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https://github.com/shuaiplus/nodewarden.git
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436 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript
436 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript
import { Env, TokenResponse } from '../types';
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import { StorageService } from '../services/storage';
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import { AuthService } from '../services/auth';
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import { RateLimitService, getClientIdentifier } from '../services/ratelimit';
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import { jsonResponse, errorResponse, identityErrorResponse } from '../utils/response';
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import { LIMITS } from '../config/limits';
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import { isTotpEnabled, verifyTotpToken } from '../utils/totp';
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import { createRefreshToken } from '../utils/jwt';
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import { readAuthRequestDeviceInfo } from '../utils/device';
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import { createRecoveryCode, recoveryCodeEquals } from '../utils/recovery-code';
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import { issueSendAccessToken } from './sends';
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const TWO_FACTOR_REMEMBER_TTL_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
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const TWO_FACTOR_PROVIDER_AUTHENTICATOR = 0;
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const TWO_FACTOR_PROVIDER_REMEMBER = 5;
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// Android client (2026.2.x) deserializes TwoFactorProviders2 keys with -1 for recovery code.
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// Keep request parsing backward-compatible with historical provider values (8 / 100).
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const TWO_FACTOR_PROVIDER_RECOVERY_CODE_RESPONSE = '-1';
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const TWO_FACTOR_PROVIDER_RECOVERY_CODE_LEGACY = 8;
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const TWO_FACTOR_PROVIDER_RECOVERY_CODE_ANDROID_REQUEST = 100;
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function resolveTotpSecret(userSecret: string | null, envSecret: string | undefined): string | null {
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if (userSecret && isTotpEnabled(userSecret)) {
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return userSecret;
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}
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if (isTotpEnabled(envSecret)) {
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return envSecret!;
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}
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return null;
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}
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function twoFactorRequiredResponse(message: string = 'Two factor required.', includeRecoveryCode: boolean = false): Response {
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const providers = includeRecoveryCode
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? [String(TWO_FACTOR_PROVIDER_AUTHENTICATOR), TWO_FACTOR_PROVIDER_RECOVERY_CODE_RESPONSE]
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: [String(TWO_FACTOR_PROVIDER_AUTHENTICATOR)];
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const providers2: Record<string, null> = {};
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for (const provider of providers) providers2[provider] = null;
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// Bitwarden clients rely on these fields to trigger the 2FA UI flow.
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return jsonResponse(
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{
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error: 'invalid_grant',
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error_description: message,
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TwoFactorProviders: providers,
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TwoFactorProviders2: providers2,
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// Required by current Android parser (nullable value is acceptable).
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SsoEmail2faSessionToken: null,
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// Keep payload shape close to upstream implementations.
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MasterPasswordPolicy: {
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Object: 'masterPasswordPolicy',
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},
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ErrorModel: {
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Message: message,
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Object: 'error',
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},
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},
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400
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);
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}
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async function recordFailedLoginAndBuildResponse(
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rateLimit: RateLimitService,
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loginIdentifier: string,
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message: string
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): Promise<Response> {
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const result = await rateLimit.recordFailedLogin(loginIdentifier);
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if (result.locked) {
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return identityErrorResponse(
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`Too many failed login attempts. Account locked for ${Math.ceil(result.retryAfterSeconds! / 60)} minutes.`,
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'TooManyRequests',
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429
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);
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}
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return identityErrorResponse(message, 'invalid_grant', 400);
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}
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async function recordFailedTwoFactorAndBuildResponse(
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rateLimit: RateLimitService,
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loginIdentifier: string
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): Promise<Response> {
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const failed = await rateLimit.recordFailedLogin(loginIdentifier);
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if (failed.locked) {
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return identityErrorResponse(
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`Too many failed login attempts. Account locked for ${Math.ceil(failed.retryAfterSeconds! / 60)} minutes.`,
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'TooManyRequests',
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429
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);
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}
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return identityErrorResponse('Two-step token is invalid. Try again.', 'invalid_grant', 400);
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}
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// POST /identity/connect/token
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export async function handleToken(request: Request, env: Env): Promise<Response> {
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const storage = new StorageService(env.DB);
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const auth = new AuthService(env);
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const rateLimit = new RateLimitService(env.DB);
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let body: Record<string, string>;
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const contentType = request.headers.get('content-type') || '';
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try {
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if (contentType.includes('application/x-www-form-urlencoded')) {
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const formData = await request.formData();
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body = Object.fromEntries(formData.entries()) as Record<string, string>;
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} else {
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body = await request.json();
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}
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} catch {
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return identityErrorResponse('Invalid request payload', 'invalid_request', 400);
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}
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const grantType = body.grant_type;
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const clientIdentifier = getClientIdentifier(request);
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if (grantType === 'password') {
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// Login with password
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const email = body.username?.toLowerCase();
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const passwordHash = body.password;
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const twoFactorToken = body.twoFactorToken;
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const twoFactorProvider = body.twoFactorProvider;
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const twoFactorRemember = body.twoFactorRemember;
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const loginIdentifier = `${clientIdentifier}:${email}`;
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const deviceInfo = readAuthRequestDeviceInfo(body, request);
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if (!email || !passwordHash) {
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// Bitwarden clients expect OAuth-style error fields.
