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https://github.com/Buriburizaem0n/nezha_domains.git
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naibaandcloudcode
05e14981b5
- consumeTransferToken now recomputes and constant-time compares the entry's HMAC-SHA256; previously the signature was minted but never checked, so the documented "防篡改" guarantee was hollow and security rested solely on the sync.Map key's randomness. - CSRF switches from a raw-random double-submit cookie to a signed token (nonce.HMAC-SHA256 keyed by JWTSecretKey). The middleware now also validates the signature, defeating sibling-subdomain cookie tossing where a naive header==cookie pair would otherwise pass. Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
1053 lines
38 KiB
Go
1053 lines
38 KiB
Go
package controller
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/binary"
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"encoding/hex"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"math"
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"net/http"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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"github.com/hashicorp/go-uuid"
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"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
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"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/pkg/utils"
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pb "github.com/nezhahq/nezha/proto"
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"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/rpc"
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"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton"
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)
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// fs.download_url / fs.upload_url 旁路通道。
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//
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// 设计目标：给 LLM 客户端一个不经 MCP 上下文的 URL，去用普通 HTTP 客户端
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// 上传/下载大文件（单文件 hard cap 100MiB，model.MCPFsTransferMaxSize）。
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//
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// 传输实现：dashboard ↔ agent 走 gRPC IOStream 双向流（TaskTypeFsTransfer），
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// dashboard 一边读 HTTP body 一边推给 agent；不再使用 base64/JSON 包装内容，
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// 避免 gRPC 4MiB 单消息上限。
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//
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// 安全机制：
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// - 一次性 token，存内存 sync.Map，TTL 默认 300s，最多 600s
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// - token 绑定 user_id + token_id + server_id + path + direction
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// - consume 时重算并以常数时间比对 entry 的 HMAC-SHA256，防篡改
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// - 命中后立即从内存删除，禁止重放
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// - revalidateTransferEntry 在 consume 时重新校验 PAT/scope/owner，应对
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// mint→consume 之间的权限变化
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// - 上传可选 ?sha256=<hex> 端到端校验；下载 NZTO 帧附 agent 计算的 sha
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type transferDirection string
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const (
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transferDirDownload transferDirection = "download"
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transferDirUpload transferDirection = "upload"
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transferTokenTTLDefault = 300 * time.Second
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transferTokenTTLMax = 600 * time.Second
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// maxTransferDuration bounds a single upload/download once the agent has
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// attached. 100MiB over a slow link still completes well within this;
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// anything longer is treated as a stalled/abusive transfer and cancelled.
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maxTransferDuration = 10 * time.Minute
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maxTransferPathLen = 4096
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)
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func validateTransferPath(path string) error {
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if path == "" {
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return errMCPInvalidArgs("path required")
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}
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if len(path) > maxTransferPathLen {
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return errMCPInvalidArgs("path too long")
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}
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return nil
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}
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type transferEntry struct {
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UserID uint64
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TokenID uint64
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ServerID uint64
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Path string
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Direction transferDirection
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ExpiresAt time.Time
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// Upload-only optional knobs carried from MCP fs.upload_url tool args
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// to transferUploadHandler so the upload handler can forward them into
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// FsTransferRequest. Empty/false values keep current behaviour for the
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// download direction (these fields are simply ignored).
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UploadMode string
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UploadCreateDirs bool
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UploadIfMatchSHA256 string
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}
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var (
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transferEntries sync.Map
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transferSecretMu sync.Mutex
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transferSecretVal string
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)
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// transferHMACSecret 返回进程内随机生成的 HMAC key。
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// 这是有意设计：transferEntries 本身也只活在内存 sync.Map 里，dashboard
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// 重启等价于全部 token 失效；让 secret 也随进程随机，可以避免“secret 来自
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// 持久化 env 但 entries 已丢”这种半持久化状态，同时保证多副本部署不会
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// 意外互认对方签发的 token（每副本一份独立 secret）。
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func transferHMACSecret() string {
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transferSecretMu.Lock()
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defer transferSecretMu.Unlock()
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if transferSecretVal != "" {
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return transferSecretVal
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}
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transferSecretVal = utils.MustGenerateRandomString(64)
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return transferSecretVal
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}
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// transferTokenSig 计算 entry 的 HMAC-SHA256 签名（hex）；mint 与 consume 共用。
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func transferTokenSig(e transferEntry) string {
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mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(transferHMACSecret()))
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fmt.Fprintf(mac, "%s|%d|%d|%d|%s|%d",
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e.Direction, e.UserID, e.TokenID, e.ServerID, e.Path, e.ExpiresAt.UnixNano())
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return hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
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}
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func mintTransferToken(e transferEntry) (string, error) {
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id, err := utils.GenerateRandomString(24)
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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tok := id + "." + transferTokenSig(e)
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transferEntries.Store(tok, e)
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return tok, nil
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}
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func consumeTransferToken(tok string, dir transferDirection) (*transferEntry, error) {
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raw, ok := transferEntries.LoadAndDelete(tok)
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if !ok {
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return nil, errors.New("invalid or already-used transfer token")
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}
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e, _ := raw.(transferEntry)
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// 校验 HMAC：token 形如 id.sig，sig 必须等于 entry 字段在进程 secret 下的
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// HMAC-SHA256。仅靠 sync.Map key 随机性不构成完整性保护——一旦 entry 被
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// 持久化/跨副本共享/从 token 解码，缺这一步即认证绕过。常数时间比较防侧信道。
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idx := strings.LastIndex(tok, ".")
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if idx < 0 {
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return nil, errors.New("malformed transfer token")
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}
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if !hmac.Equal([]byte(tok[idx+1:]), []byte(transferTokenSig(e))) {
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return nil, errors.New("transfer token signature mismatch")
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}
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if e.Direction != dir {
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return nil, errors.New("transfer token direction mismatch")
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}
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if time.Now().After(e.ExpiresAt) {
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return nil, errors.New("transfer token expired")
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}
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return &e, nil
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}
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// PurgeTransferEntries drops every minted-but-unconsumed transfer URL.
