- Set GinJWTMiddleware.SigningAlgorithm to "HS256" explicitly so a future
library default change (or an alg:none confusion attempt) cannot weaken
token validation. This matches the current gin-jwt default, so behaviour
is unchanged.
- Set CookieSameSite to Lax: same as the modern-browser default, but
pinned so server-side intent is clear and CSRF on cross-site POST is
blocked while top-level GET (OAuth callback) still works.
- Move the nz-o2s OAuth2 state cookie into writeOauth2StateCookie and
set HttpOnly=true. The frontend does not read this cookie, so HttpOnly
is strictly an XSS-hardening win with no behaviour change.
JWT Cookie HttpOnly/Secure are intentionally left default for now: the
frontend reads \`!!document.cookie\` to display login state and many
deployments terminate TLS at an upstream proxy — flipping those would
require a coordinated frontend change.
Co-authored-by: naiba/CloudCode <hi+cloudcode@nai.ba>
createTerminal and createFM correctly check server ownership before
issuing a stream UUID, but terminalStream and fmStream only verified
that the UUID existed. Any authenticated user holding a valid stream
UUID could attach to it, gaining the original creator's live shell or
file-manager session — and the UUID is exposed via URL path (referer
leaks, access logs, browser history, frontend error reporters).
Bind the creator user ID into ioStreamContext at CreateStream time,
expose StreamOwnership and IsStreamAuthorizedForUser, and check
ownership in terminalStream/fmStream before the WebSocket upgrade so a
rejected attempt does not tear down the legitimate stream via defer.
NAT streams are also routed through CreateStream(_, 0); they are not
reachable from /ws/terminal or /ws/file so a sentinel user ID is fine.
Co-authored-by: naiba/CloudCode <hi+cloudcode@nai.ba>
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