Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.
Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.
Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.
Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
GET /api/v1/file?id=<server> created an FM stream on the agent stream
and committed real state change (TaskTypeFM dispatched). With JWT
cookie SameSite=Lax a victim's browser would still send the cookie on
a top-level cross-site GET, so an attacker could trick a logged-in
user into opening an FM session on any of their own servers, consuming
resources and triggering the agent's FM machinery without consent.
Mirror the GHSA-8qhj-4f8c-j8qg fix: move the route to POST. SameSite=
Lax cookies are not sent on cross-site POST. Frontend (admin-frontend)
adjusted in a follow-up commit.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
createTerminal and createFM correctly check server ownership before
issuing a stream UUID, but terminalStream and fmStream only verified
that the UUID existed. Any authenticated user holding a valid stream
UUID could attach to it, gaining the original creator's live shell or
file-manager session — and the UUID is exposed via URL path (referer
leaks, access logs, browser history, frontend error reporters).
Bind the creator user ID into ioStreamContext at CreateStream time,
expose StreamOwnership and IsStreamAuthorizedForUser, and check
ownership in terminalStream/fmStream before the WebSocket upgrade so a
rejected attempt does not tear down the legitimate stream via defer.
NAT streams are also routed through CreateStream(_, 0); they are not
reachable from /ws/terminal or /ws/file so a sentinel user ID is fine.
Co-authored-by: naiba/CloudCode <hi+cloudcode@nai.ba>
* feat: support listening https
* refactor
* modernize
* support snake case in config
* more precise control of config fields
* update goreleaser config
* remove kubeyaml
* fix: expose agent_secret
* chore
naibaandcloudcode
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