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// EnableMCP=false invokes this so an admin pressing the kill switch
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// invalidates the 5–10min trailing window of pre-signed download/upload
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// URLs that consumeTransferToken would otherwise still honor. Returns the
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// number of entries purged for audit.
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func PurgeTransferEntries() int {
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purged := 0
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transferEntries.Range(func(key, _ any) bool {
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if _, ok := transferEntries.LoadAndDelete(key); ok {
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purged++
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}
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return true
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})
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return purged
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}
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// gcExpiredTransferEntries 按 ExpiresAt 删除所有已过期但从未被 consume
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// 的 token。kickoffTransferGC 周期调度它，防止 transferEntries 在没人
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// 触发 kill switch 的情况下随时间无界增长。
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func gcExpiredTransferEntries(now time.Time) int {
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removed := 0
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transferEntries.Range(func(key, raw any) bool {
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e, ok := raw.(transferEntry)
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if !ok {
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transferEntries.Delete(key)
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removed++
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return true
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}
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if now.After(e.ExpiresAt) {
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if _, deleted := transferEntries.LoadAndDelete(key); deleted {
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removed++
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}
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}
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return true
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})
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return removed
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}
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var transferGCStartOnce sync.Once
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// kickoffTransferGC 启动一个进程级 goroutine 定时回收过期 token，
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// 避免每个 dashboard 启动都得 PurgeTransferEntries 才能把表清空。
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// 时间间隔取 transferTokenTTLDefault / 5，对默认 5min TTL 即 1min；
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// 既能在 TTL 内多次扫到过期项，也不会让锁竞争变成热点。
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func kickoffTransferGC() {
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transferGCStartOnce.Do(func() {
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go func() {
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ticker := time.NewTicker(transferTokenTTLDefault / 5)
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defer ticker.Stop()
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for range ticker.C {
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gcExpiredTransferEntries(time.Now())
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}
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}()
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})
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}
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// --- tool: fs.download_url ---
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type fsDownloadURLArgs struct {
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ServerID uint64 `json:"server_id"`
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Path string `json:"path"`
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TTLSeconds int `json:"ttl_seconds,omitempty"`
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}
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// fsUploadURLArgs is the upload-side superset of fsDownloadURLArgs. agent's
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// FsTransferRequest already supports per-upload Mode / CreateDirs /
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// IfMatchSHA256, but fs.upload_url historically reused fsDownloadURLArgs and
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// silently dropped these fields. Splitting the arg shape lets the MCP tool
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// schema advertise them and mintTransferTool plumb them through to
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// transferUploadHandler -> openFsTransferStream.
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type fsUploadURLArgs struct {
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ServerID uint64 `json:"server_id"`
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Path string `json:"path"`
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TTLSeconds int `json:"ttl_seconds,omitempty"`
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Mode string `json:"mode,omitempty"`
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CreateDirs bool `json:"create_dirs,omitempty"`
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IfMatchSHA256 string `json:"if_match_sha256,omitempty"`
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}
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func init() {
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registerMCPTool(&mcpTool{
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Name: "fs.download_url",
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Description: "Mint a one-time signed URL to stream a file (<=100MiB) via plain HTTP GET. Bypasses MCP context and uses gRPC IOStream end-to-end.",
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InputSchema: map[string]any{
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"type": "object",
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"properties": map[string]any{
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"server_id": map[string]any{"type": "integer"},
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"path": map[string]any{"type": "string"},
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"ttl_seconds": map[string]any{"type": "integer", "minimum": 30, "maximum": 600},
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},
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"required": []string{"server_id", "path"},
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},
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RequiredScope: model.ScopeServerRead,
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Handler: handleFsDownloadURL,
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})
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registerMCPTool(&mcpTool{
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Name: "fs.upload_url",
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Description: "Mint a one-time signed URL to stream a file (<=100MiB) via plain HTTP POST. Caller MUST send Content-Length; optional ?sha256=<hex> for end-to-end integrity. mode / create_dirs / if_match_sha256 are forwarded to the agent for atomic chmod / mkdir -p / optimistic concurrency.",
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InputSchema: map[string]any{
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"type": "object",
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"properties": map[string]any{
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"server_id": map[string]any{"type": "integer"},
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"path": map[string]any{"type": "string"},
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"ttl_seconds": map[string]any{"type": "integer", "minimum": 30, "maximum": 600},
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"mode": map[string]any{"type": "string", "description": "Octal mode like '0644'."},
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"create_dirs": map[string]any{"type": "boolean"},
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"if_match_sha256": map[string]any{"type": "string", "description": "64 hex chars; precondition checked by the agent before overwrite."},
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},
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"required": []string{"server_id", "path"},
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},
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RequiredScope: model.ScopeServerWrite,
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Handler: handleFsUploadURL,
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})
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}
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func handleFsDownloadURL(c *gin.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
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var args fsDownloadURLArgs
