feat(auth): add PAT auth, scoped REST/MCP access, CSRF, and tenant isolation

Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.

Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.

Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.

Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.

Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
naiba
2026-05-30 15:56:44 +00:00
co-authored by cloudcode
parent 029695344c
commit e8dabf5bc6
153 changed files with 16974 additions and 244 deletions
+14
View File
@@ -78,6 +78,9 @@ func cancelServerTransfer(c *gin.Context) (*model.ServerTransfer, error) {
if err := q.First(&t, tid).Error; err != nil {
return nil, singleton.Localizer.ErrorT("permission denied")
}
if !t.HasPermission(c) {
return nil, singleton.Localizer.ErrorT("permission denied")
}
updated, err := singleton.ServerTransferShared.Cancel(tid)
if err != nil {
@@ -132,6 +135,14 @@ func retryServerTransfer(c *gin.Context) (*model.ServerTransfer, error) {
return nil, newGormError("%v", err)
}
// PAT server_ids 白名单必须在 admin short-circuit 之后再收一次,否则
// admin 给自己签发的“仅 server_ids={X}”PAT 仍能 retry 任意历史 transfer
// 行,与 ServerTransfer.HasPermission 注释和 cancelServerTransfer 已有
// 的复核语义直接冲突。
if !prev.HasPermission(c) {
return nil, singleton.Localizer.ErrorT("permission denied")
}
return singleton.ServerTransferShared.Retry(&prev, getUid(c))
}
@@ -166,6 +177,9 @@ func transferStream(c *gin.Context) (any, error) {
}
defer conn.Close()
deregisterPAT := registerPATConnection(c, func() { _ = conn.Close() })
defer deregisterPAT()
subID, ch := singleton.ServerTransferShared.Subscribe()
defer singleton.ServerTransferShared.Unsubscribe(subID)