GHSA-jg62-j5h6-8mpq: the terminal and file-manager endpoints created unbounded
IO streams; an authenticated member could open thousands, each spawning
goroutines, a 1MiB buffer and an agent-side PTY, exhausting dashboard and agent
resources. CreateStream now enforces a per-user (20) and per-server (40) cap in
the existing ioStreamMutex critical section, using the stream map as the single
source of truth. Dashboard-internal streams (uid==0: NAT, server transfer, MCP
transfer) skip the per-user cap but still count per-server. Adds caps,
exemption, slot-release and no-leak regression tests.
Carve a new nezha:inventory:{read,delete,*} resource family out of
nezha:server:*. Listing and deleting servers/server-groups (GET /server,
/server-group, /ws/server, batch-delete/server[-group], MCP server.list)
now require nezha:inventory:*, while nezha:server:* covers per-server
runtime operations (get, exec, fs, config, metrics, batch-move,
force-update).
Also declare MCP tool OutputSchema for exec/fs/meta/server/transfer and
wrap server.list output in {servers,count} so strict MCP clients accept
the structured result. Correct the /file all-of scope entry and the stale
server:read documentation.
- consumeTransferToken now recomputes and constant-time compares the
entry's HMAC-SHA256; previously the signature was minted but never
checked, so the documented "防篡改" guarantee was hollow and security
rested solely on the sync.Map key's randomness.
- CSRF switches from a raw-random double-submit cookie to a signed token
(nonce.HMAC-SHA256 keyed by JWTSecretKey). The middleware now also
validates the signature, defeating sibling-subdomain cookie tossing
where a naive header==cookie pair would otherwise pass.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.
Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.
Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.
Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
naibaandnaiba/CloudCode
