gosec G101 flags apiTokenCtxKey, apiTokenLastUsedCtxKey, and the
ScopeNotificationGroupWrite identifier as hardcoded credentials. They are
context-key names and a scope string, not secrets. Annotate them with
#nosec G101 (matching the existing JWTSecretEnvKey precedent) so the
gosec CI step passes without disabling the rule globally.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
- ServeRPC now applies real-IP + WAF interceptors to streaming RPCs
(RequestTask, IOStream), not just unary calls; without them
authHandler.check saw an empty real IP so brute-force BlockIP counters
never keyed on a source and the WAF block table was bypassed at the
stream entrypoint. Factored real-IP resolution into ctxWithRealIP shared
by unary and stream paths.
- handleFsRead rejects negative offset/length; handleFsWrite validates
if_match_sha256 is 64 hex chars before dispatch.
- createAPIToken always verifies each server_id exists (even for admins),
so an admin cannot bind a PAT to a not-yet-created server id that a
future server would auto-inherit.
- Add relay zero-length-chunk rejection regression test.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.
Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.
Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.
Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
naibaandnaiba/CloudCode
