mirror of
https://github.com/Buriburizaem0n/nezha_domains.git
synced 2026-09-19 17:50:12 +00:00
feat(auth): add PAT auth, scoped REST/MCP access, CSRF, and tenant isolation
Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.
Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.
Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.
Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
naiba
cloudcode
@@ -0,0 +1,493 @@
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// Package controller — MCP (Model Context Protocol) server.
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//
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// 落地约束：
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// - 仅支持 Streamable HTTP transport 的 POST 半边（请求-响应、无 SSE）。
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// 首版面向 LLM 工具调用，不需要 server→client 主动推送。后续要做 GET SSE
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// 长连接（resource subscription）时再补；客户端兼容 fallback 到普通 POST。
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// - JSON-RPC 2.0 编解码内嵌于本文件，未引入第三方 MCP SDK：MCP 协议表面足够小
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// （initialize / tools/list / tools/call），自实现可控、零额外依赖。
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// - 双层鉴权：闸 1（用户对 server 的所有权）由各 tool handler 调
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// singleton.ServerShared.Get + Server.HasPermission；闸 2（PAT scope）由
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// mcpTool.RequiredScope 在 dispatch 之前过滤。
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package controller
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
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"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/rpc"
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"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton"
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)
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// --- JSON-RPC 2.0 wire types ---
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type jsonRPCRequest struct {
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JSONRPC string `json:"jsonrpc"`
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ID json.RawMessage `json:"id,omitempty"`
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Method string `json:"method"`
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Params json.RawMessage `json:"params,omitempty"`
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}
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type jsonRPCResponse struct {
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JSONRPC string `json:"jsonrpc"`
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ID json.RawMessage `json:"id,omitempty"`
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Result any `json:"result,omitempty"`
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Error *jsonRPCError `json:"error,omitempty"`
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}
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type jsonRPCError struct {
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Code int `json:"code"`
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Message string `json:"message"`
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Data any `json:"data,omitempty"`
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}
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const (
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// JSON-RPC 标准错误码
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rpcErrParse = -32700
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rpcErrInvalidRequest = -32600
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rpcErrMethodNotFound = -32601
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rpcErrInvalidParams = -32602
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rpcErrInternal = -32603
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// MCP 自定义错误码（>= -32000 高位段）
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rpcErrUnauthorized = -32001
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rpcErrForbidden = -32002
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)
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// mcpJSONRPCMaxBodyBytes caps the JSON-RPC envelope size at the dashboard
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// edge. Real fs.write base64 content goes through fs.transfer (capped
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// separately by model.MCPFsTransferMaxSize) so tools/call params here are
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// always small. The cap is intentionally generous (8 MiB) to allow
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// per-request batched arguments while making OOM-via-decode impossible.
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const mcpJSONRPCMaxBodyBytes = 8 * 1024 * 1024
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// --- MCP types ---
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// mcpServerInfo MCP initialize 响应的 serverInfo 字段。
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type mcpServerInfo struct {
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Version string `json:"version"`
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}
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type mcpInitializeResult struct {
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ProtocolVersion string `json:"protocolVersion"`
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Capabilities map[string]any `json:"capabilities"`
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ServerInfo mcpServerInfo `json:"serverInfo"`
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}
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// mcpToolDescriptor 是 tools/list 返回的单条 tool 描述。
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type mcpToolDescriptor struct {
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Description string `json:"description"`
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InputSchema map[string]any `json:"inputSchema"`
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}
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// mcpToolsListResult tools/list 响应。
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type mcpToolsListResult struct {
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Tools []mcpToolDescriptor `json:"tools"`
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}
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// mcpContent 是 tools/call 响应里 content[] 的元素。
