuteLabel := NotificationMuteLabel.ServiceLatencyMax(mh.GetId())
if mh.Delay > ss.MaxLatency {
// 延迟超过最大值
reporterServer := m[r.Reporter]
msg := Localizer.Tf("[Latency] %s %2f > %2f, Reporter: %s", ss.Name, mh.Delay, ss.MaxLatency, reporterServer.Name)
go NotificationShared.SendNotification(notificationGroupID, msg, minMuteLabel)
} else if mh.Delay < ss.MinLatency {
// 延迟低于最小值
reporterServer := m[r.Reporter]
msg := Localizer.Tf("[Latency] %s %2f < %2f, Reporter: %s", ss.Name, mh.Delay, ss.MinLatency, reporterServer.Name)
go NotificationShared.SendNotification(notificationGroupID, msg, maxMuteLabel)
} else {
@@ -798,10 +829,16 @@ func delayCheck(r *ReportData, m map[uint64]*model.Server, ss *model.Service, mh
func notifyCheck(r *ReportData, m map[uint64]*model.Server,
ss *model.Service, mh *pb.TaskResult, lastStatus, stateCode uint8) {
// GHSA-jx78-55p5-rwv5: guard against concurrent server deletion (same TOCTOU
// class as the 2026-07-21 fix, a few dozen lines lower in the same worker).
// ServerShared has its own lock; m is a snapshot taken outside
// serviceResponseDataStoreLock, so the server may have been removed between
// the pre-lock validation and here.
reporterServer := m[r.Reporter]
// 判断是否需要发送通知
isNeedSendNotification := ss.Notify && (lastStatus != 0 || stateCode == StatusDown)
if isNeedSendNotification {
reporterServer := m[r.Reporter]
if isNeedSendNotification && reporterServer != nil {
notificationGroupID := ss.NotificationGroupID
notificationMsg := Localizer.Tf("[%s] %s Reporter: %s, Error: %s", StatusCodeToString(stateCode), ss.Name, reporterServer.Name, mh.Data)
muteLabel := NotificationMuteLabel.ServiceStateChanged(mh.GetId())
@@ -816,8 +853,7 @@ func notifyCheck(r *ReportData, m map[uint64]*model.Server,
// 判断是否需要触发任务
isNeedTriggerTask := ss.EnableTriggerTask && lastStatus != 0
if isNeedTriggerTask {
reporterServer := m[r.Reporter]
if isNeedTriggerTask && reporterServer != nil {
if stateCode == StatusGood && lastStatus != stateCode {
// 当前状态正常 前序状态非正常时 触发恢复任务
go CronShared.SendTriggerTasks(ss.RecoverTriggerTasks, reporterServer.ID, ss.UserID)
@@ -13,8 +13,183 @@ import (
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
)
// Regression markers for Finding 1 and Finding 2 of GHSA-jx78-55p5-rwv5
// (incomplete fix of GHSA-qjpp-gffx-2wm9).
const (
concurrentServerDeleteSuccessMarker = "ghsa-jx78-55p5-rwv5-finding1-no-crash"
deleteUnknownIDSuccessMarker = "ghsa-jx78-55p5-rwv5-finding2-no-zombie"
)
const serviceSentinelLifecycleSuccessMarker = "service-sentinel-stale-report-lifecycle-success"
func TestServiceSentinelReporterDeleteWaitsForSynchronousReportProcessing(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), time.Second)
defer cancel()
ss := newServiceMonitorSecurityHarness(t,
&model.Server{Common: model.Common{ID: 1, UserID: 1}, Name: "reporter"},
)
service := &model.Service{
Common: model.Common{ID: 10, UserID: 1},
Name: "lifecycle-service",
Type: model.TaskTypeTCPPing,
Target: "lifecycle.example.invalid:443",
Duration: 3600,
Cover: model.ServiceCoverIgnoreAll,
SkipServers: map[uint64]bool{1: true},
}
addServiceMonitorSecurityService(t, ss, service)
reportValidated := make(chan struct{})
releaseReport := make(chan struct{})
var releaseOnce sync.Once
release := func() { releaseOnce.Do(func() { close(releaseReport) }) }
ss.serviceReportValidatedHook = func(serviceID uint64) {
if serviceID == service.ID {
close(reportValidated)
<-releaseReport
}
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
release()
ss.Close()
})
ss.Dispatch(serviceMonitorResult(1, service.ID, model.TaskTypeTCPPing, true))
select {
case <-reportValidated:
case <-ctx.Done():
t.Fatal(ctx.Err())
}
deleteDone := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
ServerShared.Delete([]uint64{1})
close(deleteDone)
}()
select {
case <-deleteDone:
t.Fatal("server deletion returned before the accepted report completed")
case <-time.After(25 * time.Millisecond):
}
release()
select {
case <-deleteDone:
case <-ctx.Done():
t.Fatal(ctx.Err())
}
var historyCount int64
if err := DB.Model(&model.ServiceHistory{}).
