feat(auth): add PAT auth, scoped REST/MCP access, CSRF, and tenant isolation

Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.

Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.

Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.

Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.

Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>

cmd/dashboard/controller/mcp_transfer_consume_authz_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+package controller
+
+import (
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
+	"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton"
+)
+
+func TestTransferConsume_RevokedTokenIsRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	ts, tok, cleanup := setupTransferTest(t, xferAgentDownloadSend([]byte("ok")))
+	defer cleanup()
+	url := mintDownloadURL(t, ts, tok, "/srv/file")
+
+	if err := singleton.DB.Where("token_hash = ?", model.HashAPIToken(tok)).
+		Delete(&model.APIToken{}).Error; err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("revoke token: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	resp, err := http.Get(url)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+	require.Equalf(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,
+		"download URL must return 401 after the originating PAT is revoked; body=%s", string(body))
+}
+
+func TestTransferConsume_NarrowedServerWhitelistIsRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	ts, tok, cleanup := setupTransferTest(t, xferAgentDownloadSend([]byte("ok")))
+	defer cleanup()
+	url := mintDownloadURL(t, ts, tok, "/srv/file")
+
+	var stored model.APIToken
+	require.NoError(t, singleton.DB.Where("token_hash = ?", model.HashAPIToken(tok)).
+		First(&stored).Error)
+	stored.SetServerIDs([]uint64{999})
+	require.NoError(t, singleton.DB.Save(&stored).Error)
+
+	resp, err := http.Get(url)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+	require.Equalf(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,
+		"download URL must return 401 after PAT server_ids no longer cover the target; body=%s", string(body))
+}
+
+func TestTransferConsume_ServerOwnershipChangeIsRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	ts, tok, cleanup := setupTransferTest(t, xferAgentDownloadSend([]byte("ok")))
+	defer cleanup()
+	url := mintDownloadURL(t, ts, tok, "/srv/file")
+
+	srv, _ := singleton.ServerShared.Get(7)
+	require.NotNil(t, srv)
+	srv.SetUserID(99999)
+
+	resp, err := http.Get(url)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+	require.Equalf(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,
+		"download URL must return 401 after server is transferred away from the minting user; body=%s", string(body))
+}