Gosec G101 treats the environment variable name NZ_JWTSECRETKEY as a hardcoded secret value. Keep the env-first JWT secret behavior unchanged and annotate the constant so CI only suppresses this false positive.
Co-authored-by: naiba/CloudCode <hi+cloudcode@nai.ba>
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
listServerGroup returned every group, including ones whose only
servers are HideForGuest=true (or that have zero members), to
unauthenticated callers. The group name itself is then leaked to
guests even though every server it references is hidden from them.
Guest visitors now only see groups that contain at least one guest-
visible server. Authenticated members and admins keep full visibility
(including their own empty groups) so management UI still works.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
GET /api/v1/file?id=<server> created an FM stream on the agent stream
and committed real state change (TaskTypeFM dispatched). With JWT
cookie SameSite=Lax a victim's browser would still send the cookie on
a top-level cross-site GET, so an attacker could trick a logged-in
user into opening an FM session on any of their own servers, consuming
resources and triggering the agent's FM machinery without consent.
Mirror the GHSA-8qhj-4f8c-j8qg fix: move the route to POST. SameSite=
Lax cookies are not sent on cross-site POST. Frontend (admin-frontend)
adjusted in a follow-up commit.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
GHSA-vrmh-5mmx-hjwx: GET /api/v1/server/:id/service and
GET /api/v1/service/:id/history both iterate the raw service list and
emit ServiceName / timing for any service that happens to monitor the
queried server, ignoring the owner's EnableShowInService=false flag.
Both routes are on optionalAuth, so unauthenticated visitors could
enumerate hidden services by name and timing.
Introduce userCanViewService(c, service):
- EnableShowInService=true -> always visible
- admin -> always visible
- authenticated owner -> visible (HasPermission)
- everyone else -> hidden
getServiceHistory rejects unknown-or-invisible service with the same
'service not found' message so the endpoint cannot be used as an
oracle. listServerServices pre-filters the sorted service list.
Owners and admins keep their existing visibility into their own hidden
services.
Tests:
- TestUserCanViewServiceVisibleServiceIsPublic
- TestUserCanViewServiceHiddenServiceRejectsGuest
- TestUserCanViewServiceHiddenServiceRejectsForeignMember
- TestUserCanViewServiceHiddenServiceAllowsOwner
- TestUserCanViewServiceHiddenServiceAllowsAdmin
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
GHSA-8qhj-4f8c-j8qg: GET /api/v1/cron/:id/manual changed shared state
on the agent stream, and the JWT cookie is SameSite=Lax so a victim's
browser would send the cookie on a top-level cross-site GET. An
attacker could trick a logged-in user into firing any of their own
cron commands.
Switch the route to POST: SameSite=Lax cookies are not sent on cross-
site POST, closing the CSRF window without introducing a new token.
Tests:
- TestCronManualTriggerRejectsCrossSiteGET locks in that GET no longer
resolves.
- TestCronManualTriggerAcceptsSameSitePOST locks in the legitimate POST
still works.
Frontend (admin-frontend) updated in a follow-up commit.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
Replace the {user_id, ip} claim pair with {keyId, uid}:
- keyId is a 32-byte random id that points to a row in the new
jwt_sessions table holding the real user id, bound IP, UA hash,
TokenVersion and expiry.
- uid is the user id encoded through pkg/idcodec; mismatch between
claim uid and session.UserID trips WAF block on the caller IP.
- identityHandler now rejects unknown/revoked/expired sessions, IP
drift and stale TokenVersion. Refresh updates session.ExpiresAt.
User.TokenVersion bumps on password change and revokes outstanding
sessions, so a leaked JWT secret alone is no longer enough to forge
a token. JWTSession rows are GC'd every 10 minutes (expired + grace
or revoked >24h). OAuth2 callback shares the same issue path.
Includes regression tests for happy path, mismatched claim uid,
revoked session, TokenVersion bump, IP drift and unknown keyId.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
New pkg/idcodec wraps sqids with an alphabet derived from the JWT
secret via HKDF-SHA256 (info="nezha/idcodec/alphabet/v1"). Rotating
NZ_JWTSECRETKEY automatically reshuffles the alphabet, which doubles
as a kill switch for outstanding hashids without touching the encoder
itself.
The base alphabet drops visually-confusable characters (0/O/o/I/l/1)
and MinLength=8 hides small integer ids. Decode round-trips through
Encode to reject inputs that decode by accident under the same
alphabet.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
NZ_JWTSECRETKEY takes priority over config.yaml, env-injected keys are
not persisted and skip the version-driven rotation. When the secret is
auto-generated as a last-resort fallback, write it via a single-field
YAML patch so we never round-trip the in-memory key back to disk.
The JWTSecretKey field is marked json:"-" yaml:"-" so Save() can no
longer leak it. Update ReadEnvFile test to lock in env-over-yaml
precedence.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
NewServerTransferClass merged Verified and acked-rollback rows and sorted
them by AckedAt only. On Windows time.Now() granularity is ~15.6ms, so
MarkVerified and an immediately-following MarkRevertDelivered routinely
share a timestamp. The stable sort then left the Verified candidate
ahead of the rollback that is actually on disk and the agent was locked
out on the next restart. Add transferID as a deterministic tiebreaker so
the later rotation always wins.
