feat(auth): add PAT auth, scoped REST/MCP access, CSRF, and tenant isolation

Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.

Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.

Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.

Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.

Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>

cmd/dashboard/controller/mcp_tools_exec_timeout_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+package controller
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
+)
+
+func TestServerExec_RejectsOutOfRangeTimeoutSeconds(t *testing.T) {
+	cleanup, uid := setupMCPTest(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+	tok, _ := mkToken(t, uid, []string{model.ScopeServerExec}, nil)
+
+	// timeout_seconds is documented as 1..300 in the tool schema; sending
+	// 1_000_000 would otherwise let the dashboard wait ~1e6s on rpc.CallAgent
+	// when the agent is unreachable / old, turning one MCP call into a
+	// long-lived goroutine + connection occupation. Handler must reject
+	// before touching the RPC layer.
+	c, w := mcpCallCtx(t, tok, uid, jsonRPCRequest{
+		JSONRPC: "2.0", ID: json.RawMessage("1"), Method: "tools/call",
+		Params: jsonObj(t, toolCallParams{
+			Name: "server.exec",
+			Arguments: jsonRaw(map[string]any{
+				"server_id":       7,
+				"cmd":             "echo",
+				"timeout_seconds": 1_000_000,
+			}),
+		}),
+	})
+	mcpEndpoint(c)
+	_, tcr := decodeRPC(w)
+	require.NotNil(t, tcr)
+	require.True(t, tcr.IsError, "expected isError=true for out-of-range timeout, got %+v", tcr)
+	require.Contains(t, tcr.Content[0].Text, "timeout_seconds")
+}
+
+func TestServerExec_RejectsZeroLikeNegativeTimeoutBoundary(t *testing.T) {
+	cleanup, uid := setupMCPTest(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+	tok, _ := mkToken(t, uid, []string{model.ScopeServerExec}, nil)
+
+	// 301s sits one above the documented maximum. The previous handler
+	// happily forwarded it as-is and added +5s to the dashboard-side wait,
+	// so any client could ignore the schema bound. Pin the rejection.
+	c, w := mcpCallCtx(t, tok, uid, jsonRPCRequest{
+		JSONRPC: "2.0", ID: json.RawMessage("1"), Method: "tools/call",
+		Params: jsonObj(t, toolCallParams{
+			Name: "server.exec",
+			Arguments: jsonRaw(map[string]any{
+				"server_id":       7,
+				"cmd":             "echo",
+				"timeout_seconds": 301,
+			}),
+		}),
+	})
+	mcpEndpoint(c)
+	_, tcr := decodeRPC(w)
+	require.True(t, tcr.IsError)
+	require.Contains(t, tcr.Content[0].Text, "timeout_seconds")
+}