mirror of
https://github.com/Buriburizaem0n/nezha_domains.git
synced 2026-09-19 09:40:12 +00:00
naibaandcloudcode
ab25662ddd
Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.
Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.
Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.
Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
75 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
75 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
package controller
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"bytes"
|
|
"net/http/httptest"
|
|
"testing"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
|
|
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func mcpEndpointRawCtx(t *testing.T, tok *model.APIToken, raw []byte) (*gin.Context, *httptest.ResponseRecorder) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
|
|
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
|
|
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/mcp", bytes.NewReader(raw))
|
|
c.Request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
|
c.Set(apiTokenCtxKey, tok)
|
|
c.Set(model.CtxKeyAPIToken, tok)
|
|
return c, w
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func mcpRateLimitTestSetup(t *testing.T, budget int) *model.APIToken {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
originalConf := singleton.Conf
|
|
originalLimiter := mcpRateLimiterShared
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() {
|
|
singleton.Conf = originalConf
|
|
mcpRateLimiterShared = originalLimiter
|
|
})
|
|
cfg := &model.Config{}
|
|
cfg.SetMCPEnabled(true)
|
|
singleton.Conf = &singleton.ConfigClass{Config: cfg}
|
|
mcpRateLimiterShared = newMCPRateLimiter(budget, budget)
|
|
return &model.APIToken{ID: 4243, UserID: 1}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A flood of tools/call requests whose params fail to parse must still consume
|
|
// the per-token budget. Otherwise a valid PAT bypasses the limiter by always
|
|
// sending malformed arguments.
|
|
func TestMCPMalformedToolsCallParamsCountsAgainstRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tok := mcpRateLimitTestSetup(t, 2)
|
|
|
|
raw := []byte(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":"not-an-object"}`)
|
|
|
|
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
|
|
c, _ := mcpEndpointRawCtx(t, tok, raw)
|
|
mcpEndpoint(c)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if mcpRateLimiterShared.Allow(tok.ID) {
|
|
t.Fatal("malformed tools/call params must still consume the rate budget; limiter not saturated")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A flood of unparseable JSON-RPC envelopes from an authenticated PAT must also
|
|
// consume the budget.
|
|
func TestMCPMalformedEnvelopeCountsAgainstRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tok := mcpRateLimitTestSetup(t, 2)
|
|
|
|
raw := []byte(`{not valid json`)
|
|
|
|
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
|
|
c, _ := mcpEndpointRawCtx(t, tok, raw)
|
|
mcpEndpoint(c)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if mcpRateLimiterShared.Allow(tok.ID) {
|
|
t.Fatal("malformed JSON-RPC envelope must still consume the rate budget; limiter not saturated")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|