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https://github.com/Buriburizaem0n/nezha_domains.git
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naibaandcloudcode
ab25662ddd
Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.
Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.
Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.
Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
69 lines
1.8 KiB
Go
69 lines
1.8 KiB
Go
package controller
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import (
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"testing"
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"time"
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)
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// H8 regression: anonymous transfer failures (entry=nil — token was bogus
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// or already consumed) must be sampled, not written to audit one-for-one.
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// Otherwise any unauthenticated attacker can flood the audit table by
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// repeatedly POSTing /mcp/upload/garbage.
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func TestTransferAnonAuditThrottle_FirstRequestPasses(t *testing.T) {
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th := newTransferAnonAuditThrottle(10*time.Second, 5)
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if !th.shouldRecord("1.2.3.4") {
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t.Fatal("first anon failure from an IP must be recorded")
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}
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}
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func TestTransferAnonAuditThrottle_BurstCappedPerWindow(t *testing.T) {
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th := newTransferAnonAuditThrottle(time.Minute, 3)
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const ip = "5.6.7.8"
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recorded := 0
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for i := 0; i < 20; i++ {
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if th.shouldRecord(ip) {
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recorded++
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}
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}
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if recorded > 3 {
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t.Fatalf("burst of 20 anon failures must be capped at 3 per window, got %d", recorded)
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}
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if recorded == 0 {
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t.Fatal("burst must record at least one sample")
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}
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}
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func TestTransferAnonAuditThrottle_IndependentPerIP(t *testing.T) {
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th := newTransferAnonAuditThrottle(time.Minute, 1)
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if !th.shouldRecord("a") {
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t.Fatal("first request from IP a must be recorded")
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}
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if !th.shouldRecord("b") {
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t.Fatal("first request from a different IP must not share IP a's budget")
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}
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if th.shouldRecord("a") {
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t.Fatal("second request from IP a within window must be dropped")
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}
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}
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func TestTransferAnonAuditThrottle_WindowResets(t *testing.T) {
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th := newTransferAnonAuditThrottle(20*time.Millisecond, 1)
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const ip = "9.9.9.9"
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if !th.shouldRecord(ip) {
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t.Fatal("first request must be recorded")
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}
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if th.shouldRecord(ip) {
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t.Fatal("second request inside window must be dropped")
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}
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time.Sleep(40 * time.Millisecond)
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if !th.shouldRecord(ip) {
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t.Fatal("request after window expiry must be recorded again")
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}
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}
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