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// 仅实现 text 类型；嵌入对象的结构化数据放在外层 structuredContent。
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type mcpContent struct {
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Type string `json:"type"`
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Text string `json:"text,omitempty"`
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}
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// mcpToolCallResult tools/call 响应。
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type mcpToolCallResult struct {
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Content []mcpContent `json:"content"`
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StructuredContent any `json:"structuredContent,omitempty"`
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IsError bool `json:"isError,omitempty"`
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}
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// --- tool 注册框架 ---
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// mcpToolHandler 实际业务逻辑：拿到 raw params + gin ctx，返回任意可序列化结构。
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type mcpToolHandler func(c *gin.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error)
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// mcpTool 是注册表里的单元：声明 + scope 要求 + 处理函数。
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type mcpTool struct {
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Name string
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Description string
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InputSchema map[string]any
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RequiredScope string // 闸 2 入口；空字符串 = 任意 PAT 都能调（如 meta.whoami）
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Handler mcpToolHandler
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}
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var (
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mcpToolsMu sync.RWMutex
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mcpTools = map[string]*mcpTool{}
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)
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// registerMCPTool 把一个 tool 加进全局注册表。建议各 tool 文件在 init() 里调用。
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func registerMCPTool(t *mcpTool) {
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if t == nil || t.Name == "" || t.Handler == nil {
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panic("registerMCPTool: invalid tool")
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}
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mcpToolsMu.Lock()
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defer mcpToolsMu.Unlock()
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if _, dup := mcpTools[t.Name]; dup {
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panic("registerMCPTool: duplicate name " + t.Name)
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}
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mcpTools[t.Name] = t
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}
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// listRegisteredMCPTools 拷贝一份当前注册表（按名字稳定排序逻辑放在调用方）。
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func listRegisteredMCPTools() []*mcpTool {
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mcpToolsMu.RLock()
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defer mcpToolsMu.RUnlock()
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out := make([]*mcpTool, 0, len(mcpTools))
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for _, t := range mcpTools {
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out = append(out, t)
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}
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return out
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}
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// --- 入口 handler ---
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// mcpEndpoint 处理 POST /mcp。
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// 鉴权：上游 apiTokenAuthMiddleware 已经把 PAT 解析到 CtxKeyAuthorizedUser，
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// 此处只要确认有 PAT 即可（不接受裸 JWT，避免浏览器误触）。
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func mcpEndpoint(c *gin.Context) {
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if singleton.Conf == nil || !singleton.Conf.MCPEnabled() {
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writeJSONRPCError(c, nil, rpcErrForbidden, "MCP is disabled by the dashboard administrator")
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return
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}
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tok := APITokenFromContext(c)
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if tok == nil {
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// 同时返回 HTTP 401 + JSON-RPC error：标准 MCP HTTP client 依赖
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// HTTP 401 触发 auth 重试/OAuth discovery；JSON-RPC body 保留旧字段
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// 不打破 ScopeDenied 类内部断言。
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writeJSONRPCErrorWithStatus(c, nil, rpcErrUnauthorized, "missing or invalid API token", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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// MaxBytesReader 必须夹在 PAT 校验通过后、ShouldBindJSON 之前——
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// 校验前限流可能让攻击者用伪造 token 触发 audit；校验后限流既挡住合法
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// PAT 的 OOM，又不会让匿名请求走到 audit 路径。
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if c.Request != nil && c.Request.Body != nil {
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c.Request.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(c.Writer, c.Request.Body, mcpJSONRPCMaxBodyBytes)
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}
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// Consume the per-token budget before validating the request so malformed
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// envelopes and malformed tools/call params cannot flood the dashboard
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// without counting against the limiter. The outcome is applied after the
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// method is known so tools/call still surfaces the rate limit as a tool
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// error rather than a transport-level error.