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return identityErrorResponse('Email and password are required', 'invalid_request', 400);
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}
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// Check login lockout before user lookup to reduce user-enumeration signal
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const loginCheck = await rateLimit.checkLoginAttempt(loginIdentifier);
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if (!loginCheck.allowed) {
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return identityErrorResponse(
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`Too many failed login attempts. Try again in ${Math.ceil(loginCheck.retryAfterSeconds! / 60)} minutes.`,
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'TooManyRequests',
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429
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);
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}
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const user = await storage.getUser(email);
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if (!user) {
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await rateLimit.recordFailedLogin(loginIdentifier);
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return identityErrorResponse('Username or password is incorrect. Try again', 'invalid_grant', 400);
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}
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if (user.status !== 'active') {
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await rateLimit.recordFailedLogin(loginIdentifier);
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return identityErrorResponse('Account is disabled', 'invalid_grant', 400);
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}
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const valid = await auth.verifyPassword(passwordHash, user.masterPasswordHash, user.email);
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if (!valid) {
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return recordFailedLoginAndBuildResponse(
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rateLimit,
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loginIdentifier,
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'Username or password is incorrect. Try again'
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);
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}
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// Optional 2FA: enabled per-user secret first, then falls back to global env secret for compatibility.
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let trustedTwoFactorTokenToReturn: string | undefined;
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const effectiveTotpSecret = resolveTotpSecret(user.totpSecret, env.TOTP_SECRET);
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if (effectiveTotpSecret) {
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const canUseRecoveryCode = !!user.totpRecoveryCode;
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const normalizedTwoFactorProvider = String(twoFactorProvider ?? '').trim();
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const normalizedTwoFactorToken = String(twoFactorToken ?? '').trim();
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let rememberRequested = ['1', 'true', 'True', 'TRUE', 'on', 'yes', 'Yes', 'YES'].includes(String(twoFactorRemember || '').trim());
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const hasProvider = normalizedTwoFactorProvider.length > 0;
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const hasToken = normalizedTwoFactorToken.length > 0;
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// Upstream-compatible behavior: if 2FA is required and either provider or token is missing,
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// respond with a 2FA challenge payload.
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if (!hasProvider || !hasToken) {
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return twoFactorRequiredResponse('Two factor required.', canUseRecoveryCode);
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}
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let passedByRememberToken = false;
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if (normalizedTwoFactorProvider === String(TWO_FACTOR_PROVIDER_REMEMBER)) {
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if (deviceInfo.deviceIdentifier) {
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const trustedUserId = await storage.getTrustedTwoFactorDeviceTokenUserId(
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normalizedTwoFactorToken,
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deviceInfo.deviceIdentifier
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);
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passedByRememberToken = trustedUserId === user.id;
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}
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// Remember token missing/invalid/expired should re-enter the 2FA challenge flow.
