Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
naibaandnaiba/CloudCode 3f6de265a0 fix(mcp): harden dashboard dispatch lifecycle
Co-authored-by: naiba/CloudCode <hi+cloudcode@nai.ba>
2026-07-20 04:32:16 +00:00
naiba bb38a9d4d2 fix(mcp): accept agents reporting version without v prefix and stop masking tool errors
compareSemver fell back to lexical string ordering when the numeric
segments were equal, so an agent reporting "2.1.0" compared as older than
the gate constant "v2.1.0" (0x32 < 0x76). This wrongly flagged every agent
as unsupported_agent, breaking server.exec and fs.* on all online servers.
Drop the fallback: semverParts already strips the v prefix, so equal
numeric segments mean equal versions.

The error was further masked because tool error responses shipped a
structuredContent {error_code,error} that violates the tool outputSchema
(which requires exit_code/stdout/...). Strict MCP clients validated it and
rejected the whole response with -32602, hiding the real isError text.
Omit structuredContent on error; the cause stays in content[].text.
2026-05-31 16:18:57 +00:00
naibaandcloudcode e8dabf5bc6 feat(auth): add PAT auth, scoped REST/MCP access, CSRF, and tenant isolation
Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.

Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.

Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.

Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.

Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-30 15:56:44 +00:00