Where("service_id = ? AND server_id = ?", service.ID, 1).
Count(&historyCount).Error; err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if historyCount != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected report side effects before deletion returned, got %d history rows", historyCount)
}
if _, ok := ServerShared.Get(1); ok {
t.Fatal("expected reporter to be deleted after the report completed")
}
}
func TestServiceSentinelWorkerRejectsReportAfterReporterDeletion(t *testing.T) {
ss := newServiceMonitorSecurityHarness(t,
&model.Server{Common: model.Common{ID: 1, UserID: 1}, Name: "reporter"},
)
service := &model.Service{
Common: model.Common{ID: 10, UserID: 1},
Name: "deleted-reporter-service",
Type: model.TaskTypeTCPPing,
Target: "deleted-reporter.example.invalid:443",
Duration: 3600,
Cover: model.ServiceCoverIgnoreAll,
SkipServers: map[uint64]bool{1: true},
}
addServiceMonitorSecurityService(t, ss, service)
ServerShared.Delete([]uint64{1})
ss.Dispatch(serviceMonitorResult(1, service.ID, model.TaskTypeTCPPing, true))
ss.Close()
var historyCount int64
if err := DB.Model(&model.ServiceHistory{}).
Where("service_id = ? AND server_id = ?", service.ID, 1).
Count(&historyCount).Error; err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if historyCount != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected no history after reporter deletion, got %d rows", historyCount)
}
ss.serviceResponseDataStoreLock.RLock()
_, pingCached := ss.serviceResponsePing[service.ID]
_, responseCached := ss.serviceResponseDataStore[service.ID]
stats := ss.serviceStatusToday[service.ID]
ss.serviceResponseDataStoreLock.RUnlock()
if pingCached {
t.Fatal("expected no ping cache side effect after reporter deletion")
}
if responseCached {
t.Fatal("expected no response cache side effect after reporter deletion")
}
if stats == nil || stats.Up != 0 || stats.Down != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected no stats side effect after reporter deletion, got %+v", stats)
}
}
func TestServiceSentinelWorkerRecoversPerReportPanic(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), time.Second)
defer cancel()
ss := newServiceMonitorSecurityHarness(t,
&model.Server{Common: model.Common{ID: 1, UserID: 1}, Name: "reporter"},
)
panicService := &model.Service{
Common: model.Common{ID: 10, UserID: 1},
Name: "panic-service",
Type: model.TaskTypeHTTPGet,
Target: "https://panic.example.invalid",
Duration: 3600,
Cover: model.ServiceCoverIgnoreAll,
SkipServers: map[uint64]bool{1: true},
}
validService := &model.Service{
Common: model.Common{ID: 20, UserID: 1},
Name: "valid-service",
Type: model.TaskTypeTCPPing,
Target: "valid.example.invalid:443",
Duration: 3600,
Cover: model.ServiceCoverIgnoreAll,
SkipServers: map[uint64]bool{1: true},
}
addServiceMonitorSecurityService(t, ss, panicService)
addServiceMonitorSecurityService(t, ss, validService)
ss.serviceReportBeforeTLSSideEffectsHook = func(serviceID uint64) {
if serviceID == panicService.ID {
panic("test service report panic")
}
}
ss.Dispatch(serviceMonitorResult(1, panicService.ID, model.TaskTypeHTTPGet, true))
ss.Dispatch(serviceMonitorResult(1, validService.ID, model.TaskTypeTCPPing, true))
waitForServiceHistory(t, validService.ID, 1)
ss.Close()
if !ss.serviceResponseDataStoreLock.TryLock() {
t.Fatal("panic leaked the service response lock")
}
ss.serviceResponseDataStoreLock.Unlock()
deleteDone := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
ServerShared.Delete([]uint64{1})
close(deleteDone)
}()
