Commit Graph
6 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
naibaandnaiba/CloudCode c756ef9385 fix(rpc): make IO stream lifecycle race-safe
Co-authored-by: naiba/CloudCode <hi+cloudcode@nai.ba>
2026-07-20 04:26:19 +00:00
naiba 36240f5888 fix(rpc): cap concurrent IO streams per user and per server
GHSA-jg62-j5h6-8mpq: the terminal and file-manager endpoints created unbounded
IO streams; an authenticated member could open thousands, each spawning
goroutines, a 1MiB buffer and an agent-side PTY, exhausting dashboard and agent
resources. CreateStream now enforces a per-user (20) and per-server (40) cap in
the existing ioStreamMutex critical section, using the stream map as the single
source of truth. Dashboard-internal streams (uid==0: NAT, server transfer, MCP
transfer) skip the per-user cap but still count per-server. Adds caps,
exemption, slot-release and no-leak regression tests.
2026-06-05 02:42:38 +00:00
naibaandnaiba/CloudCode 0f7af0bcb2 fix(rpc): bind io streams to target agents
Co-authored-by: naiba/CloudCode <hi+cloudcode@nai.ba>
2026-05-21 02:01:54 +00:00
naibaandnaiba/CloudCode 280e34977f fix(rpc): enforce magic ff05ff05 on IOStream init
The inline magic check expressed the *invalid* form as
\`byte0 != 0xff && byte1 != 0x05 && byte2 != 0xff && byte3 == 0x05\`,
relying on && to detect a four-byte mismatch. Because && short-circuits,
any payload whose byte0 happened to be 0xff was treated as a valid magic
even if the remaining bytes did not match — almost every random payload
slipped through and only the stream-UUID layer above stood between a
caller with a valid agent secret and a live IOStream session.

Extract the check into isValidIOStreamMagic stated positively (all four
bytes must match) so short-circuit reasoning cannot reintroduce the bug.

Co-authored-by: naiba/CloudCode <hi+cloudcode@nai.ba>
2026-05-18 15:17:18 +00:00
naibaandnaiba/CloudCode 36297699f5 fix(rpc): bind io_stream sessions to creator to prevent terminal/fm hijack
createTerminal and createFM correctly check server ownership before
issuing a stream UUID, but terminalStream and fmStream only verified
that the UUID existed. Any authenticated user holding a valid stream
UUID could attach to it, gaining the original creator's live shell or
file-manager session — and the UUID is exposed via URL path (referer
leaks, access logs, browser history, frontend error reporters).

Bind the creator user ID into ioStreamContext at CreateStream time,
expose StreamOwnership and IsStreamAuthorizedForUser, and check
ownership in terminalStream/fmStream before the WebSocket upgrade so a
rejected attempt does not tear down the legitimate stream via defer.

NAT streams are also routed through CreateStream(_, 0); they are not
reachable from /ws/terminal or /ws/file so a sentinel user ID is fine.

Co-authored-by: naiba/CloudCode <hi+cloudcode@nai.ba>
2026-05-18 15:16:40 +00:00
UUBulb 3d5faa8c86 add tests for config & iostream (#1045)
* add tests for config & iostream

* chore
2025-03-25 22:44:07 +08:00