Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.
Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.
Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.
Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
Replace the {user_id, ip} claim pair with {keyId, uid}:
- keyId is a 32-byte random id that points to a row in the new
jwt_sessions table holding the real user id, bound IP, UA hash,
TokenVersion and expiry.
- uid is the user id encoded through pkg/idcodec; mismatch between
claim uid and session.UserID trips WAF block on the caller IP.
- identityHandler now rejects unknown/revoked/expired sessions, IP
drift and stale TokenVersion. Refresh updates session.ExpiresAt.
User.TokenVersion bumps on password change and revokes outstanding
sessions, so a leaked JWT secret alone is no longer enough to forge
a token. JWTSession rows are GC'd every 10 minutes (expired + grace
or revoked >24h). OAuth2 callback shares the same issue path.
Includes regression tests for happy path, mismatched claim uid,
revoked session, TokenVersion bump, IP drift and unknown keyId.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
- Set GinJWTMiddleware.SigningAlgorithm to "HS256" explicitly so a future
library default change (or an alg:none confusion attempt) cannot weaken
token validation. This matches the current gin-jwt default, so behaviour
is unchanged.
- Set CookieSameSite to Lax: same as the modern-browser default, but
pinned so server-side intent is clear and CSRF on cross-site POST is
blocked while top-level GET (OAuth callback) still works.
- Move the nz-o2s OAuth2 state cookie into writeOauth2StateCookie and
set HttpOnly=true. The frontend does not read this cookie, so HttpOnly
is strictly an XSS-hardening win with no behaviour change.
JWT Cookie HttpOnly/Secure are intentionally left default for now: the
frontend reads \`!!document.cookie\` to display login state and many
deployments terminate TLS at an upstream proxy — flipping those would
require a coordinated frontend change.
Co-authored-by: naiba/CloudCode <hi+cloudcode@nai.ba>
* feat: support listening https
* refactor
* modernize
* support snake case in config
* more precise control of config fields
* update goreleaser config
* remove kubeyaml
* fix: expose agent_secret
* chore
naibaandnaiba/CloudCode
UUBulb
JSker9