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rateLimited := !mcpRateLimiterShared.Allow(tok.ID)
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var req jsonRPCRequest
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if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, errors.New("http: request body too large")) || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "http: request body too large") {
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writeJSONRPCErrorWithStatus(c, nil, rpcErrInvalidRequest, "request body exceeds MCP envelope size limit", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
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return
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}
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// 限流优先：method 无从得知时，over-budget 请求即便 body 畸形也必须
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// 走 429，否则攻击者能用畸形 body 在不计入限额的情况下持续刷 parse error。
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if rateLimited {
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writeJSONRPCErrorWithStatus(c, nil, rpcErrForbidden, "rate limit exceeded for this token", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
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return
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}
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writeJSONRPCError(c, nil, rpcErrParse, "invalid json-rpc envelope: "+err.Error())
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return
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}
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if req.JSONRPC != "2.0" || req.Method == "" {
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if rateLimited {
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writeJSONRPCErrorWithStatus(c, req.ID, rpcErrForbidden, "rate limit exceeded for this token", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
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return
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}
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writeJSONRPCError(c, req.ID, rpcErrInvalidRequest, "invalid json-rpc envelope")
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return
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}
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if rateLimited {
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if req.Method == "tools/call" {
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writeToolCallError(c, req.ID, model.MCPOutcomeRateLimited, "rate limit exceeded for this token")
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return
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}
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writeJSONRPCErrorWithStatus(c, req.ID, rpcErrForbidden, "rate limit exceeded for this token", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
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return
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}
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switch req.Method {
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case "initialize":
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writeJSONRPCResult(c, req.ID, mcpInitializeResult{
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ProtocolVersion: "2024-11-05",
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Capabilities: map[string]any{
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"tools": map[string]any{"listChanged": false},
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},
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ServerInfo: mcpServerInfo{
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Name: "nezha-mcp",
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Version: singleton.Version,
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},
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})
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case "notifications/initialized", "ping":
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// 客户端通知或心跳；JSON-RPC 通知没有 id，但 ping 有 id 时返回空 result
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if len(req.ID) > 0 && string(req.ID) != "null" {
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writeJSONRPCResult(c, req.ID, struct{}{})
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return
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}
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c.Status(http.StatusAccepted)
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case "tools/list":
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writeJSONRPCResult(c, req.ID, mcpToolsListResult{
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Tools: buildToolDescriptors(),
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})
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case "tools/call":
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handleToolsCall(c, &req, tok)
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default:
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writeJSONRPCError(c, req.ID, rpcErrMethodNotFound, "method not supported: "+req.Method)
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}
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}
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func buildToolDescriptors() []mcpToolDescriptor {
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tools := listRegisteredMCPTools()
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out := make([]mcpToolDescriptor, 0, len(tools))
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for _, t := range tools {
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out = append(out, mcpToolDescriptor{
