feat(auth): add PAT auth, scoped REST/MCP access, CSRF, and tenant isolation

Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.

Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.

Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.

Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.

Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>

cmd/dashboard/controller/server_group.go

@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ func listServerGroup(c *gin.Context) ([]*model.ServerGroupResponseItem, error) {
 
 	_, isMember := c.Get(model.CtxKeyAuthorizedUser)
 	isAdmin := isMember && callerIsAdmin(c)
+	pat := patAccessorFromContext(c)
+	patLimited := pat != nil && patHasServerWhitelist(c)
 
 	visibleServerIDs := make(map[uint64]struct{})
 	if !isMember {
@@ -47,6 +49,9 @@ func listServerGroup(c *gin.Context) ([]*model.ServerGroupResponseItem, error) {
 				continue
 			}
 		}
+		if pat != nil && !pat.CanAccessServer(s.ServerId) {
+			continue
+		}
 		if _, ok := groupServers[s.ServerGroupId]; !ok {
 			groupServers[s.ServerGroupId] = make([]uint64, 0)
 		}
@@ -61,6 +66,9 @@ func listServerGroup(c *gin.Context) ([]*model.ServerGroupResponseItem, error) {
 		if !isMember && len(groupServers[s.ID]) == 0 {
 			continue
 		}
+		if patLimited && len(groupServers[s.ID]) == 0 {
+			continue
+		}
 		sgRes = append(sgRes, &model.ServerGroupResponseItem{
 			Group:   s,
 			Servers: groupServers[s.ID],
@@ -169,6 +177,10 @@ func updateServerGroup(c *gin.Context) (any, error) {
 		return nil, singleton.Localizer.ErrorT("unauthorized")
 	}
 
+	if !patGroupMembershipAccessAllowed(c, sgDB.ID) {
+		return nil, singleton.Localizer.ErrorT("permission denied")
+	}
+
 	sgDB.Name = sg.Name
 
 	var count int64
@@ -237,6 +249,18 @@ func batchDeleteServerGroup(c *gin.Context) (any, error) {
 		}
 	}
 
+	if pat := patAccessorFromContext(c); pat != nil && patHasServerWhitelist(c) {
+		var members []model.ServerGroupServer
+		if err := singleton.DB.Where("server_group_id in (?)", sgs).Find(&members).Error; err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		for _, m := range members {
+			if !pat.CanAccessServer(m.ServerId) {
+				return nil, singleton.Localizer.ErrorT("permission denied")
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
 	err := singleton.DB.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
 		if err := tx.Unscoped().Delete(&model.ServerGroup{}, "id in (?)", sgs).Error; err != nil {
 			return err