Files
nezha_domains/pkg/grpcx/io_stream_wrapper_concurrent_send_test.go
T
naibaandcloudcode e8dabf5bc6 feat(auth): add PAT auth, scoped REST/MCP access, CSRF, and tenant isolation
Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.

Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.

Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.

Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.

Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-30 15:56:44 +00:00

72 lines
2.2 KiB
Go

package grpcx
import (
"context"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/proto"
)
// sendObservingStream records the maximum number of goroutines that are
// inside Send at the same time. grpc-go's real server stream is NOT safe
// under concurrent Send, but this fake never blocks so any concurrent
// dispatch from the wrapper would surface here as maxInFlight > 1.
type sendObservingStream struct {
inFlight int32
maxInFlight int32
}
func (s *sendObservingStream) Recv() (*proto.IOStreamData, error) { return nil, nil }
func (s *sendObservingStream) Context() context.Context { return context.Background() }
func (s *sendObservingStream) Send(*proto.IOStreamData) error {
cur := atomic.AddInt32(&s.inFlight, 1)
defer atomic.AddInt32(&s.inFlight, -1)
for {
prev := atomic.LoadInt32(&s.maxInFlight)
if cur <= prev || atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&s.maxInFlight, prev, cur) {
break
}
}
return nil
}
// IOStreamWrapper.Send and SendKeepalive must be safe to call from many
// goroutines concurrently — this is the dashboard-side dual of the agent's
// serialIOStreamSender (see agent/cmd/agent/mcp_fs_transfer.go). Without the
// wrapper's sendMu, dashboard IOStream keepalive + MCP fs.transfer Write
// race the same gRPC stream, violating grpc-go's "no concurrent SendMsg"
// contract. We pin that with a stress test: many goroutines hammer Send /
// SendKeepalive / Write at once; the fake stream must NEVER observe more
// than one in-flight Send.
func TestIOStreamWrapper_SerializesConcurrentSends(t *testing.T) {
obs := &sendObservingStream{}
iw := NewIOStreamWrapper(obs)
const workers = 16
const opsPerWorker = 200
var wg sync.WaitGroup
wg.Add(workers)
for i := 0; i < workers; i++ {
go func(seed int) {
defer wg.Done()
for j := 0; j < opsPerWorker; j++ {
switch (seed + j) % 3 {
case 0:
_ = iw.Send(&proto.IOStreamData{Data: []byte{byte(seed)}})
case 1:
_ = iw.SendKeepalive()
case 2:
_, _ = iw.Write([]byte{byte(j)})
}
}
}(i)
}
wg.Wait()
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&obs.maxInFlight); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("IOStreamWrapper.Send must serialize through sendMu; observed max-in-flight=%d, want 1", got)
}
}