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if err := decodeToolArgs(raw, &args); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return mintTransferTool(c, args.ServerID, args.Path, args.TTLSeconds, transferDirDownload, transferEntry{})
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}
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func handleFsUploadURL(c *gin.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
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var args fsUploadURLArgs
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if err := decodeToolArgs(raw, &args); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if args.IfMatchSHA256 != "" {
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if _, decErr := hex.DecodeString(args.IfMatchSHA256); decErr != nil || len(args.IfMatchSHA256) != 64 {
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return nil, errMCPInvalidArgs("if_match_sha256 must be 64 hex chars")
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}
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}
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return mintTransferTool(c, args.ServerID, args.Path, args.TTLSeconds, transferDirUpload, transferEntry{
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UploadMode: args.Mode,
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UploadCreateDirs: args.CreateDirs,
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UploadIfMatchSHA256: args.IfMatchSHA256,
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})
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}
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func mintTransferTool(c *gin.Context, serverID uint64, path string, ttlSeconds int, dir transferDirection, uploadExtras transferEntry) (any, error) {
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srv, err := requireServerAccess(c, serverID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if err := requireAgentSupportsMCP(srv); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if err := validateTransferPath(path); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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ttl := time.Duration(ttlSeconds) * time.Second
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if ttl <= 0 {
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ttl = transferTokenTTLDefault
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}
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if ttl > transferTokenTTLMax {
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ttl = transferTokenTTLMax
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}
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tok := APITokenFromContext(c)
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if tok == nil {
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return nil, errNoToken
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}
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uid := uint64(0)
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if u, ok := c.Get(model.CtxKeyAuthorizedUser); ok {
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if user, ok := u.(*model.User); ok && user != nil {
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uid = user.ID
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}
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}
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entry := transferEntry{
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UserID: uid,
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TokenID: tok.ID,
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ServerID: serverID,
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Path: path,
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Direction: dir,
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ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(ttl),
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UploadMode: uploadExtras.UploadMode,
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UploadCreateDirs: uploadExtras.UploadCreateDirs,
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UploadIfMatchSHA256: uploadExtras.UploadIfMatchSHA256,
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}
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t, err := mintTransferToken(entry)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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scheme := "https"
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if c.Request.TLS == nil && c.Request.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto") != "https" {
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scheme = "http"
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}
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host := c.Request.Host
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url := fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s/mcp/%s/%s", scheme, host, dir, t)
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return map[string]any{
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"url": url,
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"method": map[transferDirection]string{transferDirDownload: "GET", transferDirUpload: "POST"}[dir],
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"expires_at": entry.ExpiresAt,
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}, nil
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}
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// --- HTTP handlers ---
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// transferDownloadHandler 处理 GET /mcp/download/:token。
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// 走 IOStream 双向流：dashboard 把 agent 推过来的 chunk 转发给 HTTP 客户端，
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// 单文件 hard cap 100MiB（model.MCPFsTransferMaxSize）。
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// transferRevokableContext 把进行中的传输纳入 PAT 撤销注册表。返回的 ctx 在
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// 该 PAT 被 deleteAPIToken 撤销时取消，从而切断已开始的 upload/download；
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// 否则只在传输自然结束时由 stop() 注销。stop() 必须 defer 调用。
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func transferRevokableContext(c *gin.Context, e *transferEntry) (context.Context, func()) {
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// Cap the whole transfer with a hard deadline. After the agent attaches,
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// the relay blocks in IOStreamWrapper.Read, which only honours this ctx
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// (openFsTransferStream closes the stream on ctx.Done). Without the
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// deadline a stalled or malicious agent that attaches but never sends a
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// complete header/chunk/final frame pins this goroutine, the IOStream and
|
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// the spool tmpfile until the client disconnects, allowing concurrent
|
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// hung transfers to exhaust resources within the rate limit.
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(c.Request.Context(), maxTransferDuration)
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dereg := patConnectionRegistryShared.register(e.TokenID, cancel)
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return ctx, func() {
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dereg()
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cancel()
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}
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}
|
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|
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func transferDownloadHandler(c *gin.Context) {
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tok := c.Param("token")
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entry, err := consumeTransferToken(tok, transferDirDownload)
|
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if err != nil {
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writeTransferFailureAudit(c, nil, "fs.download", classifyTransferConsumeError(err), err)
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c.String(http.StatusUnauthorized, err.Error())
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return
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}
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if err := revalidateTransferEntry(entry); err != nil {
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writeTransferFailureAudit(c, entry, "fs.download", classifyTransferRevalidateError(err), err)
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c.String(http.StatusUnauthorized, err.Error())
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return
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}
|
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|
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ctx, stop := transferRevokableContext(c, entry)
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defer stop()
|
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|
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stream, cleanup, err := openFsTransferStream(ctx, entry.ServerID, &model.FsTransferRequest{
|
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Op: model.MCPFsTransferOpDownload,
|
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Path: entry.Path,
|
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})
|
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if err != nil {
|
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writeTransferFailureAudit(c, entry, "fs.download", classifyTransferOpenStreamError(err), err)
