The backend CSRF double-submit gate rejects unsafe methods unless
X-CSRF-Token mirrors the signed nz-csrf cookie. page.request bypasses the
SPA JS that does this, so every mutating E2E call got 403, failing the suite.
- Add csrfHeaders(page) helper that mirrors the nz-csrf cookie into the
header, polling until the cookie is readable to avoid the post-login race.
- Apply it to all cookie-authenticated POST/PATCH/DELETE calls (the /mcp
Bearer calls stay header-free since PAT requests are CSRF-exempt).
- loginAs waits for the nz-csrf cookie before returning.
- Fix the create-token dialog submit selector: the button is labelled
'Create API token' (t('CreateApiToken')), not 'Create'.
Verified 8/8 passing across repeated CI-mode runs against a real backend.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
Add an API tokens management route to create, list, and revoke PATs, showing
the plaintext token once on creation with scope and server-id selection.
Mirror the nz-csrf cookie into the X-CSRF-Token header on unsafe fetcher
methods (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) for the server-side double-submit check, and
self-heal expired sessions via refresh-token without a recursive fetch loop.
Gate protected routes behind resolved auth state to avoid pre-auth SWR fetches,
and fix the login loading/race so stale probes cannot clobber the session.
Add i18n keys for the new screens across all locales.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
naibaandcloudcode