- Set GinJWTMiddleware.SigningAlgorithm to "HS256" explicitly so a future
library default change (or an alg:none confusion attempt) cannot weaken
token validation. This matches the current gin-jwt default, so behaviour
is unchanged.
- Set CookieSameSite to Lax: same as the modern-browser default, but
pinned so server-side intent is clear and CSRF on cross-site POST is
blocked while top-level GET (OAuth callback) still works.
- Move the nz-o2s OAuth2 state cookie into writeOauth2StateCookie and
set HttpOnly=true. The frontend does not read this cookie, so HttpOnly
is strictly an XSS-hardening win with no behaviour change.
JWT Cookie HttpOnly/Secure are intentionally left default for now: the
frontend reads \`!!document.cookie\` to display login state and many
deployments terminate TLS at an upstream proxy — flipping those would
require a coordinated frontend change.
Co-authored-by: naiba/CloudCode <hi+cloudcode@nai.ba>
Auth.Check resolved client_uuid → server.ID via UUIDToID without
checking that the resolved server's UserID matched the user that the
secret was bound to. An agent presenting one user's secret could
target a different user's server UUID and impersonate it — poisoning
monitoring state, triggering alerts, or quietly receiving tasks the
real owner expected.
Add authorizeAgentForUUID: if the UUID is unknown we still allow new
registration bound to the secret owner; if the UUID is known but
points to someone else's server we reject. The rejection message
"client UUID does not belong to the agent secret owner" also helps
operators trace which user's secret has leaked.
Note: this changes runtime behaviour after batch-move/server — the
new owner must reconfigure agents with their own secret. That is the
correct contract; the previous behaviour was a cross-user reporting
bug.
Co-authored-by: naiba/CloudCode <hi+cloudcode@nai.ba>
The inline magic check expressed the *invalid* form as
\`byte0 != 0xff && byte1 != 0x05 && byte2 != 0xff && byte3 == 0x05\`,
relying on && to detect a four-byte mismatch. Because && short-circuits,
any payload whose byte0 happened to be 0xff was treated as a valid magic
even if the remaining bytes did not match — almost every random payload
slipped through and only the stream-UUID layer above stood between a
caller with a valid agent secret and a live IOStream session.
Extract the check into isValidIOStreamMagic stated positively (all four
bytes must match) so short-circuit reasoning cannot reintroduce the bug.
Co-authored-by: naiba/CloudCode <hi+cloudcode@nai.ba>
The previous loop only checked ownership inside the
\`server != nil && server.TaskStream != nil\` branch. A foreign online
server returned permission denied for the whole batch while foreign
offline / unknown IDs silently went into the Offline bucket — the
response-shape delta let a RoleMember enumerate other users' online
server IDs by submitting them in batches.
Drop both foreign and unknown IDs silently into the Offline bucket
(without dispatching the upgrade task) so the response is indistinguishable
across those three states.
Co-authored-by: naiba/CloudCode <hi+cloudcode@nai.ba>
createTerminal and createFM correctly check server ownership before
issuing a stream UUID, but terminalStream and fmStream only verified
that the UUID existed. Any authenticated user holding a valid stream
UUID could attach to it, gaining the original creator's live shell or
file-manager session — and the UUID is exposed via URL path (referer
leaks, access logs, browser history, frontend error reporters).
Bind the creator user ID into ioStreamContext at CreateStream time,
expose StreamOwnership and IsStreamAuthorizedForUser, and check
ownership in terminalStream/fmStream before the WebSocket upgrade so a
rejected attempt does not tear down the legitimate stream via defer.
NAT streams are also routed through CreateStream(_, 0); they are not
reachable from /ws/terminal or /ws/file so a sentinel user ID is fine.
Co-authored-by: naiba/CloudCode <hi+cloudcode@nai.ba>
GHSA-6x26-5727-rrm9: a low-privilege member could point a DDNS webhook
at internal or loopback hosts and the dashboard would dial them with the
unrestricted utils.HttpClient.
Extract the notification SSRF defenses (CIDR blocklist, IP-pin DialContext,
SNI preservation, redirect rejection) into reusable helpers in pkg/utils
(NewRestrictedHTTPClient / ResolveAllowedHTTPURL / buildRestrictedHTTPClient)
and route the DDNS webhook through the same path. Replace the notification
inline implementation with a thin wrapper to keep behaviour identical.
Side improvements collected by the refactor:
- prepareRequest now resolves DNS once and returns the paired client, so
the dialer's pinned IP and the validated URL stay in sync (no more
double resolution between prepareRequest and SetRecords).
- response body is drained and closed.
- HttpClient / HttpClientSkipTlsVerify are explicitly tagged unsafe for
attacker-controlled URLs.
Tests cover: hermetic SNI preservation, redirect rejection, dial pin to
the vetted IP, the full blocked-CIDR list at the webhook entry point,
and the verifyTLS↔skipVerifyTLS inversion in the notification wrapper.
Co-authored-by: naiba/CloudCode <hi+cloudcode@nai.ba>
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