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https://github.com/Buriburizaem0n/nezha_domains.git
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naibaandcloudcode
e8dabf5bc6
Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.
Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.
Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.
Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
55 lines
1.5 KiB
Go
55 lines
1.5 KiB
Go
package controller
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import (
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"testing"
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"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
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)
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// C2 regression: writes must reject unknown Cover values so dirty configs
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// cannot be persisted. CronTrigger has no PAT context on the periodic
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// scheduler path, so unknown Cover sails past every PAT guard and dispatches
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// via the default branch in CronTrigger (no CoverAll/IgnoreAll match → still
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// reaches every server that passes cronCanSendToServer).
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func TestIsValidCronCover_RejectsUnknown(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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cover uint8
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want bool
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}{
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{"CoverIgnoreAll", model.CronCoverIgnoreAll, true},
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{"CoverAll", model.CronCoverAll, true},
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{"CoverAlertTrigger", model.CronCoverAlertTrigger, true},
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{"unknown_99", 99, false},
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{"unknown_max", 255, false},
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{"unknown_3", 3, false},
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}
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for _, tc := range cases {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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if got := isValidCronCover(tc.cover); got != tc.want {
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t.Fatalf("isValidCronCover(%d) = %v, want %v", tc.cover, got, tc.want)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestIsValidServiceCover_RejectsUnknown(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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cover uint8
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want bool
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}{
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{"ServiceCoverAll", model.ServiceCoverAll, true},
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{"ServiceCoverIgnoreAll", model.ServiceCoverIgnoreAll, true},
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{"unknown_99", 99, false},
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{"unknown_max", 255, false},
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}
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for _, tc := range cases {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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if got := isValidServiceCover(tc.cover); got != tc.want {
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t.Fatalf("isValidServiceCover(%d) = %v, want %v", tc.cover, got, tc.want)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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