mirror of
https://github.com/Buriburizaem0n/nezha_domains.git
synced 2026-09-19 17:50:12 +00:00
Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.
Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.
Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.
Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
149 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
149 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
package controller
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"sync"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// revokeTombstoneTTL bounds how long a revoked token id is remembered to
|
|
// close the revoke->register race. The race window is a single request's
|
|
// auth-to-register gap (sub-second); minutes of slack is ample. Without a
|
|
// TTL the tombstone set grows unbounded over the process lifetime as PATs
|
|
// are created and deleted.
|
|
const revokeTombstoneTTL = 10 * time.Minute
|
|
|
|
// patConnectionRegistry tracks active long-lived connections (terminal,
|
|
// FM, ws/server, ws/transfer, etc.) per PAT id so that deleteAPIToken can
|
|
// cancel them immediately on revocation. Without this, a deleted PAT
|
|
// keeps streaming until the underlying connection naturally drops.
|
|
//
|
|
// The registry deliberately holds no goroutines — it only stores cancel
|
|
// hooks the connection setup already owns. Handlers register on entry
|
|
// and deregister on exit; revokeToken walks the per-token slice and
|
|
// invokes every hook under the lock.
|
|
type patConnectionRegistry struct {
|
|
mu sync.Mutex
|
|
byToken map[uint64]map[uint64]func()
|
|
// revoked is a tombstone set closing the revoke->register race: a
|
|
// connection can pass apiTokenAuthMiddleware (token cached in ctx) and
|
|
// only register its cancel hook AFTER deleteAPIToken already walked the
|
|
// registry. Without the tombstone that late registration would survive
|
|
// revocation. register consults revoked under the same lock and cancels
|
|
// immediately when the id is already gone.
|
|
revoked map[uint64]time.Time
|
|
nextID uint64
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func newPATConnectionRegistry() *patConnectionRegistry {
|
|
return &patConnectionRegistry{
|
|
byToken: make(map[uint64]map[uint64]func()),
|
|
revoked: make(map[uint64]time.Time),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// pruneRevokedLocked drops tombstones older than revokeTombstoneTTL. Caller
|
|
// must hold r.mu. Bounds the tombstone set to recently-revoked ids.
|
|
func (r *patConnectionRegistry) pruneRevokedLocked(now time.Time) {
|
|
for id, at := range r.revoked {
|
|
if now.Sub(at) > revokeTombstoneTTL {
|
|
delete(r.revoked, id)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// register stores cancel under tokenID and returns a deregister hook the
|
|
// caller MUST invoke when the connection ends. Returning a closure
|
|
// (rather than exposing an id) prevents callers from forgetting to clean
|
|
// up and avoids leaking entries past connection lifetime.
|
|
//
|
|
// If tokenID was already revoked, register does NOT store the hook; it
|
|
// cancels immediately and returns a no-op deregister, so a connection that
|
|
// raced past revocation is torn down at once.
|
|
func (r *patConnectionRegistry) register(tokenID uint64, cancel func()) func() {
|
|
r.mu.Lock()
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
r.pruneRevokedLocked(now)
|
|
if at, dead := r.revoked[tokenID]; dead && now.Sub(at) <= revokeTombstoneTTL {
|
|
r.mu.Unlock()
|
|
cancel()
|
|
return func() {}
|
|
}
|
|
r.nextID++
|
|
id := r.nextID
|
|
conns, ok := r.byToken[tokenID]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
conns = make(map[uint64]func())
|
|
r.byToken[tokenID] = conns
|
|
}
|
|
conns[id] = cancel
|
|
r.mu.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
var once sync.Once
|
|
return func() {
|
|
once.Do(func() {
|
|
r.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer r.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if m, ok := r.byToken[tokenID]; ok {
|
|
delete(m, id)
|
|
if len(m) == 0 {
|
|
delete(r.byToken, tokenID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// revokeToken cancels every active connection registered under tokenID,
|
|
// clears the entry, and records a tombstone so any connection still racing
|
|
// toward register is cancelled on arrival. Safe to call on an unknown id.
|
|
func (r *patConnectionRegistry) revokeToken(tokenID uint64) {
|
|
r.mu.Lock()
|
|
conns := r.byToken[tokenID]
|
|
delete(r.byToken, tokenID)
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
r.pruneRevokedLocked(now)
|
|
r.revoked[tokenID] = now
|
|
r.mu.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
for _, cancel := range conns {
|
|
cancel()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// countForToken returns the number of active connections registered
|
|
// under tokenID. Intended for tests + future SIEM exposure; callers MUST
|
|
// NOT use it for policy decisions because the count can change the
|
|
// instant the lock is released.
|
|
func (r *patConnectionRegistry) countForToken(tokenID uint64) int {
|
|
r.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer r.mu.Unlock()
|
|
return len(r.byToken[tokenID])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var patConnectionRegistryShared = newPATConnectionRegistry()
|
|
|
|
// registerPATConnection wires the request-bound PAT (if any) into the
|
|
// process-wide revocation registry. Returns a deregister hook the
|
|
// handler MUST defer. For JWT-authenticated requests the hook is a
|
|
// no-op so call sites stay portable.
|
|
//
|
|
// Long-lived endpoints (terminal, FM, ws/server, ws/transfer) call
|
|
// this on entry and pass a cancel function that drops their websocket
|
|
// or relay loop. deleteAPIToken then revokes every active hook
|
|
// registered under the deleted token id.
|
|
func registerPATConnection(c interface {
|
|
Get(any) (any, bool)
|
|
}, cancel func()) func() {
|
|
v, ok := c.Get(apiTokenCtxKey)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return func() {}
|
|
}
|
|
tok, ok := v.(*model.APIToken)
|
|
if !ok || tok == nil {
|
|
return func() {}
|
|
}
|
|
return patConnectionRegistryShared.register(tok.ID, cancel)
|
|
}
|