select {
case <-deleteDone:
case <-ctx.Done():
t.Fatal("panic leaked a lifecycle lock: " + ctx.Err().Error())
}
}
func TestServiceSentinelWorkerIgnoresStaleReportAfterDeletion(t *testing.T) {
if os.Getenv("NEZHA_SERVICE_SENTINEL_LIFECYCLE_CHILD") == "1" {
testServiceSentinelWorkerIgnoresStaleReportAfterDeletionChild(t)
@@ -299,3 +474,173 @@ func TestServiceSentinelWorkerHoldsResponseLockDuringTLSSideEffects(t *testing.T
t.Fatalf("expected TLS cache %q, got %q", report.Data.Data, cachedCertificate)
}
}
// TestServiceSentinelWorkerSurvivesConcurrentReporterServerDelete is a
// regression test for GHSA-jx78-55p5-rwv5 Finding 1 (incomplete fix of
// GHSA-qjpp-gffx-2wm9).
//
// The vulnerability: after the 2026-07-21 fix, the worker re-validates the
// service under serviceResponseDataStoreLock, but then takes a fresh snapshot
// m := ServerShared.GetList() with no guard. A concurrent batch-delete of the
// reporter's own server removes it between the pre-lock validation and the
// GetList call, so m[r.Reporter] is nil. delayCheck and notifyCheck then
// dereference m[r.Reporter].Name unconditionally — SIGSEGV.
//
// The subprocess-isolation pattern is used because the pre-fix code path
// panicked (nil pointer dereference in an unrecovered goroutine), which would
// crash the whole test binary rather than simply failing a single test.
func TestServiceSentinelWorkerSurvivesConcurrentReporterServerDelete(t *testing.T) {
if os.Getenv("NEZHA_SENTINEL_CONCURRENT_DELETE_CHILD") == "1" {
testServiceSentinelWorkerSurvivesConcurrentReporterServerDeleteChild(t)
return
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
child := exec.CommandContext(ctx, os.Args[0],
"-test.run=^TestServiceSentinelWorkerSurvivesConcurrentReporterServerDelete$",
"-test.v",
)
child.Env = append(os.Environ(), "NEZHA_SENTINEL_CONCURRENT_DELETE_CHILD=1")
output, err := child.CombinedOutput()
if ctx.Err() != nil {
t.Fatalf("child process timed out: %v\n%s", ctx.Err(), output)
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("child process crashed (likely nil deref in delayCheck/notifyCheck): %v\n%s", err, output)
}
if !strings.Contains(string(output), concurrentServerDeleteSuccessMarker) {
t.Fatalf("child did not print success marker:\n%s", output)
}
}
func testServiceSentinelWorkerSurvivesConcurrentReporterServerDeleteChild(t *testing.T) {
// Given: a reporter server and a service with latency-alerting enabled so
// that delayCheck (the vulnerable sink at line 785) is exercised on every
// dispatch. MaxLatency=1 ensures delay=12 always exceeds the threshold and
// the notification branch (not just the mute-clear branch) is taken.
ss := newServiceMonitorSecurityHarness(t,
&model.Server{Common: model.Common{ID: 1, UserID: 1}, Name: "reporter"},
)
service := &model.Service{
Common: model.Common{ID: 10, UserID: 1},
Name: "latency-service",
Type: model.TaskTypeTCPPing,
Target: "example.invalid:443",
Duration: 3600,
Cover: model.ServiceCoverIgnoreAll,
SkipServers: map[uint64]bool{1: true},
LatencyNotify: true,
MaxLatency: 1,
}
addServiceMonitorSecurityService(t, ss, service)
reportProcessing := make(chan struct{})
releaseWorker := make(chan struct{})
var releaseOnce sync.Once
releaseWorkerFn := func() { releaseOnce.Do(func() { close(releaseWorker) }) }
// serviceReportValidatedHook runs while the report holds the lifecycle read
// lock. Deletion must therefore run in another goroutine and wait until this
// hook releases; attempting Delete here would try to upgrade the RWMutex.
