Files
nezha_domains/cmd/dashboard/controller/mcp_tools_fs_test.go
T
naibaandcloudcode ab25662ddd feat(auth): add PAT auth, scoped REST/MCP access, CSRF, and tenant isolation
Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.

Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.

Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.

Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.

Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-30 15:56:44 +00:00

169 lines
5.2 KiB
Go

package controller
import (
"encoding/json"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton"
)
// fs.* 跨租户拒绝测试:member token 调 fs.list/read/write/delete 时,如果
// server.UserID != caller.ID 必须 isError 返回,且不会触达 agent。
//
// 这些用例不依赖 agent simulator —— 它们要验证的就是 requireServerAccess 在
// agent 调用前拦截。如果错误发生在 agent CallAgent,说明权限漏失。
func makeForeignServerMCP(t *testing.T, id, ownerUID uint64) {
t.Helper()
srv := &model.Server{}
srv.ID = id
srv.SetUserID(ownerUID)
singleton.ServerShared.InsertForTest(srv)
}
func TestMCPFs_List_ForeignServerRejected(t *testing.T) {
cleanup, uid := setupMCPTest(t)
defer cleanup()
makeForeignServerMCP(t, 200, 999)
tok, _ := mkToken(t, uid, []string{model.ScopeServerRead}, nil)
c, w := mcpCallCtx(t, tok, uid, jsonRPCRequest{
JSONRPC: "2.0", ID: json.RawMessage("1"), Method: "tools/call",
Params: jsonObj(t, toolCallParams{
Name: "fs.list",
Arguments: jsonRaw(map[string]any{"server_id": 200, "path": "/etc"}),
}),
})
mcpEndpoint(c)
_, tcr := decodeRPC(w)
require.NotNil(t, tcr)
require.True(t, tcr.IsError)
require.Contains(t, tcr.Content[0].Text, "permission denied")
}
func TestMCPFs_Read_ForeignServerRejected(t *testing.T) {
cleanup, uid := setupMCPTest(t)
defer cleanup()
makeForeignServerMCP(t, 201, 999)
tok, _ := mkToken(t, uid, []string{model.ScopeServerRead}, nil)
c, w := mcpCallCtx(t, tok, uid, jsonRPCRequest{
JSONRPC: "2.0", ID: json.RawMessage("1"), Method: "tools/call",
Params: jsonObj(t, toolCallParams{
Name: "fs.read",
Arguments: jsonRaw(map[string]any{"server_id": 201, "path": "/etc/passwd"}),
}),
})
mcpEndpoint(c)
_, tcr := decodeRPC(w)
require.True(t, tcr.IsError)
require.Contains(t, tcr.Content[0].Text, "permission denied")
}
func TestMCPFs_Write_ForeignServerRejected(t *testing.T) {
cleanup, uid := setupMCPTest(t)
defer cleanup()
makeForeignServerMCP(t, 202, 999)
tok, _ := mkToken(t, uid, []string{model.ScopeServerWrite}, nil)
c, w := mcpCallCtx(t, tok, uid, jsonRPCRequest{
JSONRPC: "2.0", ID: json.RawMessage("1"), Method: "tools/call",
Params: jsonObj(t, toolCallParams{
Name: "fs.write",
Arguments: jsonRaw(map[string]any{
"server_id": 202, "path": "/tmp/evil", "content": "x",
}),
}),
})
mcpEndpoint(c)
_, tcr := decodeRPC(w)
require.True(t, tcr.IsError)
require.Contains(t, tcr.Content[0].Text, "permission denied")
}
func TestMCPFs_Delete_ForeignServerRejected(t *testing.T) {
cleanup, uid := setupMCPTest(t)
defer cleanup()
makeForeignServerMCP(t, 203, 999)
tok, _ := mkToken(t, uid, []string{model.ScopeServerDelete}, nil)
c, w := mcpCallCtx(t, tok, uid, jsonRPCRequest{
JSONRPC: "2.0", ID: json.RawMessage("1"), Method: "tools/call",
Params: jsonObj(t, toolCallParams{
Name: "fs.delete",
Arguments: jsonRaw(map[string]any{"server_id": 203, "path": "/tmp/foo"}),
}),
})
mcpEndpoint(c)
_, tcr := decodeRPC(w)
require.True(t, tcr.IsError)
require.Contains(t, tcr.Content[0].Text, "permission denied")
}
func TestMCPFs_DownloadURL_ForeignServerRejected(t *testing.T) {
cleanup, uid := setupMCPTest(t)
defer cleanup()
makeForeignServerMCP(t, 204, 999)
tok, _ := mkToken(t, uid, []string{model.ScopeServerRead}, nil)
c, w := mcpCallCtx(t, tok, uid, jsonRPCRequest{
JSONRPC: "2.0", ID: json.RawMessage("1"), Method: "tools/call",
Params: jsonObj(t, toolCallParams{
Name: "fs.download_url",
Arguments: jsonRaw(map[string]any{"server_id": 204, "path": "/etc/shadow"}),
}),
})
mcpEndpoint(c)
_, tcr := decodeRPC(w)
require.True(t, tcr.IsError)
require.Contains(t, tcr.Content[0].Text, "permission denied")
}
func TestMCPFs_UploadURL_ForeignServerRejected(t *testing.T) {
cleanup, uid := setupMCPTest(t)
defer cleanup()
makeForeignServerMCP(t, 205, 999)
tok, _ := mkToken(t, uid, []string{model.ScopeServerWrite}, nil)
c, w := mcpCallCtx(t, tok, uid, jsonRPCRequest{
JSONRPC: "2.0", ID: json.RawMessage("1"), Method: "tools/call",
Params: jsonObj(t, toolCallParams{
Name: "fs.upload_url",
Arguments: jsonRaw(map[string]any{"server_id": 205, "path": "/tmp/up"}),
}),
})
mcpEndpoint(c)
_, tcr := decodeRPC(w)
require.True(t, tcr.IsError)
require.Contains(t, tcr.Content[0].Text, "permission denied")
}
func TestMCPFs_PATServerWhitelistFiltersFs(t *testing.T) {
cleanup, uid := setupMCPTest(t)
defer cleanup()
// Both servers owned by the same user, but the PAT only whitelists server 300.
// fs.list against server 7 (in setupMCPTest) must be denied even though
// caller user owns it, because the PAT was minted for server 300 only.
srv := &model.Server{}
srv.ID = 300
srv.SetUserID(uid)
singleton.ServerShared.InsertForTest(srv)
tok, _ := mkToken(t, uid, []string{model.ScopeServerRead}, []uint64{300})
c, w := mcpCallCtx(t, tok, uid, jsonRPCRequest{
JSONRPC: "2.0", ID: json.RawMessage("1"), Method: "tools/call",
Params: jsonObj(t, toolCallParams{
Name: "fs.list",
Arguments: jsonRaw(map[string]any{"server_id": 7, "path": "/etc"}),
}),
})
mcpEndpoint(c)
_, tcr := decodeRPC(w)
require.True(t, tcr.IsError)
require.Contains(t, tcr.Content[0].Text, "permission denied")
}