feat(auth): add PAT auth, scoped REST/MCP access, CSRF, and tenant isolation

Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.

Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.

Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.

Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.

Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>

cmd/dashboard/controller/service_visibility_test.go

@@ -46,3 +46,40 @@ func TestUserCanViewServiceHiddenServiceAllowsAdmin(t *testing.T) {
 	admin := &model.User{Common: model.Common{ID: 1}, Role: model.RoleAdmin}
 	assert.True(t, userCanViewService(newServiceVisibilityCtx(admin), hidden), "admin must be able to see any hidden service")
 }
+
+// 钉死 admin 自己签发的 server_ids 受限 PAT 不能借助 admin 身份在
+// service 可见性入口绕过白名单：与 userCanViewServer 的 PAT-first 收口
+// 保持对称，避免 hidden service 通过 admin 早返回泄漏给受限 PAT。
+func TestUserCanViewServiceLimitedPATShouldDenyAdminWhenOutsideWhitelist(t *testing.T) {
+	hidden := &model.Service{
+		Common:      model.Common{ID: 1, UserID: 100},
+		Cover:       model.ServiceCoverIgnoreAll,
+		SkipServers: map[uint64]bool{2: true},
+	}
+	admin := &model.User{Common: model.Common{ID: 1}, Role: model.RoleAdmin}
+	tok := &model.APIToken{ID: 7, UserID: 1}
+	tok.SetServerIDs([]uint64{1})
+
+	ctx := newServiceVisibilityCtx(admin)
+	ctx.Set(model.CtxKeyAPIToken, tok)
+
+	assert.False(t, userCanViewService(ctx, hidden),
+		"admin caller using a server_ids=[1] PAT must NOT see a CoverIgnoreAll service whose only target is the non-whitelisted server 2")
+}
+
+func TestUserCanViewServiceLimitedPATAllowsAdminInsideWhitelist(t *testing.T) {
+	visible := &model.Service{
+		Common:      model.Common{ID: 2, UserID: 100},
+		Cover:       model.ServiceCoverIgnoreAll,
+		SkipServers: map[uint64]bool{1: true},
+	}
+	admin := &model.User{Common: model.Common{ID: 1}, Role: model.RoleAdmin}
+	tok := &model.APIToken{ID: 7, UserID: 1}
+	tok.SetServerIDs([]uint64{1})
+
+	ctx := newServiceVisibilityCtx(admin)
+	ctx.Set(model.CtxKeyAPIToken, tok)
+
+	assert.True(t, userCanViewService(ctx, visible),
+		"admin caller using a server_ids=[1] PAT must still see a CoverIgnoreAll service bound to whitelisted server 1")
+}