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c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, err.Error())
|
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return
|
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}
|
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defer cleanup()
|
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|
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hdr, err := readXferFixedHeader(stream)
|
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if err != nil {
|
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writeTransferFailureAudit(c, entry, "fs.download", model.MCPOutcomeAgentTimeout, err)
|
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c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, "agent did not return download header: "+err.Error())
|
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return
|
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}
|
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if hdr.IsErr() {
|
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writeTransferFailureAudit(c, entry, "fs.download", model.MCPOutcomeAgentError, errors.New(hdr.ErrMsg))
|
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c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, hdr.ErrMsg)
|
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return
|
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}
|
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if !bytes.Equal(hdr.Magic, model.MCPFsXferMagicDownloadHdr) {
|
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writeTransferFailureAudit(c, entry, "fs.download", model.MCPOutcomeAgentError, errors.New("unexpected header magic"))
|
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c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, "agent returned unexpected header magic")
|
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return
|
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}
|
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if hdr.Size > model.MCPFsTransferMaxSize {
|
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writeTransferFailureAudit(c, entry, "fs.download", model.MCPOutcomeAgentError, errors.New("file exceeds MCP transfer cap"))
|
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c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, "file exceeds MCP transfer cap (100MiB)")
|
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return
|
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}
|
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|
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if err := relayDownloadFrames(c, stream, hdr.Size); err != nil {
|
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writeTransferFailureAudit(c, entry, "fs.download", model.MCPOutcomeAgentError, err)
|
||
return
|
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}
|
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|
||
_ = singleton.DB.Create(&model.MCPAuditLog{
|
||
UserID: entry.UserID,
|
||
TokenID: entry.TokenID,
|
||
Tool: "fs.download",
|
||
ServerID: entry.ServerID,
|
||
Outcome: model.MCPOutcomeOK,
|
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IP: c.GetString(model.CtxKeyRealIPStr),
|
||
}).Error
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// transferUploadHandler 处理 POST /mcp/upload/:token；body 转发到 agent，
|
||
// 单文件 hard cap 100MiB。
|
||
func transferUploadHandler(c *gin.Context) {
|
||
tok := c.Param("token")
|
||
entry, err := consumeTransferToken(tok, transferDirUpload)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
writeTransferFailureAudit(c, nil, "fs.upload", classifyTransferConsumeError(err), err)
|
||
c.String(http.StatusUnauthorized, err.Error())
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
if err := revalidateTransferEntry(entry); err != nil {
|
||
writeTransferFailureAudit(c, entry, "fs.upload", classifyTransferRevalidateError(err), err)
|
||
c.String(http.StatusUnauthorized, err.Error())
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// 1) 体积闸门：Content-Length 必须存在并且不超过 cap。流式上传时这是
|
||
// 唯一能在打开 IOStream 之前就拒掉超大请求的依据，避免 agent 端
|
||
// 拒绝时已经占了一个连接。
|
||
if c.Request.ContentLength < 0 {
|
||
writeTransferFailureAudit(c, entry, "fs.upload", model.MCPOutcomeInvalidArgs, errors.New("Content-Length required"))
|
||
c.String(http.StatusLengthRequired, "Content-Length required")
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
if c.Request.ContentLength > model.MCPFsTransferMaxSize {
|
||
writeTransferFailureAudit(c, entry, "fs.upload", model.MCPOutcomeInvalidArgs, errors.New("body exceeds MCP transfer cap"))
|
||
c.String(http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, "body exceeds MCP transfer cap (100MiB)")
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
size := c.Request.ContentLength
|
||
|
||
// 可选的端到端 sha256：通过 query 参数 sha256=<hex> 传入，agent 收到全部
|
||
// 字节后会比对；不传则只回带 sha 但不强校验。
|
||
expected := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("sha256")))
|
||
if expected != "" {
|
||
if _, decErr := hex.DecodeString(expected); decErr != nil || len(expected) != 64 {
|
||
writeTransferFailureAudit(c, entry, "fs.upload", model.MCPOutcomeInvalidArgs, errors.New("sha256 must be 64 hex chars"))
|
||
c.String(http.StatusBadRequest, "sha256 must be 64 hex chars")
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// 上限再加一个字节做 MaxBytesReader 屏障：若客户端撒谎、实际 body 超过
|
||
// Content-Length，HTTP 层会立即截断并报 413。
|
||
c.Request.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(c.Writer, c.Request.Body, model.MCPFsTransferMaxSize+1)
|
||
|
||
ctx, stop := transferRevokableContext(c, entry)
|
||
defer stop()
|
||
|
||
stream, cleanup, err := openFsTransferStream(ctx, entry.ServerID, &model.FsTransferRequest{
|
||
Op: model.MCPFsTransferOpUpload,
|
||
Path: entry.Path,
|
||
Size: size,
|
||
ExpectedSHA256: expected,
|
||
Mode: entry.UploadMode,
|
||
CreateDirs: entry.UploadCreateDirs,
|
||
IfMatchSHA256: entry.UploadIfMatchSHA256,
|
||
})
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
writeTransferFailureAudit(c, entry, "fs.upload", classifyTransferOpenStreamError(err), err)
|
||
c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, err.Error())
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
defer cleanup()
|
||
|
||
hdr, err := readXferFixedHeader(stream)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
writeTransferFailureAudit(c, entry, "fs.upload", model.MCPOutcomeAgentTimeout, err)
|
||
c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, "agent did not return upload ready frame: "+err.Error())
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
if hdr.IsErr() {
|
||
writeTransferFailureAudit(c, entry, "fs.upload", model.MCPOutcomeAgentError, errors.New(hdr.ErrMsg))
|
||
c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, hdr.ErrMsg)
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
if !bytes.Equal(hdr.Magic, model.MCPFsXferMagicUploadHdr) {
|
||
writeTransferFailureAudit(c, entry, "fs.upload", model.MCPOutcomeAgentError, errors.New("unexpected header magic"))
|
||
c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, "agent returned unexpected header magic")
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
if hdr.Size != size {
|
||
writeTransferFailureAudit(c, entry, "fs.upload", model.MCPOutcomeAgentError, errors.New("agent acknowledged unexpected size"))
|
||
c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, "agent acknowledged unexpected size")
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if _, copyErr := io.CopyN(stream, c.Request.Body, size); copyErr != nil {
|
||
writeTransferFailureAudit(c, entry, "fs.upload", model.MCPOutcomeAgentError, copyErr)
|
||
c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, "stream relay failed: "+copyErr.Error())
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
final, err := readXferFixedHeader(stream)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
writeTransferFailureAudit(c, entry, "fs.upload", model.MCPOutcomeAgentTimeout, err)
|
||
c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, "agent did not acknowledge upload: "+err.Error())
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
if final.IsErr() {
|
||
writeTransferFailureAudit(c, entry, "fs.upload", model.MCPOutcomeAgentError, errors.New(final.ErrMsg))
|
||
c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, final.ErrMsg)
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
if !bytes.Equal(final.Magic, model.MCPFsXferMagicOK) {
|
||
writeTransferFailureAudit(c, entry, "fs.upload", model.MCPOutcomeAgentError, errors.New("unexpected final magic"))
|
||
c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, "agent returned unexpected final magic")
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, model.FsWriteResult{Size: int64(final.Size), SHA256: hex.EncodeToString(final.SHA256)})
|
||
_ = singleton.DB.Create(&model.MCPAuditLog{
|
||
UserID: entry.UserID,
|
||
TokenID: entry.TokenID,
|
||
Tool: "fs.upload",
|
||
ServerID: entry.ServerID,
|
||
Outcome: model.MCPOutcomeOK,
|
||
IP: c.GetString(model.CtxKeyRealIPStr),
|
||
}).Error
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// writeTransferFailureAudit 是 fs.upload / fs.download HTTP handler 失败路径
|
||
// 共用的审计写入。outcome 必须用 model.MCPOutcome* 常量；entry 可以是 nil
|
||
// （token consume 阶段就失败时拿不到 entry，UserID/TokenID/ServerID 写 0）。
|
||
//
|
||
// Anonymous failures (entry == nil) go through transferAnonAuditThrottleShared
|
||
// per-IP sampler so an unauthenticated attacker cannot flood mcp_audit_log
|
||
// by POSTing /mcp/upload/<random>. Authenticated failures bypass the
|
||
// throttle so SIEM signal stays intact.