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if (!passedByRememberToken) {
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return twoFactorRequiredResponse('Two factor required.', canUseRecoveryCode);
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}
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} else if (normalizedTwoFactorProvider === String(TWO_FACTOR_PROVIDER_AUTHENTICATOR)) {
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const totpOk = await verifyTotpToken(effectiveTotpSecret, normalizedTwoFactorToken);
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if (!totpOk) {
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return recordFailedTwoFactorAndBuildResponse(rateLimit, loginIdentifier);
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}
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} else if (
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normalizedTwoFactorProvider === TWO_FACTOR_PROVIDER_RECOVERY_CODE_RESPONSE ||
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normalizedTwoFactorProvider === String(TWO_FACTOR_PROVIDER_RECOVERY_CODE_LEGACY) ||
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normalizedTwoFactorProvider === String(TWO_FACTOR_PROVIDER_RECOVERY_CODE_ANDROID_REQUEST)
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) {
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if (!recoveryCodeEquals(normalizedTwoFactorToken, user.totpRecoveryCode)) {
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return recordFailedTwoFactorAndBuildResponse(rateLimit, loginIdentifier);
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}
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user.totpSecret = null;
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user.totpRecoveryCode = createRecoveryCode();
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user.updatedAt = new Date().toISOString();
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await storage.saveUser(user);
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await storage.deleteRefreshTokensByUserId(user.id);
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rememberRequested = false;
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} else {
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// Unsupported provider for this server profile behaves as an invalid 2FA attempt.
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return recordFailedTwoFactorAndBuildResponse(rateLimit, loginIdentifier);
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}
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// Upstream behavior: do not issue a new remember token when auth itself used remember provider.
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if (rememberRequested && !passedByRememberToken && deviceInfo.deviceIdentifier) {
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trustedTwoFactorTokenToReturn = createRefreshToken();
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await storage.saveTrustedTwoFactorDeviceToken(
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trustedTwoFactorTokenToReturn,
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user.id,
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deviceInfo.deviceIdentifier,
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Date.now() + TWO_FACTOR_REMEMBER_TTL_MS
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);
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}
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}
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// Persist device only after successful password + (optional) 2FA verification.
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if (deviceInfo.deviceIdentifier) {
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await storage.upsertDevice(user.id, deviceInfo.deviceIdentifier, deviceInfo.deviceName, deviceInfo.deviceType);
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}
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// Successful login - clear failed attempts
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await rateLimit.clearLoginAttempts(loginIdentifier);
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const accessToken = await auth.generateAccessToken(user);
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const refreshToken = await auth.generateRefreshToken(user.id);
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const response: TokenResponse = {
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access_token: accessToken,
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expires_in: LIMITS.auth.accessTokenTtlSeconds,
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token_type: 'Bearer',
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refresh_token: refreshToken,
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...(trustedTwoFactorTokenToReturn ? { TwoFactorToken: trustedTwoFactorTokenToReturn } : {}),
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Key: user.key,
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PrivateKey: user.privateKey,
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Kdf: user.kdfType,
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KdfIterations: user.kdfIterations,
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KdfMemory: user.kdfMemory,
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KdfParallelism: user.kdfParallelism,
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ForcePasswordReset: false,
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ResetMasterPassword: false,
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scope: 'api offline_access',
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unofficialServer: true,
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UserDecryptionOptions: {
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HasMasterPassword: true,
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Object: 'userDecryptionOptions',
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MasterPasswordUnlock: {
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Kdf: {
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KdfType: user.kdfType,
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Iterations: user.kdfIterations,
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Memory: user.kdfMemory || null,
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Parallelism: user.kdfParallelism || null,
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},
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MasterKeyEncryptedUserKey: user.key,
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MasterKeyWrappedUserKey: user.key,
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Salt: email, // email is already lowercased above
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Object: 'masterPasswordUnlock',
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},
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},
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};
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return jsonResponse(response);
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} else if (grantType === 'send_access') {
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const sendAccessLimit = await rateLimit.consumeBudget(`${clientIdentifier}:public`, LIMITS.rateLimit.publicRequestsPerMinute);
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if (!sendAccessLimit.allowed) {
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return identityErrorResponse(
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`Rate limit exceeded. Try again in ${sendAccessLimit.retryAfterSeconds} seconds.`,
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'TooManyRequests',
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429
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);
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}
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const sendId = String(body.send_id || body.sendId || '').trim();
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if (!sendId) {
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return jsonResponse(
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{
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error: 'invalid_request',
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error_description: 'send_id is required',
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send_access_error_type: 'invalid_send_id',
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ErrorModel: {
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Message: 'send_id is required',
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Object: 'error',
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},
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},
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400
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);
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}
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const passwordHashB64 = String(
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body.password_hash_b64 || body.passwordHashB64 || body.passwordHash || body.password_hash || ''
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).trim() || null;
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const password = String(body.password || '').trim() || null;
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const result = await issueSendAccessToken(env, sendId, passwordHashB64, password);
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if ('error' in result) {
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return result.error;
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}
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return jsonResponse({
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access_token: result.token,
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expires_in: LIMITS.auth.sendAccessTokenTtlSeconds,
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token_type: 'Bearer',
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scope: 'api.send',
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unofficialServer: true,
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});
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} else if (grantType === 'refresh_token') {
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// Refresh token
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const refreshToken = body.refresh_token;
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if (!refreshToken) {
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return identityErrorResponse('Refresh token is required', 'invalid_request', 400);
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}
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const result = await auth.refreshAccessToken(refreshToken);
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if (!result) {
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return identityErrorResponse('Invalid refresh token', 'invalid_grant', 400);
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}
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// Keep a short overlap window for old refresh token to absorb
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// concurrent refresh requests from multiple client contexts.
