mirror of
https://github.com/Buriburizaem0n/nezha_domains.git
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Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.
Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.
Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.
Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
199 lines
5.7 KiB
Go
199 lines
5.7 KiB
Go
package model
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import (
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"slices"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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"github.com/goccy/go-json"
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"gorm.io/gorm"
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)
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const (
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ModeAlwaysTrigger = 0
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ModeOnetimeTrigger = 1
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)
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type AlertRule struct {
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Common
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Name string `json:"name"`
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RulesRaw string `json:"-"`
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Enable *bool `json:"enable,omitempty"`
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TriggerMode uint8 `gorm:"default:0" json:"trigger_mode"` // 触发模式: 0-始终触发(默认) 1-单次触发
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NotificationGroupID uint64 `json:"notification_group_id"` // 该报警规则所在的通知组
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FailTriggerTasksRaw string `gorm:"default:'[]'" json:"-"`
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RecoverTriggerTasksRaw string `gorm:"default:'[]'" json:"-"`
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Rules []*Rule `gorm:"-" json:"rules"`
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FailTriggerTasks []uint64 `gorm:"-" json:"fail_trigger_tasks"` // 失败时执行的触发任务id
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RecoverTriggerTasks []uint64 `gorm:"-" json:"recover_trigger_tasks"` // 恢复时执行的触发任务id
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}
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func (r *AlertRule) BeforeSave(tx *gorm.DB) error {
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if data, err := json.Marshal(r.Rules); err != nil {
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return err
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} else {
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r.RulesRaw = string(data)
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}
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if data, err := json.Marshal(r.FailTriggerTasks); err != nil {
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return err
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} else {
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r.FailTriggerTasksRaw = string(data)
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}
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if data, err := json.Marshal(r.RecoverTriggerTasks); err != nil {
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return err
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} else {
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r.RecoverTriggerTasksRaw = string(data)
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (r *AlertRule) AfterFind(tx *gorm.DB) error {
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var err error
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if err = json.Unmarshal([]byte(r.RulesRaw), &r.Rules); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err = json.Unmarshal([]byte(r.FailTriggerTasksRaw), &r.FailTriggerTasks); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err = json.Unmarshal([]byte(r.RecoverTriggerTasksRaw), &r.RecoverTriggerTasks); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (r *AlertRule) Enabled() bool {
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return r.Enable != nil && *r.Enable
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}
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// HasPermission extends the default owner/admin check with PAT
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// server_ids whitelist enforcement. AlertRule.Snapshot fans out across
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// every owner-visible server filtered only by Rule.Ignore semantics
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// (RuleCoverAll: deny-list; RuleCoverIgnoreAll: allow-list). A
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// server-limited PAT must therefore satisfy the same cover-fanout rule
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// the cron / service paths use — otherwise it can create or update a
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// rule that monitors servers outside its whitelist (admin owner: any
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// server in the system).
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//
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// Unknown Rule.Cover is fail-closed: Snapshot's switch defaults to
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// "monitor everything", so persisting it would defeat the PAT cover
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// guard. createAlertRule / updateAlertRule should also reject unknown
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// covers at write time; this method is the runtime safety net.
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func (r *AlertRule) HasPermission(ctx *gin.Context) bool {
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if !r.Common.HasPermission(ctx) {
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return false
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}
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v, ok := ctx.Get(CtxKeyAPIToken)
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if !ok {
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return true
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}
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tok, _ := v.(APITokenAccessor)
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if tok == nil {
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return true
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}
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if wl, ok := tok.(APITokenWhitelistView); ok && len(wl.ServerIDs()) == 0 {
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return true
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}
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for _, rule := range r.Rules {
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if rule == nil {
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continue
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}
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switch rule.Cover {
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case RuleCoverAll:
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denyIDs := make([]uint64, 0, len(rule.Ignore))
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for id, ignored := range rule.Ignore {
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if ignored {
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denyIDs = append(denyIDs, id)
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}
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}
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if !DenyListSafeForLimitedPAT(tok, r.GetUserID(), denyIDs) {
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return false
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}
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case RuleCoverIgnoreAll:
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for id, monitored := range rule.Ignore {
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if monitored && !tok.CanAccessServer(id) {
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return false
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}
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}
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default:
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return false
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}
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}
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return true
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}
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// Snapshot 对传入的Server进行该报警规则下所有type的检查 返回每项检查结果
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func (r *AlertRule) Snapshot(cycleTransferStats *CycleTransferStats, server *Server, db *gorm.DB) []bool {
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point := make([]bool, len(r.Rules))
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for i, rule := range r.Rules {
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point[i] = rule.Snapshot(cycleTransferStats, server, db)
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}
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return point
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}
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// Check 传入包含当前报警规则下所有type检查结果 返回报警持续时间与是否通过报警检查(通过则返回true)
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func (r *AlertRule) Check(points [][]bool) (int, bool) {
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var hasPassedRule bool
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durations := make([]int, len(r.Rules))
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for ruleIndex, rule := range r.Rules {
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duration := int(rule.Duration)
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if rule.IsTransferDurationRule() {
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// 循环区间流量报警
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if durations[ruleIndex] < 1 {
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durations[ruleIndex] = 1
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}
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if hasPassedRule {
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continue
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}
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// 只要最后一次检查超出了规则范围 就认为检查未通过
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if len(points) > 0 && points[len(points)-1][ruleIndex] {
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hasPassedRule = true
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}
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} else if rule.IsOfflineRule() {
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// 离线报警,检查直到最后一次在线的离线采样点是否大于 duration
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if hasPassedRule = boundCheck(len(points), duration, hasPassedRule); hasPassedRule {
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continue
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}
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var fail int
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for _, point := range slices.Backward(points[len(points)-duration:]) {
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fail++
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if point[ruleIndex] {
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hasPassedRule = true
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break
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}
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}
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durations[ruleIndex] = fail
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continue
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} else {
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// 常规报警
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if hasPassedRule = boundCheck(len(points), duration, hasPassedRule); hasPassedRule {
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continue
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}
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if duration > durations[ruleIndex] {
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durations[ruleIndex] = duration
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}
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total, fail := duration, 0
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for timeTick := len(points) - duration; timeTick < len(points); timeTick++ {
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if !points[timeTick][ruleIndex] {
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fail++
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}
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}
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// 当70%以上的采样点未通过规则判断时 才认为当前检查未通过
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if fail*100/total <= 70 {
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hasPassedRule = true
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}
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}
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}
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// 仅当所有检查均未通过时 才触发告警
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return slices.Max(durations), hasPassedRule
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}
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func boundCheck(length, duration int, passed bool) bool {
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if passed {
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return true
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}
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// 如果采样点数量不足 则认为检查通过
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return length < duration
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}
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