|
||
func writeTransferFailureAudit(c *gin.Context, entry *transferEntry, tool, outcome string, err error) {
|
||
ip := c.GetString(model.CtxKeyRealIPStr)
|
||
if entry == nil && !transferAnonAuditThrottleShared.shouldRecord(ip) {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
entryLog := model.MCPAuditLog{
|
||
Tool: tool,
|
||
Outcome: outcome,
|
||
IP: ip,
|
||
}
|
||
if entry != nil {
|
||
entryLog.UserID = entry.UserID
|
||
entryLog.TokenID = entry.TokenID
|
||
entryLog.ServerID = entry.ServerID
|
||
}
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
msg := err.Error()
|
||
if len(msg) > 512 {
|
||
msg = msg[:512]
|
||
}
|
||
entryLog.ErrorMsg = msg
|
||
entryLog.ErrorCode = outcome
|
||
}
|
||
mcpAuditWrite(entryLog, nil)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// classifyTransferConsumeError 把 consumeTransferToken 的错误映射成 outcome。
|
||
// 让 SIEM 能区分“伪造/过期 token”与“direction 不匹配”等场景。
|
||
func classifyTransferConsumeError(err error) string {
|
||
if err == nil {
|
||
return model.MCPOutcomeInternalError
|
||
}
|
||
msg := err.Error()
|
||
switch {
|
||
case strings.Contains(msg, "expired"):
|
||
return model.MCPOutcomeScopeDenied
|
||
case strings.Contains(msg, "direction mismatch"):
|
||
return model.MCPOutcomeInvalidArgs
|
||
default:
|
||
return model.MCPOutcomePermDenied
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// classifyTransferRevalidateError 把 revalidateTransferEntry 的错误映射成
|
||
// outcome。最重要的一项是“MCP is disabled” → MCPOutcomeMCPDisabled，让
|
||
// 运营在 audit 表里直接看出 kill switch 命中情况，而不是只看到 perm_denied。
|
||
func classifyTransferRevalidateError(err error) string {
|
||
if err == nil {
|
||
return model.MCPOutcomeInternalError
|
||
}
|
||
msg := err.Error()
|
||
switch {
|
||
case strings.Contains(msg, "MCP is disabled"):
|
||
return model.MCPOutcomeMCPDisabled
|
||
case strings.Contains(msg, "no longer has required scope"):
|
||
return model.MCPOutcomeScopeDenied
|
||
case strings.Contains(msg, "no longer covers"):
|
||
return model.MCPOutcomeScopeDenied
|
||
case strings.Contains(msg, "expired"):
|
||
return model.MCPOutcomeScopeDenied
|
||
default:
|
||
return model.MCPOutcomePermDenied
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// classifyTransferOpenStreamError 把 openFsTransferStream 的失败映射成
|
||
// outcome：offline / 30s attach 超时分别对应 ServerOffline / AgentTimeout。
|
||
func classifyTransferOpenStreamError(err error) string {
|
||
if err == nil {
|
||
return model.MCPOutcomeInternalError
|
||
}
|
||
msg := err.Error()
|
||
switch {
|
||
case strings.Contains(msg, "server offline"):
|
||
return model.MCPOutcomeServerOffline
|
||
case strings.Contains(msg, "did not attach"):
|
||
return model.MCPOutcomeAgentTimeout
|
||
default:
|
||
return model.MCPOutcomeAgentError
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// frameReceiver is the frame-preserving subset of grpcx.IOStreamWrapper that
|
||
// the download relay needs. We accept the interface (not the concrete type)
|
||
// so test simulators can plug in a net.Pipe-backed stream without depending
|
||
// on the gRPC stack.
|
||
type frameReceiver interface {
|
||
RecvFrame() ([]byte, error)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// relayDownloadFrames forwards declared-size payload from agent to HTTP
|
||
// client. The agent wraps every data chunk in an NZTC frame (4-byte magic +
|
||
// 8-byte big-endian length + payload) so payload that happens to begin with
|
||
// the same bytes as a control frame (NZTE / NZTO) cannot be misclassified.
|
||
// Control frames (NZTE error, NZTO success) sit on the same IOStream and
|
||
// are recognized by their magic; legitimate payload always arrives inside
|
||
// NZTC frames and is never matched against the control-frame magics.
|
||
//
|
||
// Payload is spooled to a per-request tmpfile rather than kept in a 100MiB
|
||
// memory buffer: a midstream NZTE must be able to switch the HTTP response
|
||
// to 502, which forces us to defer the body write until the final NZTO
|
||
// frame is observed; but we MUST NOT pay 100MiB of heap per concurrent
|
||
// download to do so.
