feat(auth): add PAT auth, scoped REST/MCP access, CSRF, and tenant isolation

Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race. Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete, transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract. Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods, exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation. Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants. Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-19 17:50:12 +00:00 · 2026-05-30 15:56:44 +00:00
parent 58c1ea7b0b
commit ab25662ddd
153 changed files with 16974 additions and 244 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+package controller
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
+	"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton"
+)
+
+func newTriggerTaskCtxWithPAT(viewer *model.User, tok *model.APIToken) *gin.Context {
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(httptest.NewRecorder())
+	c.Request = httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/service", http.NoBody)
+	if viewer != nil {
+		c.Set(model.CtxKeyAuthorizedUser, viewer)
+	}
+	if tok != nil {
+		c.Set(model.CtxKeyAPIToken, tok)
+		c.Set(apiTokenCtxKey, tok)
+	}
+	return c
+}
+
+// 注册一个用户 1 拥有的触发任务，使 CronShared.CheckPermission 通过，
+// 从而隔离出「PAT 缺少 cron:exec」这一条裁决路径。
+func registerOwnerTriggerTask(t *testing.T, id uint64) {
+	t.Helper()
+	singleton.CronShared.Update(&model.Cron{
+		Common:   model.Common{ID: id, UserID: 1},
+		Name:     "trigger",
+		TaskType: model.CronTypeTriggerTask,
+		Cover:    model.CronCoverAll,
+	})
+}
+
+func TestValidateServersPATTriggerTaskRequiresCronExec(t *testing.T) {
+	setupAlertRuleFanoutFixture(t)
+	registerOwnerTriggerTask(t, 100)
+
+	viewer := &model.User{Common: model.Common{ID: 1}, Role: model.RoleAdmin}
+
+	noExec := &model.APIToken{ID: 10, UserID: 1}
+	noExec.SetScopes([]string{model.ScopeServiceWrite})
+	svc := &model.Service{
+		Common:            model.Common{UserID: 1},
+		EnableTriggerTask: true,
+		FailTriggerTasks:  []uint64{100},
+	}
+	require.Error(t, validateServers(newTriggerTaskCtxWithPAT(viewer, noExec), svc),
+		"service:write PAT must not bind a trigger task without cron:exec")
+
+	withExec := &model.APIToken{ID: 11, UserID: 1}
+	withExec.SetScopes([]string{model.ScopeServiceWrite, model.ScopeCronExec})
+	require.NoError(t, validateServers(newTriggerTaskCtxWithPAT(viewer, withExec), svc),
+		"service:write + cron:exec PAT may bind a trigger task")
+}
+
+func TestValidateRulePATTriggerTaskRequiresCronExec(t *testing.T) {
+	setupAlertRuleFanoutFixture(t)
+	registerOwnerTriggerTask(t, 200)
+
+	viewer := &model.User{Common: model.Common{ID: 1}, Role: model.RoleAdmin}
+
+	noExec := &model.APIToken{ID: 12, UserID: 1}
+	noExec.SetScopes([]string{model.ScopeAlertRuleWrite})
+	rule := &model.AlertRule{
+		Common:              model.Common{UserID: 1},
+		Name:                "r",
+		Rules:               []*model.Rule{{Type: "offline", Cover: model.RuleCoverAll, Duration: 10, Ignore: map[uint64]bool{}}},
+		RecoverTriggerTasks: []uint64{200},
+	}
+	require.Error(t, validateRule(newTriggerTaskCtxWithPAT(viewer, noExec), rule),
+		"alertrule:write PAT must not bind a trigger task without cron:exec")
+
+	withExec := &model.APIToken{ID: 13, UserID: 1}
+	withExec.SetScopes([]string{model.ScopeAlertRuleWrite, model.ScopeCronExec})
+	require.NoError(t, validateRule(newTriggerTaskCtxWithPAT(viewer, withExec), rule),
+		"alertrule:write + cron:exec PAT may bind a trigger task")
+}
+
+// JWT 调用者（无 PAT）不受 cron:exec 收口影响。
+func TestValidateServersJWTUnaffectedByTriggerTaskScope(t *testing.T) {
+	setupAlertRuleFanoutFixture(t)
+	registerOwnerTriggerTask(t, 300)
+
+	viewer := &model.User{Common: model.Common{ID: 1}, Role: model.RoleAdmin}
+	svc := &model.Service{
+		Common:            model.Common{UserID: 1},
+		EnableTriggerTask: true,
+		FailTriggerTasks:  []uint64{300},
+	}
+	require.NoError(t, validateServers(newTriggerTaskCtxWithPAT(viewer, nil), svc),
+		"JWT caller must not be gated by cron:exec")
+}