feat(auth): add PAT auth, scoped REST/MCP access, CSRF, and tenant isolation

Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.

Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.

Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.

Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.

Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>

cmd/dashboard/controller/cron_update_owner_uid_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package controller
+
+import (
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+	"github.com/patrickmn/go-cache"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
+	"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/pkg/i18n"
+	"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton"
+)
+
+func setupCronUpdateOwnerUIDFixture(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	originalCache := singleton.Cache
+	originalLoc := singleton.Loc
+	originalLocalizer := singleton.Localizer
+	originalServer := singleton.ServerShared
+
+	singleton.Loc = time.UTC
+	singleton.Cache = cache.New(time.Minute, time.Minute)
+	singleton.Localizer = i18n.NewLocalizer("en_US", "nezha", "translations", i18n.Translations)
+
+	sc := singleton.NewEmptyServerClassForTest()
+	for _, id := range []uint64{1, 2} {
+		s := &model.Server{}
+		s.ID = id
+		s.SetUserID(100)
+		sc.InsertForTest(s)
+	}
+	adminServer := &model.Server{}
+	adminServer.ID = 5
+	adminServer.SetUserID(200)
+	sc.InsertForTest(adminServer)
+	singleton.ServerShared = sc
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		singleton.Cache = originalCache
+		singleton.Loc = originalLoc
+		singleton.Localizer = originalLocalizer
+		singleton.ServerShared = originalServer
+	})
+}
+
+func newCtxAsAdminWithLimitedPAT(t *testing.T, callerUID uint64, whitelist []uint64) *gin.Context {
+	t.Helper()
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(httptest.NewRecorder())
+	c.Set(model.CtxKeyAuthorizedUser, &model.User{
+		Common: model.Common{ID: callerUID},
+		Role:   model.RoleAdmin,
+	})
+	tok := &model.APIToken{ID: 33, UserID: callerUID}
+	tok.SetServerIDs(whitelist)
+	c.Set(apiTokenCtxKey, tok)
+	c.Set(model.CtxKeyAPIToken, tok)
+	return c
+}
+
+// Threat: updateCron currently calls
+//
+//	rejectImplicitCoverForLimitedPAT(c, cf.Cover, cf.Servers)
+//
+// which internally resolves the owner UID via getUid(c) (caller id). When an
+// admin uses a server-limited PAT to flip a *foreign* cron to CoverAll with
+// an under-specified deny-list, the helper validates the deny-list against
+// the admin's own servers, not the cron owner's. The admin's only owned
+// server is 5 and it's already in the whitelist, so the guard returns nil
+// even though CronTrigger will fan out to the cron owner's servers 1 and 2
+// — both outside the PAT whitelist. The correct owner is the existing
+// cron.UserID, not the caller. This test calls the helper directly with the
+// cron owner uid and pins the safe behaviour.
+func TestRejectImplicitCoverForLimitedPAT_RejectsCallerWhenCronOwnerHasUncoveredServers(t *testing.T) {
+	setupCronUpdateOwnerUIDFixture(t)
+
+	c := newCtxAsAdminWithLimitedPAT(t, 200, []uint64{5})
+
+	const cronOwnerUID = uint64(100)
+	err := rejectImplicitCoverForLimitedPATWithOwner(c, model.CronCoverAll, nil, cronOwnerUID)
+	require.Error(t, err,
+		"limited PAT must NOT pass cover-all check when the cron owner has servers outside the PAT whitelist; caller uid must not be used as owner")
+	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "permission denied")
+}
+
+// Pins the safe path: same helper, but caller uid happens to equal the cron
+// owner and the deny-list covers every owner-visible server outside the
+// whitelist. Prevents regressing the helper into a blanket "always deny
+// limited PAT" form.
+func TestRejectImplicitCoverForLimitedPAT_AllowsCallerWhenDenyListCoversEveryOwnerServerOutsideWhitelist(t *testing.T) {
+	setupCronUpdateOwnerUIDFixture(t)
+
+	c := newCtxAsAdminWithLimitedPAT(t, 100, []uint64{1})
+
+	err := rejectImplicitCoverForLimitedPATWithOwner(c, model.CronCoverAll, []uint64{2}, 100)
+	require.NoError(t, err,
+		"deny-list [2] covers every server uid 100 owns outside the PAT whitelist [1]; must pass")
+}