|
||
func relayDownloadFrames(c *gin.Context, stream io.ReadWriteCloser, size int64) error {
|
||
spool, err := newTransferSpool()
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
c.String(http.StatusInternalServerError, "transfer spool: "+err.Error())
|
||
return err
|
||
}
|
||
defer spool.Close()
|
||
|
||
// Hash the relayed bytes inline; we compare against the trailing
|
||
// NZTO declared sha256 in validateDownloadFinal so corrupt or
|
||
// truncated agent payloads can't reach the client.
|
||
hasher := sha256.New()
|
||
streamed := int64(0)
|
||
|
||
remaining := size
|
||
header := make([]byte, 4+8)
|
||
for remaining > 0 {
|
||
if _, err := io.ReadFull(stream, header); err != nil {
|
||
c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, "stream relay failed: "+err.Error())
|
||
return err
|
||
}
|
||
if bytes.HasPrefix(header, model.MCPFsXferMagicErr) {
|
||
msg := readMidstreamErrMsg(stream, header)
|
||
c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, msg)
|
||
return errMCPMidstreamAbort
|
||
}
|
||
if !bytes.HasPrefix(header, model.MCPFsXferMagicChunk) {
|
||
c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, "stream relay failed: expected NZTC chunk frame")
|
||
return errMCPMidstreamAbort
|
||
}
|
||
chunkLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(header[4:12])
|
||
if chunkLen == 0 {
|
||
// A zero-length data frame makes no progress toward `remaining`.
|
||
// Treating it as a no-op `continue` lets a malicious or buggy
|
||
// agent stream an unbounded run of zero-length NZTC frames,
|
||
// pinning this goroutine, the gRPC stream and the spool tmpfile
|
||
// forever (the final NZTO is never reached). Reject it: a real
|
||
// transfer that still owes bytes never needs an empty data frame.
|
||
c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, "stream relay failed: zero-length data frame while payload incomplete")
|
||
return errMCPMidstreamAbort
|
||
}
|
||
if int64(chunkLen) > remaining {
|
||
c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, "agent oversent: more data bytes than declared size")
|
||
return errMCPMidstreamAbort
|
||
}
|
||
n, err := io.CopyN(io.MultiWriter(spool, hasher), stream, int64(chunkLen))
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, "stream relay failed: "+err.Error())
|
||
return err
|
||
}
|
||
streamed += n
|
||
remaining -= n
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
final := make([]byte, 4+8+32)
|
||
if _, err := io.ReadFull(stream, final); err != nil {
|
||
c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, "agent did not send final transfer frame: "+err.Error())
|
||
return errMCPMidstreamAbort
|
||
}
|
||
if bytes.HasPrefix(final, model.MCPFsXferMagicErr) {
|
||
msg := readMidstreamErrMsg(stream, final[:4+8])
|
||
c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, msg)
|
||
return errMCPMidstreamAbort
|
||
}
|
||
if err := validateDownloadFinal(final, streamed, hasher.Sum(nil)); err != nil {
|
||
c.String(http.StatusBadGateway, err.Error())
|
||
return errMCPMidstreamAbort
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if err := spool.Rewind(); err != nil {
|
||
c.String(http.StatusInternalServerError, "transfer spool rewind: "+err.Error())
|
||
return err
|
||
}
|
||
c.Header("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
|
||
c.Header("Content-Length", strconv.FormatInt(size, 10))
|
||
if _, writeErr := io.Copy(c.Writer, spool); writeErr != nil {
|
||
return writeErr
|
||
}
|
||
return nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// validateDownloadFinal cross-checks the trailing NZTO frame against the
|
||
// payload the dashboard actually relayed:
|
||
// - magic must be NZTO (defence-in-depth; the relay already checked).
|
||
// - frame must be the full 44 bytes (magic 4 + size 8 + sha256 32).
|
||
// - declared size must match streamed byte count exactly.
|
||
// - declared sha256 must match the streamed sha256, with one allowed
|
||
// "explicit skip" form: all-zero declared hash means agent could not
|
||
// compute a hash and we accept the size-only check.
|
||
//
|
||
// Without this gate a truncated or wrong-hash NZTO is silently accepted
|
||
// and the dashboard serves possibly-corrupt bytes to the HTTP client.
|
||
func validateDownloadFinal(final []byte, streamedSize int64, streamedSHA256 []byte) error {
|
||
if len(final) < 4 || !bytes.Equal(final[:4], model.MCPFsXferMagicOK) {
|
||
return errors.New("download final frame: unexpected magic")
|
||
}
|
||
if len(final) < 4+8+32 {
|
||
return errors.New("download final frame: truncated header (need size + sha256)")
|
||
}
|
||
declaredSize := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(final[4:12])
|
||
if uint64(streamedSize) != declaredSize {
|
||
return errors.New("download final frame: declared size does not match streamed bytes")
|
||
}
|
||
declaredSHA := final[12:44]
|
||
allZero := true
|
||
for _, b := range declaredSHA {
|
||
if b != 0 {
|
||
allZero = false
|
||
break
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
if allZero {
|
||
return nil
|
||
}
|
||
if len(streamedSHA256) < 32 {
|
||
return errors.New("download final frame: streamed sha256 too short to compare")
|
||
}
|
||
if !bytes.Equal(declaredSHA, streamedSHA256[:32]) {
|
||
return errors.New("download final frame: declared sha256 does not match streamed bytes")
|
||
}
|
||
return nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// midstreamErrMsgCap 限制错误帧 payload 的累计读取量。错误消息只作 string
|
||
// 用，没有上限的话恶意/有 bug 的 agent 可在 NZTE 后持续发 256 字节块（且不
|
||
// 关流），让 dashboard goroutine 内存无界增长或永久阻塞。读满 cap 即停止。
|
||
const midstreamErrMsgCap = 8 << 10
|
||
|
||
func readMidstreamErrMsg(stream io.Reader, header []byte) string {
|
||
rest := make([]byte, 0, 256)
|
||
tail := make([]byte, 256)
|
||
for len(rest) < midstreamErrMsgCap {
|
||
n, err := stream.Read(tail)
|
||
if n > 0 {
|
||
room := midstreamErrMsgCap - len(rest)
|
||
if n > room {
|
||
n = room
|
||
}
|
||
rest = append(rest, tail[:n]...)
