Files
nezha_domains/cmd/dashboard/controller/mcp_transfer_zero_chunk_test.go
T
naibaandcloudcode b1d84c6b2f fix(security): harden gRPC stream WAF, MCP fs arg validation, and PAT server binding
- ServeRPC now applies real-IP + WAF interceptors to streaming RPCs
  (RequestTask, IOStream), not just unary calls; without them
  authHandler.check saw an empty real IP so brute-force BlockIP counters
  never keyed on a source and the WAF block table was bypassed at the
  stream entrypoint. Factored real-IP resolution into ctxWithRealIP shared
  by unary and stream paths.
- handleFsRead rejects negative offset/length; handleFsWrite validates
  if_match_sha256 is 64 hex chars before dispatch.
- createAPIToken always verifies each server_id exists (even for admins),
  so an admin cannot bind a PAT to a not-yet-created server id that a
  future server would auto-inherit.
- Add relay zero-length-chunk rejection regression test.

Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-31 05:51:32 +00:00

79 lines
2.9 KiB
Go

package controller
import (
"bytes"
"net/http"
"testing"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
)
// writeZeroChunkFrame emits a well-formed NZTC chunk header that declares a
// zero-length payload. A malicious or buggy agent can emit an unbounded run of
// these: each frame is syntactically valid but carries no data, so a relay
// that treats them as no-op `continue` never makes progress toward `remaining`
// and never reaches the final NZTO frame — pinning a dashboard goroutine, gRPC
// stream and spool tmpfile until the client disconnects.
func writeZeroChunkFrame(out *bytes.Buffer) {
writeChunkFrame(out, nil)
}
// A download that declares size > 0 but then streams zero-length NZTC frames
// must be rejected as a protocol violation, not relayed forever. The relay
// must not accept a zero-length data frame while it still expects bytes.
func TestRelayDownloadFrames_RejectsZeroLengthDataFrames(t *testing.T) {
const size = int64(64)
var src bytes.Buffer
// A burst of zero-length chunk frames. With the buggy `continue`, the
// loop consumes all of these without decrementing `remaining`; once the
// buffer drains it hits EOF on the next ReadFull and returns a *bad
// gateway* error — but against a real (blocking) stream the same code
// path loops forever. We assert the relay rejects the zero-length frame
// the moment it sees one, before draining a long run of them.
for i := 0; i < 1000; i++ {
writeZeroChunkFrame(&src)
}
// Even if a valid chunk + final frame follow, the relay must already have
// failed on the first zero-length data frame.
writeChunkFrame(&src, bytes.Repeat([]byte{'x'}, int(size)))
writeOKFrame(&src, uint64(size))
stream := &fixedSizeFrameStream{buf: src}
sink := newCountingDiscardWriter()
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(sink)
err := relayDownloadFrames(c, stream, size)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("relayDownloadFrames accepted a stream of zero-length NZTC frames; a zero-length data frame while remaining>0 must be rejected to avoid an unbounded relay loop")
}
if sink.status == 0 || sink.status == http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("a rejected transfer must set a non-200 status, got %d", sink.status)
}
}
// Sanity: a single zero-length leading frame is just as invalid; the relay
// must not silently swallow it as progress.
func TestRelayDownloadFrames_SingleZeroLengthFrameRejected(t *testing.T) {
const size = int64(8)
var src bytes.Buffer
writeZeroChunkFrame(&src)
writeChunkFrame(&src, bytes.Repeat([]byte{'y'}, int(size)))
writeOKFrame(&src, uint64(size))
stream := &fixedSizeFrameStream{buf: src}
sink := newCountingDiscardWriter()
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(sink)
if err := relayDownloadFrames(c, stream, size); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("relayDownloadFrames must reject a zero-length data frame while remaining>0")
}
_ = model.MCPFsXferMagicChunk
}