RetentionWindow() trimmed offline-rule samples to 1, but Check's offline
branch reads points[len-Duration:] and needs Duration samples. The window
never filled, boundCheck always returned "passed", and offline alerts never
fired a notification — while other alert types worked. Offline rules now
retain Duration samples (cycle rules still keep 1, matching their last-sample
lookback).
Fixes the prior over-correction in RetentionWindow; corrects the test that
had pinned the buggy offline=1 value, and adds offline + combined-rule
regression tests driving the real trim loop.
Trim alert samples using AlertRule.RetentionWindow() (max rule duration)
instead of Check()'s verdict max, which is 0 while a rule's window is still
filling. The old max<=0 trim wiped history every tick, so Duration>=2 general
rules never accumulated enough samples and never fired a notification.
Add model + end-to-end singleton regression tests covering sample
accumulation, the retention-window contract, and the actual notify path.
A general alert rule with Duration:0 (accepted by the API, no minimum
validation) drove fail*100/total with total==0, panicking with an integer
divide-by-zero inside checkStatus, which has no recover and would take down the
whole alert goroutine — a config-reachable DoS by any user able to create alert
rules. Skip duration<=0 rules in Check via continue (not boundCheck, which would
pollute hasPassedRule and skip sibling valid rules). Also trim the sample slice
when max<=0 in alertsentinel, otherwise it appended every tick without ever
trimming. Adds regression tests for zero-only and mixed rule sets.
Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.
Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.
Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.
Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat: support listening https
* refactor
* modernize
* support snake case in config
* more precise control of config fields
* update goreleaser config
* remove kubeyaml
* fix: expose agent_secret
* chore
naiba
UUBulb
Mmx
Akkia