feat(auth): add PAT auth, scoped REST/MCP access, CSRF, and tenant isolation

Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.

Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.

Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.

Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.

Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>

model/cron_admin_pat_whitelist_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+package model
+
+import (
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+)
+
+// C1 regression: an admin-owned CronCoverAll fans out to every server in the
+// system at runtime (CronTrigger gates on userIsAdmin(cr.UserID)). A
+// server-limited PAT created by that admin must therefore only pass
+// HasPermission when its deny-list covers EVERY server outside its whitelist
+// system-wide — not just the admin's own servers, which is the visibly
+// degenerate set that OwnerServerIDsLookup returns today.
+//
+// Without this regression, an admin with a PAT scoped to server X can create
+// a CronCoverAll cron with deny-list = [X] and the dashboard will cheerfully
+// dispatch the command to every OTHER user's server.
+func TestCronHasPermission_AdminOwnerCoverAllDeniesUntilDenyListCoversAllOtherServers(t *testing.T) {
+	saved := OwnerServerIDsLookup
+	savedAdmin := OwnerIsAdminLookup
+	savedAll := AllServerIDsLookup
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		OwnerServerIDsLookup = saved
+		OwnerIsAdminLookup = savedAdmin
+		AllServerIDsLookup = savedAll
+	})
+
+	// Admin (uid=1) owns only server 1. Member (uid=200) owns server 2.
+	OwnerServerIDsLookup = func(ownerUID uint64) []uint64 {
+		switch ownerUID {
+		case 1:
+			return []uint64{1}
+		case 200:
+			return []uint64{2}
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	OwnerIsAdminLookup = func(uid uint64) bool { return uid == 1 }
+	AllServerIDsLookup = func() []uint64 { return []uint64{1, 2} }
+
+	// Limited PAT (admin's) — scoped to server 1 only.
+	pat := &stubPATAccessor{ids: []uint64{1}}
+
+	t.Run("deny_list_missing_other_owner_server_must_reject", func(t *testing.T) {
+		cron := &Cron{
+			Common:  Common{ID: 9, UserID: 1}, // admin-owned
+			Cover:   CronCoverAll,
+			Servers: []uint64{1}, // deny self, but NOT server 2 (member's)
+		}
+		ctx, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(httptest.NewRecorder())
+		ctx.Set(CtxKeyAuthorizedUser, &User{Common: Common{ID: 1}, Role: RoleAdmin})
+		ctx.Set(CtxKeyAPIToken, pat)
+
+		if cron.HasPermission(ctx) {
+			t.Fatal("admin-owned CronCoverAll fans out to ALL servers at runtime; " +
+				"deny-list missing server 2 must reject a PAT scoped to [1] — otherwise " +
+				"the cron will execute on a foreign user's server")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("deny_list_covers_all_other_servers_passes", func(t *testing.T) {
+		cron := &Cron{
+			Common:  Common{ID: 10, UserID: 1},
+			Cover:   CronCoverAll,
+			Servers: []uint64{2}, // deny the only server outside PAT whitelist
+		}
+		ctx, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(httptest.NewRecorder())
+		ctx.Set(CtxKeyAuthorizedUser, &User{Common: Common{ID: 1}, Role: RoleAdmin})
+		ctx.Set(CtxKeyAPIToken, pat)
+
+		if !cron.HasPermission(ctx) {
+			t.Fatal("deny-list covering every non-whitelisted server must pass: fan-out " +
+				"is now contained inside the PAT whitelist")
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// Companion: member-owned crons must NOT use the system-wide fan-out set.
+// Runtime CronTrigger only ships to servers whose UserID matches the
+// member-owner; HasPermission must mirror that to avoid false rejects on
+// completely legitimate configs.
+func TestCronHasPermission_MemberOwnerCoverAllStillUsesOwnerSet(t *testing.T) {
+	saved := OwnerServerIDsLookup
+	savedAdmin := OwnerIsAdminLookup
+	savedAll := AllServerIDsLookup
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		OwnerServerIDsLookup = saved
+		OwnerIsAdminLookup = savedAdmin
+		AllServerIDsLookup = savedAll
+	})
+
+	OwnerServerIDsLookup = func(ownerUID uint64) []uint64 {
+		if ownerUID == 100 {
+			return []uint64{1}
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	OwnerIsAdminLookup = func(uid uint64) bool { return false }
+	AllServerIDsLookup = func() []uint64 { return []uint64{1, 2, 3} }
+
+	cron := &Cron{
+		Common:  Common{ID: 9, UserID: 100},
+		Cover:   CronCoverAll,
+		Servers: []uint64{}, // empty deny-list: fan-out = owner-set = [1]
+	}
+	ctx, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(httptest.NewRecorder())
+	ctx.Set(CtxKeyAuthorizedUser, &User{Common: Common{ID: 100}, Role: RoleMember})
+	// PAT whitelist = [1] — covers everything the member owner can fan out to.
+	ctx.Set(CtxKeyAPIToken, &stubPATAccessor{ids: []uint64{1}})
+
+	if !cron.HasPermission(ctx) {
+		t.Fatal("member-owned CronCoverAll fans out to owner servers only; PAT [1] covers them all")
+	}
+}