GHSA-6x26-5727-rrm9: a low-privilege member could point a DDNS webhook
at internal or loopback hosts and the dashboard would dial them with the
unrestricted utils.HttpClient.
Extract the notification SSRF defenses (CIDR blocklist, IP-pin DialContext,
SNI preservation, redirect rejection) into reusable helpers in pkg/utils
(NewRestrictedHTTPClient / ResolveAllowedHTTPURL / buildRestrictedHTTPClient)
and route the DDNS webhook through the same path. Replace the notification
inline implementation with a thin wrapper to keep behaviour identical.
Side improvements collected by the refactor:
- prepareRequest now resolves DNS once and returns the paired client, so
the dialer's pinned IP and the validated URL stay in sync (no more
double resolution between prepareRequest and SetRecords).
- response body is drained and closed.
- HttpClient / HttpClientSkipTlsVerify are explicitly tagged unsafe for
attacker-controlled URLs.
Tests cover: hermetic SNI preservation, redirect rejection, dial pin to
the vetted IP, the full blocked-CIDR list at the webhook entry point,
and the verifyTLS↔skipVerifyTLS inversion in the notification wrapper.
Co-authored-by: naiba/CloudCode <hi+cloudcode@nai.ba>
* ddns: store configuation in database
Co-authored-by: nap0o <144927971+nap0o@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat: split domain with soa lookup
* switch to libdns interface
* ddns: add unit test
* ddns: skip TestSplitDomainSOA on ci
network is not steady
* fix error handling
* fix error handling
---------
Co-authored-by: nap0o <144927971+nap0o@users.noreply.github.com>
naibaandnaiba/CloudCode
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UUBulbandnap0o
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