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https://github.com/Buriburizaem0n/nezha_domains.git
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naibaandcloudcode
e8dabf5bc6
Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.
Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.
Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.
Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
104 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
104 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
package controller
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import (
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"net/http/httptest"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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"github.com/patrickmn/go-cache"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
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"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/pkg/i18n"
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"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton"
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)
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func setupCronUpdateOwnerUIDFixture(t *testing.T) {
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t.Helper()
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originalCache := singleton.Cache
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originalLoc := singleton.Loc
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originalLocalizer := singleton.Localizer
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originalServer := singleton.ServerShared
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singleton.Loc = time.UTC
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singleton.Cache = cache.New(time.Minute, time.Minute)
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singleton.Localizer = i18n.NewLocalizer("en_US", "nezha", "translations", i18n.Translations)
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sc := singleton.NewEmptyServerClassForTest()
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for _, id := range []uint64{1, 2} {
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s := &model.Server{}
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s.ID = id
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s.SetUserID(100)
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sc.InsertForTest(s)
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}
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adminServer := &model.Server{}
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adminServer.ID = 5
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adminServer.SetUserID(200)
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sc.InsertForTest(adminServer)
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singleton.ServerShared = sc
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t.Cleanup(func() {
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singleton.Cache = originalCache
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singleton.Loc = originalLoc
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singleton.Localizer = originalLocalizer
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singleton.ServerShared = originalServer
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})
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}
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func newCtxAsAdminWithLimitedPAT(t *testing.T, callerUID uint64, whitelist []uint64) *gin.Context {
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t.Helper()
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gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
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c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(httptest.NewRecorder())
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c.Set(model.CtxKeyAuthorizedUser, &model.User{
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Common: model.Common{ID: callerUID},
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Role: model.RoleAdmin,
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})
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tok := &model.APIToken{ID: 33, UserID: callerUID}
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tok.SetServerIDs(whitelist)
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c.Set(apiTokenCtxKey, tok)
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c.Set(model.CtxKeyAPIToken, tok)
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return c
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}
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// Threat: updateCron currently calls
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//
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// rejectImplicitCoverForLimitedPAT(c, cf.Cover, cf.Servers)
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//
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// which internally resolves the owner UID via getUid(c) (caller id). When an
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// admin uses a server-limited PAT to flip a *foreign* cron to CoverAll with
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// an under-specified deny-list, the helper validates the deny-list against
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// the admin's own servers, not the cron owner's. The admin's only owned
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// server is 5 and it's already in the whitelist, so the guard returns nil
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// even though CronTrigger will fan out to the cron owner's servers 1 and 2
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// — both outside the PAT whitelist. The correct owner is the existing
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// cron.UserID, not the caller. This test calls the helper directly with the
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// cron owner uid and pins the safe behaviour.
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func TestRejectImplicitCoverForLimitedPAT_RejectsCallerWhenCronOwnerHasUncoveredServers(t *testing.T) {
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setupCronUpdateOwnerUIDFixture(t)
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c := newCtxAsAdminWithLimitedPAT(t, 200, []uint64{5})
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const cronOwnerUID = uint64(100)
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err := rejectImplicitCoverForLimitedPATWithOwner(c, model.CronCoverAll, nil, cronOwnerUID)
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require.Error(t, err,
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"limited PAT must NOT pass cover-all check when the cron owner has servers outside the PAT whitelist; caller uid must not be used as owner")
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assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "permission denied")
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}
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// Pins the safe path: same helper, but caller uid happens to equal the cron
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// owner and the deny-list covers every owner-visible server outside the
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// whitelist. Prevents regressing the helper into a blanket "always deny
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// limited PAT" form.
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func TestRejectImplicitCoverForLimitedPAT_AllowsCallerWhenDenyListCoversEveryOwnerServerOutsideWhitelist(t *testing.T) {
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setupCronUpdateOwnerUIDFixture(t)
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c := newCtxAsAdminWithLimitedPAT(t, 100, []uint64{1})
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err := rejectImplicitCoverForLimitedPATWithOwner(c, model.CronCoverAll, []uint64{2}, 100)
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require.NoError(t, err,
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"deny-list [2] covers every server uid 100 owns outside the PAT whitelist [1]; must pass")
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}
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