Decouple OAuth2 callback host from agent install host. When dashboard_host
is empty, the request Host is passed through; otherwise non-reserved hosts
are pinned to dashboard_host. Added to reserved-host allowlist for NAT.
GHSA-9rc6-8cjv-rcvx: getRedirectURL derived the OAuth2 callback URL from the
raw Host header, so a forged Host (or a provider with loose redirect-URI
matching) could divert a victim's authorization code to an attacker origin and
bind their identity. Trust the request Host only when it is an operator-declared
dashboard host (IsReservedDashboardHost, same allowlist guarding NAT routing);
otherwise fall back to the configured InstallHost.
Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.
Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.
Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.
Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
naiba