|
||
}
|
||
if err != nil || n < len(tail) {
|
||
break
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
return string(header[len(model.MCPFsXferMagicErr):]) + string(rest)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
var errMCPMidstreamAbort = errors.New("mcp transfer: aborted mid-stream by agent")
|
||
|
||
// fsTransferXferHeader 是 dashboard 解析 NZTU/NZTD/NZTO/NZTE 后得到的统一
|
||
// 结构。Magic 与 model.MCPFsXferMagic* 对照判断帧类型。
|
||
type fsTransferXferHeader struct {
|
||
Magic []byte
|
||
Size int64
|
||
SHA256 []byte
|
||
ErrMsg string
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (h *fsTransferXferHeader) IsErr() bool {
|
||
return bytes.Equal(h.Magic, model.MCPFsXferMagicErr)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// readXferFixedHeader 读取一帧 IOStream 数据并解析。每条 agent 控制帧都在
|
||
// 单条 IOStreamData 内完整发送（agent 端用 stream.Send(buf) 整块写），所以
|
||
// 一次 8KiB 缓冲即可拿到完整帧；不需要跨帧拼接。
|
||
//
|
||
// 心跳帧（空 Data）由 agent 那侧的 ioStreamKeepAlive 周期性下发，io.Read
|
||
// 不会暴露空读，因此这里不必特殊跳过。
|
||
func readXferFixedHeader(stream io.Reader) (*fsTransferXferHeader, error) {
|
||
buf := make([]byte, 4+8+32+512)
|
||
n, err := stream.Read(buf)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
return readXferFixedHeaderFromBytes(buf[:n])
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// readXferFixedHeaderFromBytes parses a fully-received transfer control
|
||
// frame. Extracted so a malicious-input regression suite can pin the
|
||
// uint64→int64 overflow gate: raw u64 size > MCPFsTransferMaxSize or
|
||
// > MaxInt64 must be rejected BEFORE narrowing, otherwise the cap check
|
||
// later in the handler sees a wrapped negative value and lets the
|
||
// transfer through.
|
||
func readXferFixedHeaderFromBytes(raw []byte) (*fsTransferXferHeader, error) {
|
||
if len(raw) < 4 {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("frame too short")
|
||
}
|
||
magic := raw[:4]
|
||
out := &fsTransferXferHeader{Magic: append([]byte(nil), magic...)}
|
||
switch {
|
||
case bytes.Equal(magic, model.MCPFsXferMagicErr):
|
||
out.ErrMsg = string(raw[4:])
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
case bytes.Equal(magic, model.MCPFsXferMagicUploadHdr):
|
||
if len(raw) < 4+8 {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("upload header too short")
|
||
}
|
||
size, err := xferSizeFromU64(binary.BigEndian.Uint64(raw[4:12]))
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
out.Size = size
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
case bytes.Equal(magic, model.MCPFsXferMagicDownloadHdr):
|
||
if len(raw) < 4+8+32 {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("download header too short")
|
||
}
|
||
size, err := xferSizeFromU64(binary.BigEndian.Uint64(raw[4:12]))
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
out.Size = size
|
||
out.SHA256 = append([]byte(nil), raw[12:44]...)
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
case bytes.Equal(magic, model.MCPFsXferMagicOK):
|
||
if len(raw) < 4+8+32 {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("ok header too short")
|
||
}
|
||
size, err := xferSizeFromU64(binary.BigEndian.Uint64(raw[4:12]))
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
out.Size = size
|
||
out.SHA256 = append([]byte(nil), raw[12:44]...)
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
default:
|
||
return nil, errors.New("unexpected frame magic")
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// xferSizeFromU64 caps the raw u64 size carried by an NZTU/NZTD/NZTO frame
|
||
// at MCPFsTransferMaxSize AND math.MaxInt64. Both bounds matter: the cap
|
||
// keeps the protocol invariant, the MaxInt64 floor keeps later int64
|
||
// arithmetic safe even if MCPFsTransferMaxSize is ever raised above
|
||
// MaxInt64 by accident.