ss.serviceReportValidatedHook = func(serviceID uint64) {
if serviceID == service.ID {
close(reportProcessing)
<-releaseWorker
}
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
releaseWorkerFn()
ss.Close()
})
// When
ss.Dispatch(serviceMonitorResult(1, service.ID, model.TaskTypeTCPPing, true))
select {
case <-reportProcessing:
case <-t.Context().Done():
t.Fatal(t.Context().Err())
}
deleteDone := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
ServerShared.Delete([]uint64{1})
close(deleteDone)
}()
releaseWorkerFn()
select {
case <-deleteDone:
case <-t.Context().Done():
t.Fatal(t.Context().Err())
}
ss.Close()
// Then: no crash; the worker handled the nil reporter gracefully.
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(os.Stdout, concurrentServerDeleteSuccessMarker); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
// TestServiceSentinelDeleteWithUnknownIDDoesNotLeaveZombies is a regression
// test for GHSA-jx78-55p5-rwv5 Finding 2 (low severity).
//
// The vulnerability: ServiceSentinel.Delete iterates the caller-supplied id
// slice and does CronShared.Remove(ss.services[id].CronJobID) without checking
// whether id is present in ss.services. CheckPermission returns vacuously
// true for unknown ids, so the controller layer cannot block this path.
// ss.services[unknownID] returns nil, and .CronJobID panics. Because the
// panic aborts the loop, every id ordered AFTER the bogus one is never removed
// from the in-memory registry even though its database row was already deleted,
// producing zombie services that keep dispatching cron probes.
func TestServiceSentinelDeleteWithUnknownIDDoesNotLeaveZombies(t *testing.T) {
// Given: one legitimate service (ID 10) registered in the sentinel.
ss := newServiceMonitorSecurityHarness(t,
&model.Server{Common: model.Common{ID: 1, UserID: 1}, Name: "reporter"},
)
service := &model.Service{
Common: model.Common{ID: 10, UserID: 1},
Name: "real-service",
Type: model.TaskTypeTCPPing,
Target: "example.invalid:443",
Duration: 3600,
Cover: model.ServiceCoverIgnoreAll,
SkipServers: map[uint64]bool{1: true},
}
addServiceMonitorSecurityService(t, ss, service)
// When: Delete is called with a bogus ID first, then the real service ID.
// Before the fix this panicked on ss.services[99999].CronJobID and left
// service 10 as a zombie.
ss.Delete([]uint64{99999, service.ID})
// Then: the real service must be fully removed from every in-memory map.
ss.serviceResponseDataStoreLock.RLock()
_, todayPresent := ss.serviceStatusToday[service.ID]
_, pingPresent := ss.serviceResponsePing[service.ID]
ss.serviceResponseDataStoreLock.RUnlock()
ss.servicesLock.RLock()
_, servicePresent := ss.services[service.ID]
ss.servicesLock.RUnlock()
ss.monthlyStatusLock.Lock()
_, monthlyPresent := ss.monthlyStatus[service.ID]
ss.monthlyStatusLock.Unlock()
if todayPresent {
t.Error("zombie: serviceStatusToday still contains the deleted service")
}
if pingPresent {
t.Error("zombie: serviceResponsePing still contains the deleted service")
}
if servicePresent {
t.Error("zombie: services map still contains the deleted service")
}
if monthlyPresent {
t.Error("zombie: monthlyStatus still contains the deleted service")
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(os.Stdout, deleteUnknownIDSuccessMarker); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
+3
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ func NewEmptyServerClassForTest() *ServerClass {
// InsertForTest 把一个 server 直接塞进内存表与排序快照,跳过 DB & InitServer 逻辑。
// 调用方需保证 server.ID 已经设置。
func (c *ServerClass) InsertForTest(s *model.Server) {
c.lockLifecycleWrite()
defer c.unlockLifecycleWrite()
c.listMu.Lock()
c.list[s.ID] = s
if s.UUID != "" {