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https://github.com/Buriburizaem0n/nezha_domains.git
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naibaandcloudcode
e8dabf5bc6
Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.
Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.
Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.
Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
39 lines
1.2 KiB
Go
39 lines
1.2 KiB
Go
package controller
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import (
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"context"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
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"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton"
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)
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func TestValidateTransferPathRejectsOversizedPath(t *testing.T) {
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if err := validateTransferPath(strings.Repeat("a", maxTransferPathLen+1)); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("path longer than maxTransferPathLen must be rejected to bound transferEntry memory")
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}
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if err := validateTransferPath(""); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("empty path must be rejected")
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}
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if err := validateTransferPath("/etc/hostname"); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("a normal path must be accepted, got %v", err)
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}
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}
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// openFsTransferStream must refuse to start a new transfer (and never reach
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// SendTask) once the administrator has disabled MCP, closing the race window
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// between revalidateTransferEntry and stream creation.
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func TestOpenFsTransferStreamRefusesWhenMCPDisabled(t *testing.T) {
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originalConf := singleton.Conf
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t.Cleanup(func() { singleton.Conf = originalConf })
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cfg := &model.Config{}
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cfg.SetMCPEnabled(false)
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singleton.Conf = &singleton.ConfigClass{Config: cfg}
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_, _, err := openFsTransferStream(context.Background(), 1, &model.FsTransferRequest{})
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("transfer stream must not open while MCP is disabled")
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}
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}
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