mirror of
https://github.com/Buriburizaem0n/nezha_domains.git
synced 2026-09-19 17:50:12 +00:00
naibaandcloudcode
834ae25024
- consumeTransferToken now recomputes and constant-time compares the entry's HMAC-SHA256; previously the signature was minted but never checked, so the documented "防篡改" guarantee was hollow and security rested solely on the sync.Map key's randomness. - CSRF switches from a raw-random double-submit cookie to a signed token (nonce.HMAC-SHA256 keyed by JWTSecretKey). The middleware now also validates the signature, defeating sibling-subdomain cookie tossing where a naive header==cookie pair would otherwise pass. Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
85 lines
2.9 KiB
Go
85 lines
2.9 KiB
Go
package controller
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"net/http"
|
|
"net/http/httptest"
|
|
"testing"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
|
|
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func withCSRFSecret(t *testing.T, secret string) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
prev := singleton.Conf
|
|
singleton.Conf = &singleton.ConfigClass{Config: &model.Config{}}
|
|
singleton.Conf.JWTSecretKey = secret
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() { singleton.Conf = prev })
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Sibling-subdomain cookie tossing: an attacker who can set nz-csrf for the
|
|
// parent domain injects an attacker-chosen value and mirrors it into the
|
|
// header. A naive double-submit accepts header==cookie. The signed
|
|
// double-submit must reject it because the injected value carries no valid
|
|
// server HMAC.
|
|
func TestCSRFMiddleware_RejectsUnsignedInjectedPair(t *testing.T) {
|
|
withCSRFSecret(t, "test-jwt-secret")
|
|
mw := csrfMiddleware()
|
|
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
|
|
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/v1/profile", nil)
|
|
c.Request.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: "nz-jwt", Value: "session"})
|
|
c.Request.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: csrfCookieName, Value: "attacker-chosen"})
|
|
c.Request.Header.Set(csrfHeaderName, "attacker-chosen")
|
|
mw(c)
|
|
if !c.IsAborted() || w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
|
t.Fatalf("an unsigned (cookie-tossed) csrf pair must be rejected, got aborted=%v code=%d", c.IsAborted(), w.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A token minted by the server (issueCSRFToken) must pass when mirrored
|
|
// correctly into the header.
|
|
func TestCSRFMiddleware_AcceptsServerSignedPair(t *testing.T) {
|
|
withCSRFSecret(t, "test-jwt-secret")
|
|
token := issueCSRFToken()
|
|
if token == "" {
|
|
t.Fatal("issueCSRFToken must produce a value")
|
|
}
|
|
mw := csrfMiddleware()
|
|
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
|
|
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/v1/profile", nil)
|
|
c.Request.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: "nz-jwt", Value: "session"})
|
|
c.Request.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: csrfCookieName, Value: token})
|
|
c.Request.Header.Set(csrfHeaderName, token)
|
|
mw(c)
|
|
if c.IsAborted() {
|
|
t.Fatal("a correctly mirrored server-signed csrf pair must pass")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Even with header==cookie, a value whose signature does not verify under the
|
|
// server secret must be rejected (forged signature segment).
|
|
func TestCSRFMiddleware_RejectsForgedSignature(t *testing.T) {
|
|
withCSRFSecret(t, "test-jwt-secret")
|
|
token := issueCSRFToken()
|
|
forged := token[:len(token)-1]
|
|
if token[len(token)-1] == 'a' {
|
|
forged += "b"
|
|
} else {
|
|
forged += "a"
|
|
}
|
|
mw := csrfMiddleware()
|
|
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
|
|
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/v1/profile", nil)
|
|
c.Request.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: csrfCookieName, Value: forged})
|
|
c.Request.Header.Set(csrfHeaderName, forged)
|
|
mw(c)
|
|
if !c.IsAborted() || w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
|
t.Fatalf("a forged-signature csrf pair must be rejected, got aborted=%v code=%d", c.IsAborted(), w.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|