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https://github.com/Buriburizaem0n/nezha_domains.git
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naibaandcloudcode
e8dabf5bc6
Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.
Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.
Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.
Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
64 lines
2.0 KiB
Go
64 lines
2.0 KiB
Go
package controller
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"testing"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
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)
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func TestServerExec_RejectsOutOfRangeTimeoutSeconds(t *testing.T) {
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cleanup, uid := setupMCPTest(t)
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defer cleanup()
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tok, _ := mkToken(t, uid, []string{model.ScopeServerExec}, nil)
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// timeout_seconds is documented as 1..300 in the tool schema; sending
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// 1_000_000 would otherwise let the dashboard wait ~1e6s on rpc.CallAgent
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// when the agent is unreachable / old, turning one MCP call into a
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// long-lived goroutine + connection occupation. Handler must reject
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// before touching the RPC layer.
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c, w := mcpCallCtx(t, tok, uid, jsonRPCRequest{
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JSONRPC: "2.0", ID: json.RawMessage("1"), Method: "tools/call",
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Params: jsonObj(t, toolCallParams{
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Name: "server.exec",
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Arguments: jsonRaw(map[string]any{
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"server_id": 7,
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"cmd": "echo",
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"timeout_seconds": 1_000_000,
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}),
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}),
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})
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mcpEndpoint(c)
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_, tcr := decodeRPC(w)
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require.NotNil(t, tcr)
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require.True(t, tcr.IsError, "expected isError=true for out-of-range timeout, got %+v", tcr)
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require.Contains(t, tcr.Content[0].Text, "timeout_seconds")
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}
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func TestServerExec_RejectsZeroLikeNegativeTimeoutBoundary(t *testing.T) {
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cleanup, uid := setupMCPTest(t)
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defer cleanup()
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tok, _ := mkToken(t, uid, []string{model.ScopeServerExec}, nil)
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// 301s sits one above the documented maximum. The previous handler
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// happily forwarded it as-is and added +5s to the dashboard-side wait,
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// so any client could ignore the schema bound. Pin the rejection.
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c, w := mcpCallCtx(t, tok, uid, jsonRPCRequest{
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JSONRPC: "2.0", ID: json.RawMessage("1"), Method: "tools/call",
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Params: jsonObj(t, toolCallParams{
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Name: "server.exec",
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Arguments: jsonRaw(map[string]any{
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"server_id": 7,
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"cmd": "echo",
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"timeout_seconds": 301,
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}),
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}),
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})
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mcpEndpoint(c)
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_, tcr := decodeRPC(w)
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require.True(t, tcr.IsError)
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require.Contains(t, tcr.Content[0].Text, "timeout_seconds")
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}
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