Files
nezha_domains/model/alertrule.go
T
naibaandcloudcode e8dabf5bc6 feat(auth): add PAT auth, scoped REST/MCP access, CSRF, and tenant isolation
Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.

Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.

Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.

Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.

Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-30 15:56:44 +00:00

199 lines
5.7 KiB
Go

package model
import (
"slices"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/goccy/go-json"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
const (
ModeAlwaysTrigger = 0
ModeOnetimeTrigger = 1
)
type AlertRule struct {
Common
Name string `json:"name"`
RulesRaw string `json:"-"`
Enable *bool `json:"enable,omitempty"`
TriggerMode uint8 `gorm:"default:0" json:"trigger_mode"` // 触发模式: 0-始终触发(默认) 1-单次触发
NotificationGroupID uint64 `json:"notification_group_id"` // 该报警规则所在的通知组
FailTriggerTasksRaw string `gorm:"default:'[]'" json:"-"`
RecoverTriggerTasksRaw string `gorm:"default:'[]'" json:"-"`
Rules []*Rule `gorm:"-" json:"rules"`
FailTriggerTasks []uint64 `gorm:"-" json:"fail_trigger_tasks"` // 失败时执行的触发任务id
RecoverTriggerTasks []uint64 `gorm:"-" json:"recover_trigger_tasks"` // 恢复时执行的触发任务id
}
func (r *AlertRule) BeforeSave(tx *gorm.DB) error {
if data, err := json.Marshal(r.Rules); err != nil {
return err
} else {
r.RulesRaw = string(data)
}
if data, err := json.Marshal(r.FailTriggerTasks); err != nil {
return err
} else {
r.FailTriggerTasksRaw = string(data)
}
if data, err := json.Marshal(r.RecoverTriggerTasks); err != nil {
return err
} else {
r.RecoverTriggerTasksRaw = string(data)
}
return nil
}
func (r *AlertRule) AfterFind(tx *gorm.DB) error {
var err error
if err = json.Unmarshal([]byte(r.RulesRaw), &r.Rules); err != nil {
return err
}
if err = json.Unmarshal([]byte(r.FailTriggerTasksRaw), &r.FailTriggerTasks); err != nil {
return err
}
if err = json.Unmarshal([]byte(r.RecoverTriggerTasksRaw), &r.RecoverTriggerTasks); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (r *AlertRule) Enabled() bool {
return r.Enable != nil && *r.Enable
}
// HasPermission extends the default owner/admin check with PAT
// server_ids whitelist enforcement. AlertRule.Snapshot fans out across
// every owner-visible server filtered only by Rule.Ignore semantics
// (RuleCoverAll: deny-list; RuleCoverIgnoreAll: allow-list). A
// server-limited PAT must therefore satisfy the same cover-fanout rule
// the cron / service paths use — otherwise it can create or update a
// rule that monitors servers outside its whitelist (admin owner: any
// server in the system).
//
// Unknown Rule.Cover is fail-closed: Snapshot's switch defaults to
// "monitor everything", so persisting it would defeat the PAT cover
// guard. createAlertRule / updateAlertRule should also reject unknown
// covers at write time; this method is the runtime safety net.
func (r *AlertRule) HasPermission(ctx *gin.Context) bool {
if !r.Common.HasPermission(ctx) {
return false
}
v, ok := ctx.Get(CtxKeyAPIToken)
if !ok {
return true
}
tok, _ := v.(APITokenAccessor)
if tok == nil {
return true
}
if wl, ok := tok.(APITokenWhitelistView); ok && len(wl.ServerIDs()) == 0 {
return true
}
for _, rule := range r.Rules {
if rule == nil {
continue
}
switch rule.Cover {
case RuleCoverAll:
denyIDs := make([]uint64, 0, len(rule.Ignore))
for id, ignored := range rule.Ignore {
if ignored {
denyIDs = append(denyIDs, id)
}
}
if !DenyListSafeForLimitedPAT(tok, r.GetUserID(), denyIDs) {
return false
}
case RuleCoverIgnoreAll:
for id, monitored := range rule.Ignore {
if monitored && !tok.CanAccessServer(id) {
return false
}
}
default:
return false
}
}
return true
}
// Snapshot 对传入的Server进行该报警规则下所有type的检查 返回每项检查结果
func (r *AlertRule) Snapshot(cycleTransferStats *CycleTransferStats, server *Server, db *gorm.DB) []bool {
point := make([]bool, len(r.Rules))
for i, rule := range r.Rules {
point[i] = rule.Snapshot(cycleTransferStats, server, db)
}
return point
}
// Check 传入包含当前报警规则下所有type检查结果 返回报警持续时间与是否通过报警检查(通过则返回true)
func (r *AlertRule) Check(points [][]bool) (int, bool) {
var hasPassedRule bool
durations := make([]int, len(r.Rules))
for ruleIndex, rule := range r.Rules {
duration := int(rule.Duration)
if rule.IsTransferDurationRule() {
// 循环区间流量报警
if durations[ruleIndex] < 1 {
durations[ruleIndex] = 1
}
if hasPassedRule {
continue
}
// 只要最后一次检查超出了规则范围 就认为检查未通过
if len(points) > 0 && points[len(points)-1][ruleIndex] {
hasPassedRule = true
}
} else if rule.IsOfflineRule() {
// 离线报警,检查直到最后一次在线的离线采样点是否大于 duration
if hasPassedRule = boundCheck(len(points), duration, hasPassedRule); hasPassedRule {
continue
}
var fail int
for _, point := range slices.Backward(points[len(points)-duration:]) {
fail++
if point[ruleIndex] {
hasPassedRule = true
break
}
}
durations[ruleIndex] = fail
continue
} else {
// 常规报警
if hasPassedRule = boundCheck(len(points), duration, hasPassedRule); hasPassedRule {
continue
}
if duration > durations[ruleIndex] {
durations[ruleIndex] = duration
}
total, fail := duration, 0
for timeTick := len(points) - duration; timeTick < len(points); timeTick++ {
if !points[timeTick][ruleIndex] {
fail++
}
}
// 当70%以上的采样点未通过规则判断时 才认为当前检查未通过
if fail*100/total <= 70 {
hasPassedRule = true
}
}
}
// 仅当所有检查均未通过时 才触发告警
return slices.Max(durations), hasPassedRule
}
func boundCheck(length, duration int, passed bool) bool {
if passed {
return true
}
// 如果采样点数量不足 则认为检查通过
return length < duration
}