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Name: t.Name,
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Description: t.Description,
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InputSchema: t.InputSchema,
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})
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}
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return out
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}
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// toolCallParams 是 tools/call 的 params 结构。
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type toolCallParams struct {
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Arguments json.RawMessage `json:"arguments,omitempty"`
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}
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func handleToolsCall(c *gin.Context, req *jsonRPCRequest, tok *model.APIToken) {
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var p toolCallParams
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if len(req.Params) > 0 {
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if err := json.Unmarshal(req.Params, &p); err != nil {
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writeJSONRPCError(c, req.ID, rpcErrInvalidParams, "invalid arguments: "+err.Error())
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return
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}
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}
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if p.Name == "" {
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writeJSONRPCError(c, req.ID, rpcErrInvalidParams, "tool name required")
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return
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}
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mcpToolsMu.RLock()
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tool, ok := mcpTools[p.Name]
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mcpToolsMu.RUnlock()
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if !ok {
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writeJSONRPCError(c, req.ID, rpcErrMethodNotFound, "unknown tool: "+p.Name)
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return
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}
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uid := uint64(0)
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if u, ok := c.Get(model.CtxKeyAuthorizedUser); ok {
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if user, ok := u.(*model.User); ok && user != nil {
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uid = user.ID
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}
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}
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startedAt := time.Now()
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audit := model.MCPAuditLog{
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UserID: uid,
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TokenID: tok.ID,
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Tool: p.Name,
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IP: c.GetString(model.CtxKeyRealIPStr),
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}
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finish := func(outcome, errCode, errMsg string, result any) {
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audit.Outcome = outcome
|
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audit.ErrorCode = errCode
|
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audit.ErrorMsg = truncateString(errMsg, 512)
|
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audit.DurationMs = time.Since(startedAt).Milliseconds()
|
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audit.ServerID = extractServerID(p.Arguments)
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mcpAuditWrite(audit, p.Arguments)
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|
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if outcome == model.MCPOutcomeOK {
|
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textPayload := "{}"
|
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if result != nil {
|
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if b, err := json.Marshal(result); err == nil {
|
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textPayload = string(b)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
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writeJSONRPCResult(c, req.ID, mcpToolCallResult{
|
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Content: []mcpContent{{Type: "text", Text: textPayload}},
|
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StructuredContent: result,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
writeJSONRPCResult(c, req.ID, mcpToolCallResult{
|
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Content: []mcpContent{{Type: "text", Text: errMsg}},
|
||||
IsError: true,
|
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StructuredContent: map[string]string{
|
||||
"error_code": errCode,
|
||||
"error": errMsg,
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if tool.RequiredScope != "" && !tok.HasScope(tool.RequiredScope) {
|
||||
finish(model.MCPOutcomeScopeDenied, model.MCPOutcomeScopeDenied,
|
||||
"missing required scope: "+tool.RequiredScope, nil)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 让 PAT 吊销能立即中断进行中的 tools/call（如 server.exec 最长 ~305s）：
|
||||
// 派生一个可取消 ctx 注入 c.Request，下游 CallAgent 用 c.Request.Context()
|
||||
// 即会观察到取消；cancel 注册进吊销表，deleteAPIToken 会立刻触发它。
|
||||
if c.Request != nil {
|
||||
callCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(c.Request.Context())
|
||||
defer cancel()
|
||||
deregister := registerPATConnection(c, cancel)
|
||||
defer deregister()
|
||||
c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(callCtx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
result, err := tool.Handler(c, p.Arguments)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
code, msg := classifyToolError(err)
|
||||
finish(code, code, msg, nil)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
finish(model.MCPOutcomeOK, "", "", result)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// classifyToolError 把任何 handler 返回的 error 归类成审计 outcome + 安全错误消息。
|
||||
// 优先匹配 mcpError 自带的 Code；否则匹配已知的 rpc.ErrAgent* 类型，最后回退 internal。
|
||||
func classifyToolError(err error) (code, msg string) {
|
||||
if me, ok := err.(*mcpError); ok {
|
||||
return me.Code, me.Msg
|
||||
}
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, rpc.ErrAgentOffline) {
|
||||
return model.MCPOutcomeServerOffline, "agent offline"
|
||||
}
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, rpc.ErrAgentTimeout) {
|
||||
return model.MCPOutcomeAgentTimeout, "agent did not respond within timeout"
|
||||
}
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, rpc.ErrMCPDisabled) {
|
||||
// kill switch 触发的中断必须独立成 outcome，避免审计/SIEM 把
|
||||
// “管理员关了 MCP”误报成 agent 故障；错误文本透传原始原因。
|
||||
return model.MCPOutcomeMCPDisabled, err.Error()
|
||||
}
|
||||
return model.MCPOutcomeAgentError, err.Error()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// extractServerID 从 raw arguments JSON 里提取 server_id（best-effort，只用于审计字段）。
|
||||
func extractServerID(raw json.RawMessage) uint64 {
|
||||
if len(raw) == 0 {
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
var probe struct {
|
||||
ServerID uint64 `json:"server_id"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ = json.Unmarshal(raw, &probe)
|
||||
return probe.ServerID
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func truncateString(s string, max int) string {
|
||||
if len(s) <= max {
|
||||
return s
|
||||
}
|
||||
return s[:max]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// --- wire writers ---
|
||||
|
||||
func writeJSONRPCResult(c *gin.Context, id json.RawMessage, result any) {
|
||||
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, jsonRPCResponse{
|
||||
JSONRPC: "2.0",
|
||||
ID: id,
|
||||
Result: result,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func writeJSONRPCError(c *gin.Context, id json.RawMessage, code int, message string) {
|
||||
writeJSONRPCErrorWithStatus(c, id, code, message, http.StatusOK)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func writeToolCallError(c *gin.Context, id json.RawMessage, errCode, errMsg string) {
|
||||
writeJSONRPCResult(c, id, mcpToolCallResult{
|
||||
Content: []mcpContent{{Type: "text", Text: errMsg}},
|
||||
IsError: true,
|
||||
StructuredContent: map[string]string{
|
||||
"error_code": errCode,
|
||||
"error": errMsg,
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func writeJSONRPCErrorWithStatus(c *gin.Context, id json.RawMessage, code int, message string, status int) {
|
||||
c.JSON(status, jsonRPCResponse{
|
||||
JSONRPC: "2.0",
|
||||
ID: id,
|
||||
Error: &jsonRPCError{Code: code, Message: message},
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// --- 错误语义 ---
|
||||
|
||||
// mcpError 是 tool handler 可以返回的语义化错误。
|
||||
// dispatch 根据 Code 决定 audit outcome 与 JSON-RPC 错误码（如果命中 rpcErr* 域）。
|
||||
type mcpError struct {
|
||||
Code string
|
||||
Msg string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (e *mcpError) Error() string { return e.Msg }
|
||||
|
||||
func newMCPError(code, msg string) *mcpError { return &mcpError{Code: code, Msg: msg} }
|
||||
|
||||
// 预制错误
|
||||
var (
|
||||
errMCPInvalidArgs = func(s string) *mcpError { return newMCPError(model.MCPOutcomeInvalidArgs, s) }
|
||||
errMCPPermDenied = newMCPError(model.MCPOutcomePermDenied, "permission denied")
|
||||
errMCPScopeDenied = func(s string) *mcpError {
|
||||
return newMCPError(model.MCPOutcomeScopeDenied, "missing required scope: "+s)
|
||||
}
|
||||
errMCPServerOffline = newMCPError(model.MCPOutcomeServerOffline, "agent offline")
|
||||
errMCPAgentTimeout = newMCPError(model.MCPOutcomeAgentTimeout, "agent did not respond within timeout")
|
||||
errMCPUnsupported = newMCPError(model.MCPOutcomeUnsupportedAgent, "agent does not support this MCP capability; please upgrade the agent")
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// --- 共用工具 ---
|
||||
|
||||
var errNoToken = errors.New("no api token in context")
|
||||
|
||||
// decodeToolArgs 是 tool handler 用来反序列化 arguments 的辅助。
|
||||
func decodeToolArgs(raw json.RawMessage, out any) error {
|
||||
if len(raw) == 0 {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, out); err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("invalid arguments: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// requireServerAccess 是 tool handler 共用的「闸 1 + 闸 2 服务器白名单」组合校验。
|
||||
// 通过返回 *model.Server；失败返回带语义 Code 的 mcpError，便于 dispatch 归类审计。
|
||||
func requireServerAccess(c *gin.Context, serverID uint64) (*model.Server, error) {
|
||||
if serverID == 0 {
|
||||
return nil, errMCPInvalidArgs("server_id required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
tok := APITokenFromContext(c)
|
||||
if tok != nil && !tok.CanAccessServer(serverID) {
|
||||
return nil, errMCPPermDenied
|
||||
}
|
||||
server, _ := singleton.ServerShared.Get(serverID)
|
||||
if server == nil {
|
||||
return nil, errMCPServerOffline
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !server.HasPermission(c) {
|
||||
return nil, errMCPPermDenied
|
||||
}
|
||||
return server, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user