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https://github.com/Buriburizaem0n/nezha_domains.git
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naibaandcloudcode
e8dabf5bc6
Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.
Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.
Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.
Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
73 lines
1.9 KiB
Go
73 lines
1.9 KiB
Go
package controller
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import (
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"sync"
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"time"
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)
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// transferAnonAuditThrottle caps the number of audit rows written per
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// source IP within a sliding window for transfer requests that failed
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// before a valid `entry` could be loaded (bogus/expired/replayed token).
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//
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// Without this cap an unauthenticated attacker can POST millions of
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// /mcp/upload/<random> requests; every miss invokes
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// writeTransferFailureAudit which inserts into mcp_audit_log. The
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// throttle keeps a small per-IP token bucket in memory and drops audit
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// rows past the budget — successful and authenticated failures (entry
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// != nil) bypass this gate entirely so SIEM signal is unaffected.
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type transferAnonAuditThrottle struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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window time.Duration
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limit int
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hits map[string]*anonHitBucket
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clock func() time.Time
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}
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type anonHitBucket struct {
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firstAt time.Time
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count int
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}
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func newTransferAnonAuditThrottle(window time.Duration, perWindow int) *transferAnonAuditThrottle {
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return &transferAnonAuditThrottle{
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window: window,
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limit: perWindow,
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hits: make(map[string]*anonHitBucket),
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clock: time.Now,
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}
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}
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// shouldRecord reports whether the anonymous failure for this IP should
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// land in the audit table. Empty ip is treated as "always record" since
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// suppressing it would silently lose signal in test/headless contexts.
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func (t *transferAnonAuditThrottle) shouldRecord(ip string) bool {
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if ip == "" {
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return true
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}
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t.mu.Lock()
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defer t.mu.Unlock()
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now := t.clock()
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t.pruneLocked(now)
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b, ok := t.hits[ip]
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if !ok || now.Sub(b.firstAt) >= t.window {
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t.hits[ip] = &anonHitBucket{firstAt: now, count: 1}
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return true
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}
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if b.count >= t.limit {
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return false
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}
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b.count++
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return true
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}
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func (t *transferAnonAuditThrottle) pruneLocked(now time.Time) {
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for ip, b := range t.hits {
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if now.Sub(b.firstAt) >= t.window {
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delete(t.hits, ip)
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}
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}
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}
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var transferAnonAuditThrottleShared = newTransferAnonAuditThrottle(time.Minute, 5)
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