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https://github.com/Buriburizaem0n/nezha_domains.git
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naibaandcloudcode
e8dabf5bc6
Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.
Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.
Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.
Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
67 lines
2.7 KiB
Go
67 lines
2.7 KiB
Go
package controller
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import (
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"net/http/httptest"
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"testing"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
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"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/pkg/i18n"
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"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton"
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)
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func ensureLocalizerForServiceTest(t *testing.T) {
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t.Helper()
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if singleton.Localizer == nil {
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singleton.Localizer = i18n.NewLocalizer("en_US", "nezha", "translations", i18n.Translations)
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}
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}
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// M13 regression: checkServiceSkipServerPermission must treat SkipServers
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// as a typed map[uint64]bool where only `true` entries actually skip
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// at runtime (DispatchTask only consults true keys). Entries with value
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// false carry no dispatch meaning, so requiring HasPermission on them
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// rejects perfectly legitimate updates from members whose PAT does not
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// own the no-op `{2: false}` server.
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func TestCheckServiceSkipServerPermission_IgnoresFalseEntries(t *testing.T) {
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ensureLocalizerForServiceTest(t)
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saved := singleton.ServerShared
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t.Cleanup(func() { singleton.ServerShared = saved })
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sc := singleton.NewEmptyServerClassForTest()
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sc.InsertForTest(&model.Server{Common: model.Common{ID: 1, UserID: 100}})
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sc.InsertForTest(&model.Server{Common: model.Common{ID: 2, UserID: 999}})
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singleton.ServerShared = sc
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ctx, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(httptest.NewRecorder())
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ctx.Set(model.CtxKeyAuthorizedUser, &model.User{Common: model.Common{ID: 100}, Role: model.RoleMember})
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skip := map[uint64]bool{
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1: true, // member owns it — legal allow-list entry
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2: false, // no-op entry; member doesn't own server 2 but it's not actually skipped
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}
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if err := checkServiceSkipServerPermission(ctx, model.ServiceCoverIgnoreAll, skip, 100); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("`{2: false}` must NOT trigger permission denied — it has no runtime dispatch effect, got %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestCheckServiceSkipServerPermission_RejectsForeignTrueEntries(t *testing.T) {
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ensureLocalizerForServiceTest(t)
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saved := singleton.ServerShared
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t.Cleanup(func() { singleton.ServerShared = saved })
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sc := singleton.NewEmptyServerClassForTest()
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sc.InsertForTest(&model.Server{Common: model.Common{ID: 1, UserID: 100}})
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sc.InsertForTest(&model.Server{Common: model.Common{ID: 2, UserID: 999}})
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singleton.ServerShared = sc
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ctx, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(httptest.NewRecorder())
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ctx.Set(model.CtxKeyAuthorizedUser, &model.User{Common: model.Common{ID: 100}, Role: model.RoleMember})
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skip := map[uint64]bool{
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2: true, // member doesn't own server 2 — true entry IS the allow-list, must reject
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}
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if err := checkServiceSkipServerPermission(ctx, model.ServiceCoverIgnoreAll, skip, 100); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("true entry pointing at foreign-owned server must still be rejected — pre-existing safety invariant")
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}
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}
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