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await storage.constrainRefreshTokenExpiry(
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refreshToken,
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Date.now() + LIMITS.auth.refreshTokenOverlapGraceMs
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);
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const { accessToken, user } = result;
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const newRefreshToken = await auth.generateRefreshToken(user.id);
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const response: TokenResponse = {
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access_token: accessToken,
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expires_in: LIMITS.auth.accessTokenTtlSeconds,
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token_type: 'Bearer',
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refresh_token: newRefreshToken,
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Key: user.key,
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PrivateKey: user.privateKey,
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Kdf: user.kdfType,
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KdfIterations: user.kdfIterations,
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KdfMemory: user.kdfMemory,
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KdfParallelism: user.kdfParallelism,
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ForcePasswordReset: false,
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ResetMasterPassword: false,
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scope: 'api offline_access',
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unofficialServer: true,
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UserDecryptionOptions: {
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HasMasterPassword: true,
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Object: 'userDecryptionOptions',
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MasterPasswordUnlock: {
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Kdf: {
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KdfType: user.kdfType,
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Iterations: user.kdfIterations,
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Memory: user.kdfMemory || null,
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Parallelism: user.kdfParallelism || null,
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},
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MasterKeyEncryptedUserKey: user.key,
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MasterKeyWrappedUserKey: user.key,
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Salt: user.email.toLowerCase(),
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Object: 'masterPasswordUnlock',
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},
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},
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};
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return jsonResponse(response);
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}
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return identityErrorResponse('Unsupported grant type', 'unsupported_grant_type', 400);
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}
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// POST /identity/accounts/prelogin
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export async function handlePrelogin(request: Request, env: Env): Promise<Response> {
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const storage = new StorageService(env.DB);
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let body: { email?: string };
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try {
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body = await request.json();
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} catch {
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return errorResponse('Invalid JSON', 400);
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}
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const email = body.email?.toLowerCase();
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if (!email) {
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return errorResponse('Email is required', 400);
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}
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const user = await storage.getUser(email);
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// Return default KDF settings even if user doesn't exist (to prevent user enumeration)
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const kdfType = user?.kdfType ?? 0;
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const kdfIterations = user?.kdfIterations ?? LIMITS.auth.defaultKdfIterations;
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// Use ?? null so non-existent users return null (not undefined/omitted) for these fields,
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// matching the response shape of real PBKDF2 users and reducing enumeration signal.
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const kdfMemory = user?.kdfMemory ?? null;
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const kdfParallelism = user?.kdfParallelism ?? null;
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return jsonResponse({
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kdf: kdfType,
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kdfIterations: kdfIterations,
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kdfMemory: kdfMemory,
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kdfParallelism: kdfParallelism,
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});
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}
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// POST /identity/connect/revocation
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// Best-effort OAuth token revocation endpoint.
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// RFC 7009 allows returning 200 even if token is unknown.
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export async function handleRevocation(request: Request, env: Env): Promise<Response> {
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const storage = new StorageService(env.DB);
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let body: Record<string, string>;
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const contentType = request.headers.get('content-type') || '';
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try {
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if (contentType.includes('application/x-www-form-urlencoded')) {
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const formData = await request.formData();
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body = Object.fromEntries(formData.entries()) as Record<string, string>;
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} else {
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body = await request.json();
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}
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} catch {
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return new Response(null, { status: 200 });
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}
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const token = String(body.token || '').trim();
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if (token) {
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await storage.deleteRefreshToken(token);
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}
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return new Response(null, { status: 200 });
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}
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