Files
nezha_domains/cmd/dashboard/controller/mcp_ratelimit_bypass_test.go
T
naibaandcloudcode e8dabf5bc6 feat(auth): add PAT auth, scoped REST/MCP access, CSRF, and tenant isolation
Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.

Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.

Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.

Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.

Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-30 15:56:44 +00:00

69 lines
1.8 KiB
Go

package controller
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton"
)
func mcpEndpointTestCtx(t *testing.T, tok *model.APIToken, body any) (*gin.Context, *httptest.ResponseRecorder) {
t.Helper()
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
raw, _ := json.Marshal(body)
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/mcp", bytes.NewReader(raw))
c.Request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
c.Set(apiTokenCtxKey, tok)
c.Set(model.CtxKeyAPIToken, tok)
return c, w
}
// An unknown tool name in tools/call must still consume the per-token rate
// budget; otherwise a valid PAT can flood /mcp with does-not-exist tools and
// bypass the limiter entirely.
func TestMCPUnknownToolCountsAgainstRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
originalConf := singleton.Conf
originalLimiter := mcpRateLimiterShared
t.Cleanup(func() {
singleton.Conf = originalConf
mcpRateLimiterShared = originalLimiter
})
cfg := &model.Config{}
cfg.SetMCPEnabled(true)
singleton.Conf = &singleton.ConfigClass{Config: cfg}
mcpRateLimiterShared = newMCPRateLimiter(2, 2)
tok := &model.APIToken{ID: 4242, UserID: 1}
body := map[string]any{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 1,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": map[string]any{"name": "does.not.exist", "arguments": map[string]any{}},
}
var lastStatus int
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
c, w := mcpEndpointTestCtx(t, tok, body)
mcpEndpoint(c)
lastStatus = w.Code
}
if !mcpRateLimiterSaturated(tok.ID) {
t.Fatalf("after 5 unknown-tool calls with a budget of 2, the limiter must be saturated (last status %d)", lastStatus)
}
}
func mcpRateLimiterSaturated(tokenID uint64) bool {
return !mcpRateLimiterShared.Allow(tokenID)
}