feat(auth): add PAT auth, scoped REST/MCP access, CSRF, and tenant isolation

Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.

Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.

Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.

Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.

Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>

cmd/dashboard/controller/server_group_update_pat_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+package controller
+
+import (
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+	"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+
+	"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
+	"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton"
+)
+
+// H1 regression: updateServerGroup must reject a server-limited PAT whose
+// whitelist does not cover the group's CURRENT membership. Today the
+// handler only checks the incoming sg.Servers list and then unconditionally
+// `DELETE FROM server_group_server WHERE server_group_id = ?`, so a PAT
+// scoped to [X] can remove server Y (owned by another tenant or just
+// outside the whitelist) from a group it shares with X.
+func TestPatHasGroupMembershipAccess_DeniesGroupContainingOutsideServer(t *testing.T) {
+	db := newTestDB(t)
+	swap := swapSingletonDB(t, db)
+	defer swap()
+
+	if err := db.Create(&model.ServerGroupServer{
+		Common:        model.Common{ID: 1, UserID: 1},
+		ServerGroupId: 42,
+		ServerId:      9, // outside whitelist
+	}).Error; err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.Create(&model.ServerGroupServer{
+		Common:        model.Common{ID: 2, UserID: 1},
+		ServerGroupId: 42,
+		ServerId:      1, // inside whitelist
+	}).Error; err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	ctx, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(httptest.NewRecorder())
+	ctx.Set(model.CtxKeyAuthorizedUser, &model.User{Common: model.Common{ID: 1}, Role: model.RoleAdmin})
+	ctx.Set(model.CtxKeyAPIToken, &model.APIToken{ServersCSV: "1"})
+
+	if patGroupMembershipAccessAllowed(ctx, 42) {
+		t.Fatal("PAT scoped to [1] must NOT be allowed to mutate a group whose current members include server 9; " +
+			"transactional DELETE+INSERT would drop server 9 from the group")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPatHasGroupMembershipAccess_AllowsGroupFullyInsideWhitelist(t *testing.T) {
+	db := newTestDB(t)
+	swap := swapSingletonDB(t, db)
+	defer swap()
+
+	if err := db.Create(&model.ServerGroupServer{
+		Common:        model.Common{ID: 1, UserID: 1},
+		ServerGroupId: 7,
+		ServerId:      1,
+	}).Error; err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	ctx, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(httptest.NewRecorder())
+	ctx.Set(model.CtxKeyAuthorizedUser, &model.User{Common: model.Common{ID: 1}, Role: model.RoleAdmin})
+	ctx.Set(model.CtxKeyAPIToken, &model.APIToken{ServersCSV: "1,2"})
+
+	if !patGroupMembershipAccessAllowed(ctx, 7) {
+		t.Fatal("PAT whitelist [1,2] covers all current members → must allow update")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPatHasGroupMembershipAccess_JWTAlwaysAllowed(t *testing.T) {
+	db := newTestDB(t)
+	swap := swapSingletonDB(t, db)
+	defer swap()
+
+	if err := db.Create(&model.ServerGroupServer{
+		Common:        model.Common{ID: 1, UserID: 1},
+		ServerGroupId: 100,
+		ServerId:      99,
+	}).Error; err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	ctx, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(httptest.NewRecorder())
+	ctx.Set(model.CtxKeyAuthorizedUser, &model.User{Common: model.Common{ID: 1}, Role: model.RoleAdmin})
+
+	if !patGroupMembershipAccessAllowed(ctx, 100) {
+		t.Fatal("JWT requests (no PAT) must always pass — the existing admin/owner check stands")
+	}
+}
+
+func newTestDB(t *testing.T) *gorm.DB {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Open("file:"+t.Name()+"?mode=memory&cache=shared"), &gorm.Config{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.AutoMigrate(&model.ServerGroupServer{}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		sqlDB, _ := db.DB()
+		if sqlDB != nil {
+			_ = sqlDB.Close()
+		}
+	})
+	return db
+}
+
+func swapSingletonDB(t *testing.T, db *gorm.DB) func() {
+	t.Helper()
+	original := singleton.DB
+	singleton.DB = db
+	return func() { singleton.DB = original }
+}