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feat(auth): add PAT auth, scoped REST/MCP access, CSRF, and tenant isolation

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Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.

Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.

Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.

Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.

Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
naiba
2026-05-30 15:56:44 +00:00
co-authored by cloudcode
parent 58c1ea7b0b
commit ab25662ddd
153 changed files with 16974 additions and 244 deletions
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service/singleton/server_transfer.go
+8 -15
View File
@@ -232,20 +232,6 @@ func NewServerTransferClass() *ServerTransferClass {
}
c.pending[t.ServerID] = &t
}
for i := range pending {
t := pending[i]
// Skip ghost rows whose server has been deleted out from under
// the transfer (e.g. before OnServersDeleted existed, or because
// the row predates this branch). Loading them would resurrect a
// HasPending state that no longer corresponds to a real server
// and the timeout sweeper would log errors every 30s without
// being able to settle the row.
if s, ok := ServerShared.Get(t.ServerID); !ok || s == nil {
log.Printf("NEZHA>> ServerTransferClass: ignoring pending transfer %d for missing server %d (likely a leftover from before OnServersDeleted was wired)", t.ID, t.ServerID)
continue
}
c.pending[t.ServerID] = &t
}
var reverted []model.ServerTransfer
// acked_at IS NULL is non-negotiable: MarkRevertDelivered persists
@@ -927,7 +913,14 @@ func (c *ServerTransferClass) sendApplyConfigTask(s *model.Server, stream pb.Nez
// Keep Send synchronous under the per-server lock. A goroutine+timeout cannot
// cancel grpc.ServerStream.Send; returning early would let a stale new-secret
// ApplyConfig complete after a cancel/fail revert and overwrite the rollback.
if err := stream.Send(task); err != nil {
//
// Route through Server.SendTask so the holder-scoped send mutex is
// honoured: cron / MCP CallAgent / MCP fs.transfer dispatch on the same
// gRPC stream and would otherwise race grpc-go's one-SendMsg-per-stream
// invariant. The captured stream argument is still passed to
// ClearTaskStreamIfCurrent so a reconnect mid-Send cannot wipe a newer
// published stream when Send fails on the stale one.
if err := s.SendTask(task); err != nil {
log.Printf("NEZHA>> ServerTransfer ApplyConfig send failed: serverID=%d transferID=%d: %v", s.ID, task.Id, err)
s.ClearTaskStreamIfCurrent(stream)
return err