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feat(auth): add PAT auth, scoped REST/MCP access, CSRF, and tenant isolation

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Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.

Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.

Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.

Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.

Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
naiba
2026-05-30 15:56:44 +00:00
co-authored by cloudcode
parent 029695344c
commit e8dabf5bc6
153 changed files with 16974 additions and 244 deletions
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cmd/dashboard/controller/alertrule.go
+9 -2
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package controller
import (
"maps"
"slices"
"strconv"
"time"
@@ -168,9 +167,14 @@ func batchDeleteAlertRule(c *gin.Context) (any, error) {
}
func validateRule(c *gin.Context, r *model.AlertRule) error {
if !r.HasPermission(c) {
return singleton.Localizer.ErrorT("permission denied")
}
if len(r.Rules) > 0 {
for _, rule := range r.Rules {
if !singleton.ServerShared.CheckPermission(c, maps.Keys(rule.Ignore)) {
switch rule.Cover {
case model.RuleCoverAll, model.RuleCoverIgnoreAll:
default:
return singleton.Localizer.ErrorT("permission denied")
}
@@ -200,6 +204,9 @@ func validateRule(c *gin.Context, r *model.AlertRule) error {
if !singleton.CronShared.CheckPermission(c, slices.Values(r.RecoverTriggerTasks)) {
return singleton.Localizer.ErrorT("permission denied")
}
if err := enforcePATTriggerTaskScope(c, r.FailTriggerTasks, r.RecoverTriggerTasks); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := assertOwnsNotificationGroup(c, r.NotificationGroupID); err != nil {
return err