|
||
func xferSizeFromU64(raw uint64) (int64, error) {
|
||
if raw > uint64(model.MCPFsTransferMaxSize) {
|
||
return 0, errors.New("declared size exceeds MCP transfer cap")
|
||
}
|
||
if raw > math.MaxInt64 {
|
||
return 0, errors.New("declared size overflows int64")
|
||
}
|
||
return int64(raw), nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// openFsTransferStream 走 IOStream 通道与目标 agent 建立一条专用大文件流。
|
||
// 返回的 io.ReadWriteCloser 既能 Read（接收 agent→dashboard 字节）又能 Write
|
||
// （发送 dashboard→agent 字节）；调用方通过 readXferFixedHeader 解析控制帧。
|
||
//
|
||
// 内部步骤：
|
||
// 1. 分配 streamId，CreateStream(streamId, 0, serverID) 在 NezhaHandler 注册
|
||
// 一个 ioStreamContext，targetServerID 用于 agent 侧 stream 归属校验。
|
||
// 2. 通过 server 当前的 RequestTask 流发 TaskTypeFsTransfer，把 streamId +
|
||
// req JSON 下发给 agent。
|
||
// 3. 等 agent 通过 IOStream() RPC 完成 magic 引导帧并 AgentConnected。
|
||
// 4. 返回 agent 端流和 cleanup（CloseStream）。
|
||
//
|
||
// 任何步骤失败都会 CloseStream 释放资源；调用方只需在 defer cleanup() 即可。
|
||
func openFsTransferStream(ctx context.Context, serverID uint64, req *model.FsTransferRequest) (io.ReadWriteCloser, func(), error) {
|
||
if singleton.Conf == nil || !singleton.Conf.MCPEnabled() {
|
||
return nil, func() {}, errors.New("MCP is disabled by the dashboard administrator")
|
||
}
|
||
server, _ := singleton.ServerShared.Get(serverID)
|
||
if server == nil {
|
||
return nil, func() {}, errors.New("server offline")
|
||
}
|
||
if server.GetTaskStream() == nil {
|
||
return nil, func() {}, errors.New("server offline")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
streamId, err := uuid.GenerateUUID()
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, func() {}, err
|
||
}
|
||
req.StreamID = streamId
|
||
|
||
rpc.NezhaHandlerSingleton.CreateStreamWithPurpose(streamId, 0, serverID, rpc.PurposeMCPTransfer)
|
||
cleanup := func() { _ = rpc.NezhaHandlerSingleton.CloseStream(streamId) }
|
||
|
||
body, err := json.Marshal(req)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
cleanup()
|
||
return nil, func() {}, err
|
||
}
|
||
// 关闭 entry-check 与 SendTask 之间的 TOCTOU：stream 已注册后再复查一次
|
||
// kill switch / ctx 取消，确保 disable sweep 要么扫到这条已注册 stream、
|
||
// 要么这里读到 disabled，绝不会在禁用/吊销后仍把 transfer 任务发给 agent。
|
||
if singleton.Conf == nil || !singleton.Conf.MCPEnabled() {
|
||
cleanup()
|
||
return nil, func() {}, errors.New("MCP is disabled by the dashboard administrator")
|
||
}
|
||
if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
|
||
cleanup()
|
||
return nil, func() {}, err
|
||
}
|
||
if err := server.SendTask(&pb.Task{
|
||
Type: model.TaskTypeFsTransfer,
|
||
Data: string(body),
|
||
}); err != nil {
|
||
cleanup()
|
||
if errors.Is(err, model.ErrTaskStreamOffline) {
|
||
return nil, func() {}, errors.New("server offline")
|
||
}
|
||
return nil, func() {}, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
agentStream, ok := rpc.NezhaHandlerSingleton.WaitForAgent(ctx, streamId, 30*time.Second)
|
||
if !ok {
|
||
cleanup()
|
||
return nil, func() {}, errors.New("agent did not attach within 30s")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// After attach, the relay blocks in IOStreamWrapper.Read, which only
|
||
// honours the gRPC stream context — not this per-transfer ctx. Without
|
||
// the watcher below, a PAT revocation (deleteAPIToken cancels ctx) or a
|
||
// client disconnect would leave a stalled/compromised agent pinning this
|
||
// goroutine + IOStream until process restart. Closing the stream on
|
||
// ctx.Done() unblocks the agent-side handler (iw.Wait) so Read returns.
|
||
watcherDone := make(chan struct{})
|
||
go func() {
|
||
select {
|
||
case <-ctx.Done():
|
||
_ = rpc.NezhaHandlerSingleton.CloseStream(streamId)
|
||
case <-watcherDone:
|
||
}
|
||
}()
|
||
wrappedCleanup := func() {
|
||
close(watcherDone)
|
||
cleanup()
|
||
}
|
||
return agentStream, wrappedCleanup, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// revalidateTransferEntry 在消费一次性 URL 时重新检查 mint 阶段的全部前置。
|
||
// 这是 mint→consume 之间发生权限变化（PAT 吊销、scope/whitelist 收紧、
|
||
// server 转手）时的兜底闸门：HMAC 签发与 sync.Map 一次性消费机制本身只能
|
||
// 防伪造与防重放，无法感知后端状态。
|
||
func revalidateTransferEntry(e *transferEntry) error {
|
||
if singleton.Conf == nil || !singleton.Conf.MCPEnabled() {
|
||
return errors.New("MCP is disabled by the dashboard administrator")
|
||
}
|
||
var tok model.APIToken
|
||
if err := singleton.DB.First(&tok, e.TokenID).Error; err != nil {
|
||
return errors.New("originating api token no longer exists")
|
||
}
|
||
// Bind the reloaded token back to the minting user. If the original PAT
|
||
// was deleted and its numeric primary key reused by a different user's
|
||
// token, the row would still load here; without this check the stale
|
||
// one-time URL would be revalidated against an unrelated token.
|
||
if tok.UserID != e.UserID {
|
||
return errors.New("originating api token no longer exists")
|
||
}
|
||
if tok.IsExpired(time.Now()) {
|
||
return errors.New("originating api token expired")
|
||
}
|
||
wantScope := model.ScopeServerRead
|
||
if e.Direction == transferDirUpload {
|
||
wantScope = model.ScopeServerWrite
|
||
}
|
||
if !tok.HasScope(wantScope) {
|
||
return errors.New("originating api token no longer has required scope")
|
||
}
|
||
if !tok.CanAccessServer(e.ServerID) {
|
||
return errors.New("originating api token no longer covers target server")
|
||
}
|
||
srv, _ := singleton.ServerShared.Get(e.ServerID)
|
||
if srv == nil {
|
||
return errors.New("target server no longer exists")
|
||
}
|
||
var user model.User
|
||
if err := singleton.DB.First(&user, e.UserID).Error; err != nil {
|
||
return errors.New("originating user no longer exists")
|
||
}
|
||
if user.Role != model.RoleAdmin && srv.GetUserID() != e.UserID {
|
||
return errors.New("target server is no longer owned by the originating user")
|
||
}
|
||
return nil
|
||
}
|